Michelson, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a former US Army colonel with over 30 years of service in airborne and special operations units, said: “The idea of ‘cutting and running’ completely is a disaster,” but added “I think we’re in a time of recalibration right now, and that’s okay.”
In a Q&A with CEPA, Michelson discussed the strategic, logistical, and symbolic importance of forward basing, how adversaries might interpret a US drawdown from Europe, and the broader risks such a move could entail.
CEPA: From your experience, which US bases in Europe are most critical to military operations, both on and beyond the continent?
Michelson: I would say it’s less about specific bases and more about strategic capabilities. This includes force projection bases, training bases, and the headquarters. Headquarters are important because that’s a coordinated function with other militaries. Training bases are key because that’s where we train both our own but also foreign militaries. These two are important because in any conflict in Europe, I cannot imagine the US acting alone. Then there’s also the force projection concerns, that’s why having all the major air bases is important.
CEPA: Operationally, what could be lost if big bases such as Rota, Souda Bay, or Sigonella were closed?
Michelson: If you deactivate big bases, they can’t just be instantly reactivated. There’s significant infrastructure and lead times involved. War is not only about the troops with the guns, aircraft, and naval forces, but it’s also about the logistics that fall underneath that. Logistics capabilities are the bigger part. Napoleon quipped that tactics are for amateurs, logistics are for the pros.
If you don’t have forward basing, if you don’t have the ability to project by air and sea into places, and then eventually continental rail, everything gets exponentially harder. If you’re trying to fly everything into a new base and in a new location and there’s no infrastructure, that process takes a lot longer. It dramatically reduces the speed at which you’re able to act at an operational and strategic level. If we telegraph our punch with a slow logistical build up, the enemy will be watching what we’re doing, and go, ‘Oh, this is great, we’ve got plenty of time to react to this.’ We always want to act with a speed that allows us to get inside the enemy’s decision loop and act faster than they can. The logistics piece of that is, I believe, a critical part of it.
The logistics bases are critical, both for sea and air. It’s not just access to the air bases, because you can only fly so much in. You can fly the wings off our planes and still not get it all there. The ability to move a ship into the harbor and offload is a key part of that, too.
CEPA: What is the importance of forward-deployed forces on the Eastern flank for a broader US strategic security objective?
Michelson: America’s forward-deployed forces, it’s a couple of different things. Number one, it’s a statement of intent and of commitment. Because the most important things to a nation are its blood and treasure. Where a nation puts this at risk is a clear statement of intent and commitment
Secondly, it has an effect on our ability to work with allies, and them with us. I think it helps training, interoperability and military effectiveness, because it allows us to learn about allies and how they operate. We operate a little differently than some of them. Those relationships were probably a lot better during the Cold War, when everybody was a lot more serious about it. Until the Russo-Ukrainian War lit off, it was possible to just mail it in. I think that there has been a big difference between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. On the Eastern flank, I had a chance to meet with a bunch of the attachés, and they are a far more serious group than the ones in the West. They are far more focused and far more interested in real business. I found the Poles, and Baltic countries to be especially serious. It’s a different perspective depending on how close you live to the bear.
Thirdly, there’s deterrence in forward deployment. If you cross a line and you kill an American, you’ve just changed dramatically the geo-political calculus of a decision for somebody, as well as our president.
CEPA: Are there specific strategic or geographical advantages to having US bases in Europe in comparison to the Pacific theater or in the Middle East?
Michelson: I think there are, but the question is how many and how much do we need, what is prudent in light of limited resources and focus on the Pacific theater? Bases cost money, time, effort, troops, etc., and how much is that worth? I’m a big believer that maintaining capability, if you can do it wisely, is always a good thing. We should also work to maintain relationships. We’ve got so many partners, and there’s a lot of value in holding onto those relationships, they’re important. The idea of ‘cutting and running’ completely is a disaster for everyone involved: Europe, NATO, and America. But I think we’re in a time of recalibration right now, and that’s okay. My hope is that it won’t be too big of a swing.
CEPA: How would China and Russia interpret a significant US drawdown from Europe?
Michelson: One, they’re going to view it as a threat because it’s an indicator that the Americans are getting serious about Asia. If I was the Chinese, I’d be like, ‘Hey, keep as much as you can in Europe. You need to keep it all there.’ The Russians, of course, are like, ‘Get it all out. Send it to Asia.’ Interesting dynamic there, right?
But the reality is, it’s both a threat for China and an opportunity for Russia. An over-divestment of our European basing would likely, and reasonably, indicate that the Americans are softening on Europe. While it is a broad generalization, by and large, most NATO nations that aren’t on the Eastern flank of NATO have underinvested in their military for decades and now no longer have the ability to respond effectively. This is apparent in the amount of handwringing we now see. Even if there was political will to act, there may not be the capability to do so. I’m big on Slava Ukraini, but if Ukraine is in the back door of Europe and an ocean away from us, why is America providing so much to the effort as compared to Europe? Why are the nations of Europe so unable to provide a militarily credible threat of a counterpunch or anything of this nature?
There has been a lot of talk about, ‘Oh, we’re going to rearm’ and all that. I’ve heard this before. We’ll see what really happens. We’ll see if in the next set of European elections, people just talk about it or they actually do it. It goes back to ‘show me the money,’ that famous line from Jerry Maguire. And also to ‘show me the deployments’. When there are more NATO soldiers on the Eastern flank, that’s when people will get serious. I think Russia is going to look at this as an opportunity to see whether the Europeans are going to step up or not.
CEPA: As defense priorities shift towards the Indo-Pacific, how do you see the role of US bases in Europe evolving?
Michelson: I think it’s hard to say at this point. I expect that it’s going to evolve, but also I think it would be unwise to disinvest from some of the key critical bases and infrastructures that we have, because you’ve got to plan for the unexpected.
It’s like car insurance. You don’t need it until you do. Then when you do, you’re either going to say, ‘I’m glad I bought good insurance,’ or ‘I wish I’d bought good insurance.’ That’s the kind of moment we have to plan for and why I look as some of the basing capabilities as an insurance policy.
What happens, for instance, if Russia were to invade Poland, Latvia, or another NATO country? Those bases are going to be pretty important then. What I would like to see is that we at least maintain the key structures there. Essentially, I view it as buying down future risk at the operational and strategic levels of war. I’m hoping that that’s how it’s viewed.
Interview conducted by Mila Tanghe of CEPA’s editorial staff.
Mila Tanghe attended Columbia University and is currently an Intern with the Editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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