Europe’s defense procurement policies aren’t working. So says Italy’s former premier Mario Draghi in a major report written for the European Commission on the state of the continent’s economic competitiveness.
He presents a laundry list of challenges facing the European defense industrial base, but there is one complaint that stands out: European Union (EU) countries buy too much military equipment from the United States and not enough from their fellow Europeans.
This is not an uncommon sentiment in Europe; I encounter it frequently in my own interactions with peers across the Atlantic. It is not a point without merit either, as a majority of European defense procurement spending does in fact go to the United States. Why is this the case though?
While Draghi pays lip service in a footnote to a tired old theory that the US has full access to the European market while denying European firms access to Department of Defense tenders, he goes on to identify several key causes of European defense dollars going to the US:
- Much of Europe lacks an equivalent to the US Foreign Military Sales program, which makes defense acquisitions significantly easier for smaller countries;
- Weak awareness of what products are available from European suppliers;
- US-made defense systems have a superior reputation, and
- Desired interoperability with the US military.
Most importantly, though, he notes that Europe does not have many categories of equipment on offer. “Strategic airlifters, heavy utility helicopters, long-range missile defense interceptors, 5th generation combat aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)” are the examples cited in evidence of this. These are, of course, both key capabilities and major drivers of procurement budgets. The F-35 fighter jet and Patriot air and missile-defense system are big ticket items that numerous European states are queuing to buy. Even before the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these were highly desirable assets; the war has reinforced just how essential they are.
Missing from the list is the single most important capability of all, though: long-range strike missiles. As capable as Patriot is, Russia’s unrelenting bombardment of Ukraine has demonstrated the futility of trying to “play catch” in perpetuity without being able to strike back.
Air and missile defense exists to protect your own counterstrike capabilities and enable the destruction of the enemy’s offensive weapons. Ukraine continues to plead for additional long-range missiles and permission to strike Russia on its home turf, but European leaders have seemingly not appreciated this. There is no European equivalent to the American ATACMS ballistic missile system and no apparent desire to develop one. Europe has cruise missiles and is developing more, but seemingly struggles to do this and resume production of the Storm Shadow/Scalp-EG missiles handed to Ukraine by the UK and France.
European missile multinational MBDA has shuttered almost all its cruise missile production capacity and, anyway, only produced hundreds of missiles for the UK and France. MBDA Germany’s Taurus KEPD 350 has not been built since 2020, and the Bundeswehr can’t even get money to restart the half-completed service life extension of their existing inventory.
MBDA UK shut down Storm Shadow production years ago and only maintains the capacity to refurbish the RAF’s own diminishing inventory (although the UK and others last year tendered for Storm Shadow-type missiles with four other European countries.) MBDA France has been kept alive thanks to a more recent order for a new Scalp-EG from Greece. Without new contracts for additional missiles, MBDA stands to have its institutional capacity depleted even further.
The UK, France, and Italy have partnered on the development of a new missile, the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon, but it is not expected to enter service for another four years at a minimum. In comparison, the United States has continuously produced thousands of its more capable JASSM cruise missiles while simultaneously developing new, improved variants, which are then cut into the production line.
For prospective customers looking for a cruise missile, the choice is obvious. JASSM offers an always hot production line and the best price. MBDA offers missiles that were only procured in modest quantities and not deemed important enough to justify keeping in production. Though by no means poorly performing, if Britain and France won’t buy more of their own missiles, why would anyone else?
Though Europe does have some other firms in the missile space, such as Norway’s Kongsberg with its Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and Joint Strike Missile (JSM) and Sweden’s Saab with RBS 15, these are not in the same capability class as JASSM or MBDA’s portfolio. Though competition is important, the fragmentation of Europe’s defense industry is a major limitation.
MBDA, in theory, should help resolve this problem, but in practice, we still find that each national division is offering its own missile. This disperses potential sale revenue and prevents economies of scale. Differing procurement priorities across the continent similarly eliminate potential buying power and result in each country procuring a small number of boutique systems at a high cost.
There is no better example of this than France’s plan to replace its current fleet of American M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System with a new domestic design. They intend to spend €600m ($666m) to develop and procure 13 systems by 2030, with a long-term goal of 26 by 2035. By that time, Lockheed Martin will have equipped much of the free world with M142 HIMARS, which is a superior capability at a fraction of the price.
The French may feel their policy works for them, but it doesn’t for the rest of Europe. The way forward is demonstrated by Germany’s Rheinmetall — seeing the success of HIMARS and the US Army’s MLRS Family of Munitions (GMLRS, ATACMS), they have partnered with Lockheed to offer a made-in-Europe variant: the GMARS. This gives Europe the best of both worlds: a domestically produced system that is still combat-proven, and interoperable with the US and much of NATO.
If Europe tries to outcompete the US, they will lose. Partnerships like this are the best way that they can rebuild their defense industrial base, and that’s good for both Europe and the United States.
Colby Badhwar is a security columnist for The Insider, a Russia-focused, independent media outlet. He writes on global security issues, with an emphasis on armaments and the arms trade. He is a founding member of Tochnyi, a collaborative project covering the War in Ukraine with a weekly podcast, where his research and analysis can be heard. He resides in Toronto, Canada.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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