Before President Joe Biden leaves office on January 20, one of his final decisions could be to designate Ukraine as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). It would bring long-term security benefits and, while other countries with this status are blocked from alliance membership due to geography, it won’t necessarily be an obstacle to Kyiv’s eventual alliance integration.
The President must notify Congress 30 days before granting the status, but it cannot block the designation unless voted on by both chambers. To grant such status, he will need to notify Congress by mid-December.
If approved, it would add Ukraine to a list of 19 countries, including Australia, Brazil, Israel, and Japan, and would have a range of positive consequences.
Kyiv would qualify for the highest possible priority for receiving excess US defense equipment at cut prices. The cost of excess military and civilian equipment sold under the program ranges from 5% to 50% of the original value.
It would also be able to participate in joint scientific research, which is critically important to the development of its defense industry. State-owned enterprises, primarily those under the umbrella of Ukroboronprom, would be able to work alongside private companies and US manufacturers to improve the quality of their products and create new armaments.
Crucially, Ukraine would gain the right to store US military and civilian equipment on its territory. While Kyiv would not be able to use it immediately, the President could transfer equipment for temporary use, or sell it after an eventual ceasefire.
As a result, in the event of renewed conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, the transfer of weapons would require only the US President’s signature and some other straightforward legal requirements, without the need for time-consuming logistics.
As an MNNA, Ukraine would also be able to purchase high-tech ammunition containing depleted uranium, which could be used against Russian armored vehicles and tanks.
Kyiv would be able to sign joint training agreements on a bilateral or multilateral basis, which could significantly increase the combat capability of its forces and demonstrate continuing support by the US.
If Ukraine is designated MNNA status, its companies would be able to compete for contracts for the maintenance and repair of US military equipment, gaining experience, which would be useful for the current war and any future conflict with Russia.
The opportunity to participate in developing explosive detection equipment with the US would help reduce casualties on the frontline, demine areas after the conflict, and help prevent terrorist attacks.
A downside for Kyiv is that President-elect Donald Trump could remove Ukraine from the list of MNNA states through an executive order. While he pledged to end the conflict promptly, he did not provide a clear vision of how he plans to achieve this goal.
Even so, MNNA may be a convenient tool for President Trump to keep supporting Ukraine while making it pay for its military supplies, especially if Congress keeps providing Kyiv with financial assistance, and the European Union (EU) takes a larger stake in financing Ukraine’s military.
And the benefits would flow both ways. Cooperation in defense production and research — drawing on Ukraine’s hot war experience — could also be highly beneficial for US manufacturers.
Of course, Russia would denounce the decision, and yet it might be quietly content to accept this rather than full-scale NATO membership, especially if it forms part of a compromise ceasefire agreement (though it might equally provide another reason for the Kremlin to block a settlement, given Putin’s ambition to have Ukraine as poorly armed and vulnerable as possible.)
Nonetheless, with NATO membership prospects seemingly bleak for Ukraine, it will need something that goes beyond the current level of cooperation.
The designation of Kyiv as a Major Non-NATO Ally would not be just a symbolic move, it would lay the foundation for the security guarantees Ukraine desperately needs.
There’s even a good chance that MNNA status might strengthen Ukraine enough to deter Russia from launching another assault at all.
Andrii Vdovychenko is an emerging expert in international security. He is pursuing a Master’s in International Security and Development and holds a Bachelor’s from Jagiellonian University. His research focuses on emerging technologies and strategic studies.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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