Contrary to expectations that young people will be more forward-looking than their elders, evidence from Bulgaria shows its young people have no greater affection for democracy, social tolerance, or pro-Western attitudes than the rest of society.
These tendencies are mirrored in other Central and Eastern European countries, where millennials and Generation Z are politically alienated, inclined to autocratic leadership, and susceptible to pro-Russian disinformation.
The lack of sustained progress towards “more democracy and Europeanism” among the young, after more than 30 years of transition from communism, requires both diagnosis and remedies to buttress a democratic Euro-Atlantic future.
In Bulgaria, public opinion research has pointed to lukewarm support for democracy among respondents in the 18-24 age group, more than half of whom would prefer a strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with Parliament and elections.
Nationalist sentiments are also gaining ground, with 18 to 24 and 25 to 34-year-olds less likely than other age groups to see a threat to national identity and values from far-right nationalist groups. Just 32% of 18 to 24-year-olds and 37% of 25 to 34-year-olds see the far-right as a threat.
Conversely, attachment to international arrangements, primarily embodied by the European Union (EU), has declined. An overwhelming 71%of 18-34 year-olds think the EU “dictates to Bulgaria.”
Bulgaria’s young people also equivocate in their condemnation of Russia’s war with Ukraine, with almost 40% blaming the victim for inciting the war. Focus groups with Bulgarians aged 18 to 29 reveal a strong view that there is a pro-Ukrainian bias in the media, even as objective research shows pro-Kremlin disinformation is rife.
A similar picture is replicated in other Central and Eastern European states. Political alienation, voting abstention, and nationalist-authoritarian proclivities are increasingly becoming a feature of young people’s behavior in the region, especially in countries that have experienced authoritarianism.
In Hungary, for example, Viktor Orbán’s political dominance and media influencing (specifically directed at young people) have fostered a socio-political environment that favors traditionalist and pro-Kremlin positions.
Even if young Hungarians don’t vote for the governing Fidesz party, surveys of under-30s show they are most likely to side with far-right opposition forces such as Our Homeland.
In Serbia, young people don’t deviate significantly from their older counterparts on nationalism or authoritarianism. A poll found only 36% of young Serbs have a positive attitude toward democracy, while 40% prefer the continued maintenance of a “balanced” foreign policy between East and West. Just 13% want a decisive alignment with the EU and NATO.
How can we begin to make sense of these understudied strands in youth attitudes that seem inimical to democracy and the West?
For one, unreformed and politically instrumentalized education systems can pass ideological stereotypes and regime-friendly interpretations from generation to generation.
A report by the Institute for Global Analytics found school history textbooks used in Bulgaria perpetuate distorted, Kremlin-friendly interpretations of the past, which socialize students into a pro-Russian mindset.
In Hungary, Orbán’s nationalist-traditionalist agenda has been promoted through the centralization of school education, patriotic curricula, and the imposition of political control over universities.
Pro-Russian disinformation on social media also plays a major role in shaping the attitudes of young people, who may lack the skills to judge the reliability of information online, despite their digital savviness.
According to Eurostat data, using social media is a preferred activity for 84% of all young respondents. And the rates of social media use among youth in CEE are higher than in a number of Western European states, including Germany, France, and Italy.
The phenomenon of social media influencing can lead to simplified, conformist understandings as influencers aim to boost engagement rates rather than educate their followers. For their part, pro-Kremlin groups on Facebook, and increasingly Telegram, disseminate anti-Western messages, which are rarely subject to content moderation.
But mainstream media can be just as pernicious when used by governing regimes, as in Serbia and Hungary, to cultivate obedient younger generations by whipping up nationalism and anti-Western grievances.
Young people’s reactions to the overall socio-political environment are also important in attitude formation. Perceptions of political and economic exclusion, informed by economic inequality, diminishing opportunities for social mobility, and limited consideration of youth concerns by governments, have been important spurs for a withdrawal from politics.
On the positive side, political dissatisfaction has occasionally sparked youth protest activity, as in Bulgaria in 2020 and Serbia in 2023.
Reclaiming young people’s hearts and minds for the democratic and transatlantic cause will first require educational reform, by promoting standard mainstream texts stripped of political-ideological content, doubling down on teaching historical and media literacy, and the introduction of politics classes in schools.
Inquiry should be fostered so that students learn to critically assess the narratives of all political forces in society and to understand their roots and consequences.
Governments also need to foster strategic communication efforts to reach out to youth more proactively and explain the benefits of EU and NATO cooperation.
Ultimately, democratic political forces should devise youth-sensitive policies and promote youth inclusion in the political process so younger people perceive themselves as a key constituency, rather than an afterthought, in democratic renewal and the strengthening of the transatlantic bond.
Dr. Rumena Filipova is chair of the Institute for Global Analytics in Bulgaria. Her research concentrates on the politics and international relations of Central and Eastern Europe, with a focus on media and disinformation, identity, and the authoritarian influence of Russia and China in the region. She holds a DPhil and MPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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