Taiwan — Lessons From Ukraine

Russia's war in Ukraine has profoundly changed the nature of modern conflict. The lessons are being learned by Central and Eastern European nations, and the threatened island state of Taiwan.

By Doug Livermore

August 28, 2024

As they gaze out at the straits separating their island state from China, the Taiwanese military can see an awful lot. It’s not a pretty picture. Radars detect whole squadrons of Chinese attack aircraft blithely crossing into Taiwan’s air defense zone, spy balloons drifting over the country, or naval and other vessels taking station to practice strangulation of the island state. Chinese propagandists make no secret of their goal — enforced Taiwanese capitulation or invasion.

How to fight this war, if and when it comes? Taiwan is preparing — see its increased orders of US equipment and its record defense budget — but it is also taking note of what is happening in Ukraine. Because the nature of war has changed and the old answers are very likely inadequate to meet the threat.

On the plus side, as the threat grows, so do the defensive possibilities. Ukraine is, in many ways, a completely different strategic challenge, but if the right lessons are drawn, it can help inform a smarter and more resilient approach to the Chinese menace. The war is, after all, the most recent large-scale, advanced tech war the world has seen.

So, what are the right lessons? These can be summarized as:

One of the most salient lessons is the necessity for a robust and resilient territorial defense force. Ukraine’s success in blunting Russia’s advances, particularly in the early stages of the conflict, can be attributed to the effective mobilization of its territorial defense units.

These units, composed of local volunteers and ex-servicemen from the 2014-22 fighting in Donbas, provided critical resistance that slowed Russian forces and bought time for the regular army to regroup and launch counteroffensives. They played a key role, for example, in defeating Russia’s attempt to seize Hostomel airport just outside Kyiv in 2022, the centerpiece of its first offensive.

Taiwan, like Ukraine, faces the threat of invasion by a larger and more powerful neighbor in China. The ability to mobilize and sustain a territorial defense force could be crucial in slowing down an invasion and providing time for international support to kick in. Taiwan has already begun to make strides in this area, but further investment and training will be necessary to ensure its forces are adequately prepared as China ramps up pressure.

Central and Eastern European nations, many of which share borders with Russia or its allies, have taken note and have begun to bolster their own territorial defense capabilities. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, for example, have all significantly increased the size and scope of their reserve forces and have intensified training for these units. The United States has been critical in supporting these efforts over the last several years, greatly expanding and improving its RIDGE RUNNER Irregular Warfare joint training exercises conducted between US special operators and European defense forces in rural West Virginia. US elite forces similarly have a long history with their Ukrainian counterparts, who were also trained by CIA paramilitary forces.

Get the Latest

The war in Ukraine has also highlighted the importance of integrating hybrid warfare capabilities into national defense strategies.

Russia’s use of cyberattacks, disinformation, and other non-kinetic means to destabilize Ukraine and influence international opinion has demonstrated the need for a comprehensive approach to national security. Central and Eastern European NATO members are increasingly focusing on developing their cyber defenses and countering disinformation campaigns. Poland and Estonia, for example, have invested heavily in exposing and countering Russian hybrid attacks while developing national strategies to combat disinformation. At July’s NATO summit in Washington, DC, members established a centralized NATO Cyber Security Centre to coordinate these efforts across the alliance.

The conflict has also reinforced the importance of international alliances and support. Ukraine’s ability to sustain its defense against Russia has been significantly bolstered by the military and financial aid provided by NATO members and other Western countries. For Central and Eastern European nations, this underscores the value of their NATO membership and the need to deepen ties within the alliance.

Taiwan, like Ukraine, has no formal defense treaty with the US or its democratic allies, which makes this task harder. But it also makes the building and reinforcement of diplomatic and military ties all the more critical. Just as Ukraine has benefited — and arguably survived — because of Western support, Taiwan must continue to strengthen its ties with the United States and other like-minded nations.

This includes deepening military cooperation, participation in joint exercises, and securing commitments for international support in the event of a conflict. The last year has seen a marked increase in efforts by the US, Australia, and other regional partners to integrate Taiwan into progressively more advanced training and exercises. It has also seen a large rise in the number of US personnel stationed on the island, from around 30 to as many as 200. This is something China will need to consider if it chooses to attack, and while it’s probably not enough to deter an invasion on its own, it is nonetheless a significant win for Taiwan.

The war has accelerated efforts to enhance interoperability among NATO forces, with a particular focus on integrating the defense capabilities of frontline members into the broader alliance structure. Joint exercises, such as those conducted under the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence initiative, have become more frequent and complex, ensuring that these countries are better prepared to respond collectively to any potential Russian aggression.

Inevitably, as with Taiwan, this has meant large increases in defense budgets. But as always with defense outlays, it is critical to buy the right equipment and invest in the right elements of the defense forces. The Baltic states, for example, are buying heavier armor and artillery as part of their greatly expanded spending, while also restructuring the armed forces, and developing new operational concepts.

Air defense systems are also being modernized and adding unmanned systems and advanced reconnaissance tools.

The experiences of NATO’s frontline members offer valuable lessons for others, such as Taiwan. The first and most crucial lesson is the importance of preparing for a multi-domain conflict.

But there’s also a need for more imaginative approaches to the fundamentals — Ukraine has won the Battle of the Black Sea despite having a tiny navy that was largely neutered at the war’s outset. Cheap, single-use unmanned drone vessels armed with large explosive charges and long-range missiles have sunk numerous Russian warships and seen the rest huddled in safe ports.

Hardly anyone saw this coming. It’s a fair bet that any new conflict will generate similar surprises, so smart thinking and rapid tech development are now at a premium.

Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves as Chair of the Advisory Committee for No One Left Behind.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.