Revisionist authoritarian powers, led by Russia and China, are intensifying their assault on the existing world order. Their initial targets are the democratic world’s outlying fortress states — Ukraine, the victim of an all-out war of invasion since 2022, and Taiwan, the democratic island-nation in China’s crosshairs. Both are under severe stress, and the loss of either would be a grave setback.
As I argue in The Taiwan Tinderbox: The Island-Nation at the Center of the New Cold War, Moscow and Beijing are hostile to the status quo and will increasingly resort to destabilizing behavior — even force — to “rectify” what they regard as historical wrongs: NATO enlargement in Europe after the end of the Cold War, and a mixture of fuzzy language and creative policymaking after World War II in Asia that, in Beijing’s eyes, permitted the existence of “two Chinas” — the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan).
Over Ukraine and Taiwan, Moscow and Beijing have both resorted to a series of actions, from grey zone operations to the use of their military, to whittle away resistance within the targeted societies and governments. As the two dictatorships deepen their strategic partnership, these joint contingencies are, more than ever, a test of resilience and persistence for the democratic camp. It is now clear that a flagging effort in one of these two theaters, not to mention outright defeat, will have catastrophic repercussions in the other.
Failure in either crisis is simply unacceptable, and, consequently, the targeted countries concerned, as well as their security partners, must not only hold the line against their respective external aggressors but must redouble efforts to avoid defeat. Success in defending Ukraine’s integrity against Russian aggression is essential to continued deterrence against an attempted invasion of Taiwan by China’s People’s Liberation Army.
Therefore, any action by Kyiv or NATO members that undermines resistance, or, through concessions imposed on Ukraine, that reward aggression, will inevitably embolden the regime in Beijing, which will regard such developments as weakness. It would then ramp up pressure on Taiwan, and perhaps use military force against it to impose “reunification” on its recalcitrant prize.
Taiwan’s security and survival as a free, democratic nation passes through Ukraine, notwithstanding views to the contrary in some circles within the Trump administration. Defeat in Ukraine, especially one that resulted from weakened international support or outright abandonment, would inevitably endanger Taiwan, just as the fall of Taiwan would have a detrimental impact on Ukraine’s continued resistance.
Moreover, it would be foolish to assume that Moscow’s and Beijing’s ambitions would cease with the acquisition of those two territories: in fact, their collapse would almost inevitably result in a second round of expansionism in Asia, including parts of the South and East China Seas. That in turn would heighten insecurity among China’s neighbors and conceivably spark a dangerous arms race — one that could become nuclear — in the Indo-Pacific. Likewise, Russia would target smaller states in northeastern Europe; indeed, Russia’s continual harping on about the supposed “root causes” of its Ukraine invasion makes clear that toppling Kyiv is just the first chapter of a much more ambitious playbook.
Both Moscow and Beijing are aware that success in their respective territorial ambitions is contingent on breaking the international support that, thus far, has ensured that Ukraine and Taiwan remain free. As such, the two despotic regimes have encouraged tag-teaming within the anti-democratic camp, with simultaneous crises aimed at distracting and overstretching the Western alliance, chief among them the US, where they hope to exacerbate intervention fatigue and encourage isolationism.
Such tag-teaming by autocratic powers, which involves countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Belarus, among others, must be met in kind. The democratic camp must recognize and act upon the fact that, confronted with an existential threat to global stability, burden-sharing has become essential. Powers within each of these two main theaters have no choice but to pool their political and war-making capabilities to deter, hold the line, and reverse aggression.
Cognizant of its limitations and flagging enthusiasm for an American role as the global policeman, the US must continue to play its indispensable role as the tip of the defensive spear while encouraging regional powers to do what they must to ensure stability, security, and, where necessary, victory in their respective regions.
NATO is already playing that role in Europe; in the Indo Pacific, where no such security architecture exists, regional powers such as Japan, in concert with other concerned nations, must also redouble their efforts to prevent armed conflict and ensure that they have the wherewithal to act should Xi do the unthinkable and mimic Putin’s 2022 invasion — rolling the dice and unleashing his armed forces to achieve territorial gain.
Recent remarks in the Diet by the new Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, which underscored Taiwan’s centrality to Japan’s national security, are a step in the right direction. From this follows the need to create sufficient capability for Japan to act as a force multiplier and reliable partner in the region, where the US remains the principal security guarantor.
Beijing’s harsh reaction to Takaichi’s statement, and to her refusal to walk back her comments, is a clear indication that a more robust Japanese involvement in regional security — one which furthermore would conceivably have an effet d’entraînement (or ripple effect) that prompts other powers to join a new security architecture — is exactly what it doesn’t want to see happen. Moscow and Beijing’s core strategy is to achieve the exact opposite: to weaken international solidarity in the democratic camp, isolate their targets, and exploit the resulting weakness to achieve their political and military objectives.
There is no guarantee of success, even if the security alliances discussed above are achieved in both theaters. But one thing is certain: division, concessions, and abandonment are the surest way to ensure that the anti-democratic, revisionist powers achieve their aims and, by doing so, create a world that is much more dangerous for all.
J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow with the Global Taiwan Institute in Washington, D.C., and the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa, Canada. He is also a research fellow and executive editor with the Prospect Foundation in Taipei, Taiwan.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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