Not for the first time, a Chinese merchant ship has been accused of ripping to pieces sensitive seabed infrastructure belonging to NATO nations in the Baltic Sea. Not for the first time, there are accusations of gray zone warfare, which is to say authoritarian state aggression short of outright war.
But, for the first time, something different is happening, and it could get ugly. The suspect, named Yi Peng 3, a 40,000-ton bulk carrier owned, flagged, and crewed in China, has now anchored in the Kattegat between Denmark and Sweden. Warships and Coast Guard vessels from Denmark, Germany, and Sweden are close by, although she has not been boarded, and it’s unknown whether she has been barred from proceeding. A Russian missile corvette is reportedly lurking not far away.
What happens next poses grave questions for the West, and especially for the smaller NATO nations of the Baltic Sea, which may have to confront Russia and China, invariably the lead suspects in the sort of international lawlessness that has seen undersea cables sabotaged, water plants broken into, and parcel bombs brought to DHL hubs.
There are even bigger questions at play — Western nations face a profoundly difficult choice between turning the other cheek (as in the past) or adopting a more robust approach and face the likelihood that authoritarian states will accuse them of breaching the international rules-based order.
So what happened? First, two undersea data cables near the Swedish island of Öland were cut within 24 hours of each other, on or around November 17-18. Open source analysts noted the Yi Peng 3 had crossed both and appeared to slow down as she did so. The two links connected Sweden and Lithuania, and Finland and Germany. In one place at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, the two cables nearly intersected, and it turned out their sudden dysfunction had no natural or engineering explanations: it must have been caused from outside.
“Nobody believes that these cables were cut accidentally,” said German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, without naming a suspect. His Lithuanian and Swedish counterparts said the events “must be assessed with the growing threat posed by Russia in our neighborhood.”
Since no merchant vessel would damage undersea cables for the fun of it, and since it’s virtually impossible to mistakenly maul two cables within 24 hours, it is reasonable to conclude that Yi Peng 3 was on a mission on behalf of Russia, which has an interest in causing mischief in the Baltic Sea, and with the permission of the Chinese government, without whose acquiescence no Chinese-flagged vessel would ever dare take on such a subversive task.
As mentioned, this is not the first time this has happened. When two pieces of seabed infrastructure ripped up in October 2023, it transpired both the Chinese vessel Newnew Polar Bear and a Russian ship, Sevmorput, had crossed over the gas pipeline and the communications cable at the points where they were cut in the eastern Baltic Sea near Finland. Ten months later, China later admitted the damage was caused by New Polar Bear and said it was “an accident.”
That vessel was able to leave the area unhindered. This time, a different pattern has emerged. As Yi Peng 3 sailed on toward the Danish Straits with a stated destination of Egypt’s Port Said, it stopped just outside Danish territorial waters.
Had she anchored inside territorial waters, Denmark would have had little trouble boarding her and perhaps detaining her and her crew: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s (UNCLOS) concept of the innocent passage gives vessels the right to traverse any waters they like.
UNCLOS also bans deliberate harm to undersea infrastructure. On these grounds, Danish authorities could rightfully have argued that they had authority to board the bulk carrier.
But with the vessel outside its waters, albeit within Denmark’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the situation is less clear. For now (November 25), the cluster of Danish and other naval and coastguard vessels next to Yi Peng 3 suggests that, at the very least, she has been asked not to proceed. An investigation into the cable severing is also underway.
On social media and elsewhere, Western commentators demanded that Danish authorities board. But under UNCLOS, it would be very difficult to make the case for boarding a ship in an EEZ. The international statute only gives coastal “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.” It allows wind farms, for example, but doesn’t give law-enforcement powers.
One could, of course, argue that since Russia and China regularly violate all manner of treaties, Denmark has the right to act. Indeed, one could argue that Denmark has an obligation to do so since taking no action would suggest the West is powerless to protect its infrastructure.
That’s a political decision that will need to be made in Denmark and other NATO member states because Denmark won’t be the last country facing this dilemma.
Some of these countries may decide that adhering to UNCLOS when others don’t is a fool’s errand, but jettisoning a painfully negotiated international law would also offer authoritarian states the opportunity to shout about “Western hypocrisy” given their mantras of support for the rules-based international order.
That’s what makes this a political choice, at the highest national and multination levels, and not one for naval commanders or media commentators.
Elisabeth Braw is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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