If Ukrainian popular sentiment is anything to go by, then the Trump administration’s demands, echoing those of the Kremlin, run into a wall of opposition.
According to the latest data, only 15% of Ukrainians support elections during the war, while 69% favor President Zelenskyy remaining in office until the end of martial law.
That’s not to say that trust in the government is overwhelming. It isn’t. In December, only 45% of respondents expressed trust in the president, and confidence in the government and the Verkhovna Rada is at an all-time low.
So how might Ukraine go about it?
In 2019, the 450-member Verkhovna Rada adopted a new electoral code, transitioning Ukraine to a proportional electoral system. Under this system, political parties nominate candidates. The new structure maintained a connection between representatives and the communities they represent. However, the war in the east of the country and the annexation of Crimea have clearly complicated this model. It remains unclear how candidates will represent the occupied territories, potentially leading to the underrepresentation of war-affected regions.
Electoral districts have seen drastic changes due to the war. Some are now sparsely populated due to active conflict or occupation, while others have grown due to the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs). This imbalance could distort representation in the Verkhovna Rada, with some regions receiving disproportionately high or low levels of representation.
The Central Election Commission (CEC) is responsible for organizing elections, guided by the Constitution and various laws. The process begins with a preparation phase, which includes setting election dates, forming election commissions, and updating voter lists. In the candidate and party registration stage, the CEC verifies the legal compliance of candidates, registers them, and issues certificates. The commission also monitors adherence to campaign regulations and organizes the printing and distribution of ballots.
On election day, the CEC coordinates the work of election commissions, ensuring transparency and accessibility in the voting process. Once the polls close, votes are counted and transmitted to district election commissions, which then send the results to the CEC for final tabulation. After the declaration, the commission reviews any complaints and ensures the legality of the process.
However, the Ukrainian electoral process has not been immune to political pressure. In 2019, political figures attempted to pressure the CEC, notably regarding the registration of Andriy Klyuyev, a former member of the Party of Regions (a pro-Russian political party). Similarly, the 2010 presidential elections were marred by allegations of vote manipulation and political interference, putting the credibility of the electoral process under some strain. Given this history, there is concern that external or internal forces may again attempt to exert influence on the CEC during future elections, especially in wartime conditions.
Nonetheless, it has never been alleged that Ukrainian elections have been rigged in the same industrial-scale manner as votes in Russia, where experts suggested last year’s presidential vote for Putin included as many as 50% fake ballots, equivalent to around 22 million votes.
Ukraine has a vibrant multi-party system, with 370 registered political parties as of 2022. Major players include the Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party, Batkivshchyna, European Solidarity, and Voice (Holos). Political competition was notably intense before the war, with the incumbent party, Servant of the People, securing a dominant position in the 2019 parliamentary elections.
The political landscape during wartime, however, has shifted dramatically. Political competition has weakened as many politicians have been either marginalized or focused solely on war-related efforts. Sanctions against former President Petro Poroshenko, a prominent opposition figure, have further complicated the political atmosphere.
Moreover, the ability to organize campaigns has become more difficult, as the logistical challenges of holding elections in wartime, coupled with the uncertain timeline for elections, leave political parties struggling to function effectively.
Financially, political groups are under pressure. With many middle-class Ukrainians displaced abroad and limited resources available, the risk of relying on oligarchic funding or external sources, including Russia, becomes a significant concern. Previous instances, such as the funding of pro-Russian political parties like the Opposition Platform – For Life group associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, the Kremlin ally who donated millions of dollars, underscore the vulnerability of Ukraine’s electoral system to outsiders.
The media plays a crucial role in Ukraine’s electoral process. Before the war, the country had more than 150 TV channels, with major national broadcasters reaching large audiences. However, since Russia’s invasion, the media landscape has shrunk, and many outlets have been repurposed for war. The Unified News telethon, launched in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, brought together multiple broadcasters to provide a unified front in countering Russian propaganda.
Despite its success at the onset of the war, Unified News has faced intensifying criticism. A USAID-Internews study in 2024 revealed that while 86% of Ukrainians are aware of the telethon, only 47% watch it. Concerns about a lack of editorial independence have emerged, with many viewers perceiving the broadcasts as biased or government-controlled. This has clear implications for the electoral process. A growing reliance on social media platforms, particularly Telegram, for news consumption (73%), adds another layer of complexity, as these platforms are more difficult to regulate and monitor for misinformation.
The plus side of a vote would be to ensure political dialogue and combat Russian disinformation. Elections would provide a platform for democratic participation and help restore trust in governmental institutions. On the other hand, the practical challenges of organizing elections in the midst of war—such as the uncertainty surrounding election dates, limited financial resources, and the potential for external interference — make the process highly complex. The risk of oligarchic or foreign influence, particularly from Russia, remains a significant concern.
And the demands on Ukraine’s electoral system would be extraordinary. The UN says that 10.6 million Ukrainians from a pre-war population of about 41 million are displaced within the country or living abroad. A third of people need humanitarian aid and a third of the national territory is contaminated by landmines or ordnance. Two million homes have been destroyed and a third of pre-war jobs have been lost.
Meanwhile, it is certain that Russia would seek to influence elections through support for extreme right-wing or left-wing politicians, as it has elsewhere, although the stakes in Ukraine are far higher for the Kremlin and it can be expected its efforts would reflect this. A result not to Moscow’s liking would bring claims of unfairness and quite possibly a return to conflict.
In the event of a ceasefire, Ukraine nonetheless needs to be thinking about how to address these issues. It might have to consider electoral reforms, focusing on clarifying candidate lists, improving competition in the media space, and safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process from external threats.
Only through such reforms can Ukraine ensure that future elections are free, fair, and truly representative of its people. That said, this would be the most extraordinarily difficult election Europe has seen since the immediate aftermath of World War II.
Kateryna Odarchenko is a political consultant, a partner of the SIC Group Ukraine, and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. A specialist practicing in the field of political communication and projects, she has practical experience in the implementation of all-Ukrainian political campaigns and party-building projects.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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