Russia and Belarus will launch the main element of their joint military exercise Zapad 2025 on September 12, an event closely watched in Europe and by all NATO allies, given its history as a precursor to escalation. Smaller elements of the drill are already underway.
The exercise is officially expected to involve around 13,000 troops, but analysts caution the real number is likely to be far higher. In Zapad 2021, Moscow claimed 12,800 servicemen participated on Belarusian territory. The total number of troops in the region was, in fact, around 200,000, according to Russian authorities.
Regardless of its size, Russia is once again turning its eyes toward its NATO neighbors. The deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council said in September that Finland was preparing for war, an accusation the Kremlin has previously made against the Baltic States, even as it rebuilds a significant military presence along NATO’s eastern flank.
This year’s drill raises three central questions: whether Russia is using Zapad to mask potential military preparations, what its military capacities are given the continuing war in Ukraine, and how it fits into the bigger geopolitical picture.
“I think the purpose is for [Vladimir] Putin to try to show that he is still strong, that the war in Ukraine hasn’t really affected them. But I don’t think that’s the truth,” says Lt. Gen. Lance Landrum (Ret).
“They’re very capable, but how much can he really take on with the war in Ukraine, and how much has the war in Ukraine cost him? I think this is a display for nations and world media as part of their influence campaign,” says Landrum. Putin may also be hoping to win additional bargaining power in the continuing US-Russia negotiations on ending the Ukraine war.
“Zapad,” which translates as West, is a joint exercise testing the military readiness of Russia and Belarus, also known as the Union State. Just months after Zapad-2021, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine using forces that had remained in Belarus after the exercise ended. Landrum, therefore, stresses that this year’s exercise should be compared with the events leading up to that invasion.
“I do think it could serve as a cover. Now we have to look and see what exactly they do in this upcoming exercise, because we have a lot of historical intelligence on previous exercises, and we can compare that,” he says.
The 2011 Vienna Document of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) requires mandatory observation for military exercises involving more than 13,000 troops. The Lithuanian military says that there will only be 8,000 soldiers in Belarus at this year’s exercise but that it expects the total number of participants in the region to be around could be up to 30,000 soldiers.
For NATO, Zapad-2025 also provides insights into Russian capabilities and strategies, according to Landrum. Just as on the battlefield in Ukraine, there will likely be a lot of drone activity, he says.
Equally, an absence of drone activity could also serve as a sign, he points out. That could indicate Russia does not have personnel available and lacks sufficient spare equipment to operate drones during the exercise. “I think there’s a lot to be learned here,” he says.
The electromagnetic spectrum must also be monitored, Landrum notes, particularly in terms of jamming and the frequencies used during the exercise. These observations could provide valuable insights.
Even as Russia and Belarus prepare for and engage in drills, Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin recently appeared in China in a demonstration of their growing ties to Beijing by participating in a gargantuan military parade on September 3.
China, while claiming neutrality on the war in Ukraine, has not condemned Russia’s aggression and has supplied very significant military aid to the Kremlin. Bilateral trade between China and Russia also reached new records in 2024.
The parade marked the first public meeting between China’s Xi Jinping, Russia’s Putin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. Landrum cautions, however, that this apparent alliance should be treated with skepticism.
“Putin and Xi are very happy to get big headlines in the media and be seen collaborating on the world stage. They like showing unity and strength. But how deep is that relationship really?” he asks.
Even so, he cautioned: “We would like to think it’s a relationship of convenience, but this is something that we have to watch very carefully, and it’s something we should guard against,” says Landrum.
The retired Air Force general argues that it is unlikely to develop into an alliance like NATO or the previous Axis Powers during World War II. “There’s clear evidence that China is not interested in multilateral organizations and alliances,” he says.
“They are interested in their own self-interest and their own sphere of influence, and so they will use this at their convenience. They will use this to make the gains that they need to make as they play the long game against the West.” It would therefore be odd if they were now shifting their position, according to Landrum.
“They’re using this as a tactical maneuver for their long-term strategic goal of gaining regional influence, dominating the Indo-Pacific, coercing and reuniting Taiwan, and pressuring the United States and its allies and partners into their vision of a multipolar world.”
It will nonetheless be important to see if China does participate in some way at Zapad 2025, Landrum says. He also mentions the other countries that were present at the military parade, like North Korea and Iran. “Are they going to be invited? Are they going to have just a couple of observers?” he asks. “Will it be a façade, or will there truly be a serious military engagement with serious military exercises?”
“It’s yet to be seen, but I think there will be signs either way, how this activity takes place, and how robust it is in a multilateral framework,” Landrum says.
Zapad 2025 may turn out to be a carefully choreographed show of strength, or it may reveal the limits of Russia’s capabilities. It will, however, provide crucial signals about not only Moscow’s military readiness, but also the evolving geopolitical alignments shaping Eurasia.
Lt. Gen. Lance Landrum (Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He served in the US Air Force for over 31 years and is currently President of Team Landrum Advising and Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic advice on executive-level leadership, developing enterprise strategy, and forming implementation plans to achieve tangible results. He was Deputy Chair of NATO’s Military Committee (2021-2023) and was also the United States European Command Director of Operations, J3 (2020-2021).
Heine Sandvik Brekke is an Editorial Intern at CEPA. He is currently studying at the American University in Washington, DC. Heine is pursuing a degree in journalism and has worked in a variety of editorial roles, including at the daily newspaper Aftenposten. He also served in the Norwegian Army as a conscript in Northern Norway.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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