If the September test of the Sarmat 2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), commonly referred to as Satan 2, was supposed to make enemies tremble, it was not only a technical but also a political failure.
The missile, a key element of Russia’s modernized strategic nuclear forces, is supposed to travel up to 11,000 miles. Instead it may have traveled a few feet and left a smoldering 200ft-wide crater and obliterated launch silo following its catastrophic failure. A wide swath of north Russian forest was wiped out at the launch site 500 miles north of Moscow.
The test was supposed to demonstrate that Russia maintains a credible second-strike capability against adversaries, primarily the United States and NATO. However, the failure of such a pivotal system, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, reveals critical vulnerabilities in Russia’s military apparatus. Moreover, it presents an opportunity for NATO to reassess its deterrence posture and reinforce measures to prevent nuclear escalation.
The Sarmat 2 ICBM is part of Russia’s effort to replace aging Soviet-era SS-18 Satan missiles, upon which its current deterrent capability is heavily dependent, with more advanced and survivable systems. The missile is designed to carry up to 15 independently targetable nuclear warheads, employ advanced countermeasures to evade missile defense systems, and strike targets across continents.
Additionally, the Sarmat 2’s ability to deliver nuclear warheads via unconventional flight paths — such as over the South Pole — makes it theoretically capable of bypassing NATO’s missile defense shield. This capability is central to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent, providing a credible second-strike capability that forms the backbone of its nuclear doctrine.
However, Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy goes beyond mere capability; it includes psychological warfare, aimed at keeping NATO off-balance through intimidation and threats of nuclear escalation. Vladimir Putin has frequently referenced nuclear options in the context of Ukraine, signaling that Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a safeguard against NATO intervention. Consequently, the failure of the Sarmat 2 test significantly undermines Russia’s ability to project nuclear threats as a means of deterrence and coercion.
The failed test of the Sarmat 2 underscores growing concerns about the overall state of Russia’s military-industrial complex and its capacity to develop and maintain advanced weapons systems. The war in Ukraine has exposed severe weaknesses in Russian conventional military capabilities, ranging from poor logistics to outdated equipment. This latest failure suggests that similar vulnerabilities may exist within Russia’s strategic forces, particularly regarding the readiness and reliability of its nuclear deterrent.
For NATO, the failed test offers both reassurance and caution. On one hand, it indicates that Russia’s most advanced nuclear missile may not be as operationally reliable as Moscow has portrayed. This weakens Russia’s ability to credibly threaten nuclear strikes, particularly as it seeks to discourage continuing support to Ukraine.
On the other hand, a failing Russian nuclear infrastructure could increase the likelihood of miscalculation or accident. A Russia that feels cornered — either due to its setbacks in Ukraine or the unreliability of its nuclear arsenal — might be more prone to considering nuclear options out of desperation, even if those options involve tactical or limited nuclear strikes.
So what should the alliance conclude? It should consider these five recommendations:
- Maintain and Strengthen Strategic Deterrence: While the failure of the Sarmat 2 test reveals weaknesses in Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities, NATO cannot assume that Russia’s overall deterrence has been significantly diminished. Instead, the alliance should continue to maintain a robust strategic deterrent, including the modernization of its nuclear triad and missile defense systems; after all, Russia has helpfully reminded us that nuclear systems need to work. US initiatives to replace its Minuteman III missiles with Sentinel ICBMs and continued investment in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers will be crucial in maintaining credible deterrence against potential Russian threats.
- Enhance Tactical Nuclear Preparedness: Given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its repeated threats of nuclear escalation, NATO should be particularly attentive to the risks posed by the Kremlin’s tactical nuclear weapons. As these smaller nuclear warheads are deployed on shorter-range systems that are normally armed with conventional warheads, it becomes nearly impossible to differentiate Russian intent until the missiles actually strike their targets. NATO should ensure that its response mechanisms, including the deterrence framework provided by the US nuclear umbrella, can address potential tactical nuclear threats.
- Pursue Diplomatic Engagement and Crisis Communication Channels: The current war in Ukraine has strained Russia-NATO relations to unprecedented levels. However, dialogue on nuclear issues remains essential. NATO and Russia must maintain open channels of communication, especially through existing forums like the currently moribund NATO-Russia Council or similar bilateral mechanisms. This is essential to manage the risk of nuclear miscalculation, particularly when the two sides might misinterpret the other’s actions as preparatory steps toward a nuclear strike.
- Reinforce NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Russia’s attempts to develop missiles capable of bypassing NATO’s missile defenses — such as the Sarmat 2 — highlight the importance of an advanced and integrated missile defense system for NATO. Continued investment in systems like the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and further integration of missile defense systems across NATO will enhance the alliance’s ability to intercept current and emergent nuclear threats.
- Promote Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Initiatives: Finally, the Sarmat 2 failure underscores the importance of arms control agreements in mitigating the risks posed by nuclear weapons. Although Russia has suspended participation in the New START treaty, NATO should continue advocating for the renewal and expansion of arms control agreements that limit the number and capabilities of nuclear weapons. By doing so, the alliance can work to reduce the overall risk of nuclear conflict and establish norms that deter the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts such as Ukraine.
The Sarmat 2 failure presents a useful moment for NATO to reassess its nuclear deterrence, especially given the ongoing war in Ukraine. While the test highlights vulnerabilities in Russia’s nuclear forces, it also underscores the potential dangers of a Russia that feels increasingly cornered by its military failures.
By maintaining a credible strategic and tactical deterrent, enhancing missile defenses, fostering diplomatic engagement, and promoting arms control, NATO can ensure continued deterrence against a nuclear exchange
Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves as Chair of the Advisory Committee for No One Left Behind.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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