British statecraft has “lived free in Russia’s head” for hundreds of years, in the words of a former UK defense attaché in Moscow. The historian Mark Galeotti noted that, over the last century, “Perfidious Albion” was, in Russia’s eyes, its “most cunning and devious foe”.
From this soil, fed by £25 bn ($33 bn) of UK aid to Ukraine since 2022, has emerged an eruption of suspicion and hostility. It may yet produce something more menacing than the current torrent of Kremlin-inspired verbal barrages.
Russia is run in part by a siloviki of former Soviet security officials who were spoon-fed distrust of the British as part of their training. It is part of their lore that London did terrible harm to the Bolsheviks and then the Soviet era, and that British intelligence chalked up significant triumphs at their expense. In this worldview, British attempts to undermine Russian power and greatness are part of an old game.
The flip side is the strange magnetism of Britain for the Russian elite; there have been massive Russian investments in British real estate, academia, and legal and financial sectors which have led to the sobriquet ‘Londongrad’ for the second home of many oligarchs.
This summer Russia again singled out devious Britain for some of its harshest rhetoric since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In August, the Russian Foreign Ministry warned that Moscow could strike British military targets inside and outside Ukraine in response to Ukrainian “deep strike” attacks in Russia using British-supplied drones. The UK is also handing Storm Shadow cruise missile blueprints to Kyiv for domestic production.
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused London of pursuing a “hostile, aggressive” policy, while the Russian embassy in London ominously warned that the deeper Britain became involved in supporting Ukrainian long-range strikes, “the higher the price it will pay.”
Yet Britain has been helping Ukraine conduct long-range strikes for years. In May 2023, it became the first country to supply Ukraine with Storm Shadow. Given that Moscow has repeatedly warned since then that British military assistance could provoke retaliation, why has Russian invective toward Britain become so intense now?
There are two main reasons: First, bold British leadership across political parties in durably supporting Ukraine (reflecting broad public backing) has emboldened more cautious European states to overcome their fears and do likewise. British examples of repeatedly being the first mover to break taboos in lethal support to Kyiv have provided critical military capabilities and operational know-how that have aided Ukraine’s success in fighting Moscow to a strategic standstill. British staff officers have worked inside the country, troops have been deployed (two have died in accidents while serving there), and special forces units have operated on the ground.
Second, the Ukrainians are now bringing the war home to Russia through long-range strikes against energy, military, and commercial targets, including in Moscow, that have called Putin’s wisdom in launching his “three-day special military operation” increasingly into question at home. It is therefore an urgent priority for Putin to throttle Kyiv’s military power and effective long-range strike capability, and to separate Kyiv from its more resolute backers. That starts with London.
Deep strikes are becoming a more serious strategic problem for Moscow, with long gas lines across Russia, exposed warehouses, military-related manufacturing facilities, and critical infrastructure, and it is about to get worse. According to one estimate, Ukraine has launched at least 830 deep strikes against Russia in 2026, already 15% more than it did during the entire year of 2025 and 120% more than in all of 2024.
On September 9, Ukraine launched its deepest strike into Russia, targeting two gas condensate facilities that are almost 1,900 miles from Ukraine’s border. According to the International Energy Agency, a Russian refinery was hit approximately once every three days during February-August. Russians at home are also becoming emboldened to complain publicly about how the war, once largely distant from their daily lives, has begun to worsen their livelihoods and businesses.
While Russian cities such as St. Petersburg and Moscow were once seen as unreachable by Ukraine’s military, these metropolitan centers are now increasingly witnessing flames and dark clouds of smoke rising from targets visible from residents’ windows. Such scenes travel rapidly across the rest of the country via social media. On September 20, the final day of Russia’s rigged parliamentary elections, Ukraine launched its largest-ever drone and missile attack on Moscow and the surrounding areas.
Of course Britain is not alone in supporting Ukraine, but Russian officials seem to recognize the importance of British leadership in stiffening the spine of Ukraine’s other backers. In March 2025, Reuters quoted a Russian official who explained that the UK is the “locomotive” that “pulls others along with them.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov underlined the point: “Britain is methodically and regularly adding fuel to the fire and methodically and regularly plotting to prevent any progress in the peace process.” Now the co-chair of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Britain was the first European country to provide lethal aid before the full-scale invasion, the first G7 member to commit modern main battle tanks and the first country to provide long-range Western cruise missiles. Those initiatives and others, initially seen by some in NATO as exceptionally dangerous and escalatory, became ordinary thanks to London’s initiative.
Recent Russian threats against Britain have at least two audiences. Obviously, Whitehall is the primary audience. The Kremlin wants the UK to reconsider the scale and nature of its support for Ukraine, particularly its role in facilitating long-range strikes, but the second audience is other European capitals who have been following London’s lead.
Putin likely reasons that if His Majesty’s government can be deterred from further Ukraine support, other European supporters of Kyiv may get cowed as well. After all, cracks among Ukraine’s allies are Russia’s main road to victory. To date, many European governments have withstood Russian attempts at various forms of coercion, including nuclear saber-rattling, and there is no sign that British leadership will waver. Prime Minister Burnham has vowed to continue to support Ukraine “100%”.
As a signal of the pain that allied support is inflicting on the Russian regime, the current surge of Anglophobia is hard to beat. It is yet to develop into something more serious.
David V. Gioe is a visiting professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and academic director for the Cambridge Security Initiative. He is a former CIA analyst and operations officer and a US Navy veteran. He holds a PhD from Cambridge University and is an elected Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
Ilya Timtchenko is a Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at CEPA and a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. An analyst with more than 14 years of experience focused on Eastern Europe, he holds a Master’s in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School, where he was a Belfer Center fellow. Before studying at Harvard, he worked as an editor and journalist in Ukraine.
*All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
