A recent surge in high-level repression alongside ongoing asset nationalization and redistribution points to intensifying infighting within Russia’s elite, as rival groups compete for control over shrinking resources. In this high-intensity environment, the ambitious and the quick-witted see a chance to gain influence.
Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, a largely charisma-free, gray-toned bureaucrat and economist, emerges as one such figure, as suggested by recent developments, and confirmed by this author’s sources inside the government. Belousov, who describes himself as a devout Orthodox believer and likes to begin meetings with a prayer, is seizing the moment to extend his political power.
The 67-year-old’s political ambition is emerging in a symbolic manner, but it is there nonetheless. Impending State Duma elections, the first since Russia’s all-out invasion, have triggered a fight among the elite. Scheduled for September, the vote is certain to be even more unfree and unfair than in 2021.
With the result a mere act of theater, Vladimir Putin and his elite focused on something else. Russia’s ruler wanted at least 100 of the new 450-member Duma to be veterans of the war in Ukraine, men he describes as “Russia’s true elite.”
So the Presidential Administration’s Domestic Policy Directorate drafted a list of “war veterans” to fill the 100-seat quota. Then something unexpected happened — Belousov’s ministry rejected the list, according to two sources familiar with the discussions. This was, of course, not framed as outright opposition to Putin’s idea. That’s not how despotism works. Instead, the defense minister made another argument — those named were not the right type of war heroes.
So he argued that the list comprised “paper veterans”, that is, insider officials or politicians who logged brief stints in elite reserve battalions without seeing combat. There was probably some truth in the allegation — Putin’s elite would never willingly share power with mere veterans whose politics and loyalties are uncertain. The standoff later surfaced publicly as the Presidential Administration scaled back plans for mass inclusion of such candidates.
This sits awkwardly alongside Putin’s repeated calls to build a “new elite” from “warriors and workers”. But should he decide to pursue this idea, Belousov will have his own list in the pipeline, which would be prepared by Anna Tsivileva, Putin’s niece and Deputy Defense Minister, as well as General Goremykin, another Deputy Minister and long-serving supervisor of the Main Political Directorate in the Ministry of Defense.
Belousov’s growing appetite for spending and property control is another indication of his rising star. Late last year, the Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin moved to centralize control over the nationalization process, probably aiming to secure personal advantage over a process that has stripped roughly 5 trillion rubles ($61bn) worth of assets from private owners since the full-scale invasion began. A source in the government tells this author that the Ministry of Defense has now become the main initiator of requests for property nationalization.
The Ministry can initiate nationalization, but cannot manage seized assets itself. This creates a natural opening for the state-owned defense conglomerate, the Rostec Corporation, and its chief, Sergei Chemezov. They are the Ministry’s closest industrial partners. Unlike other elite clans who view nationalization as a prelude to privatization and personal gain, Chemezov has no interest in re-privatization — as head of a state corporation, he profits from managing assets directly and drawing state budget funds for their upkeep. In the Russian manner, the ultimate destination of these funds is not always clear.
Chemezov’s outlook aligns squarely with Belousov’s statist economic preferences and points to an emerging coalition between the two, indicating both material and ideological alignment within the state military-industrial complex.
Thus, at the end of his second year as the defense minister, Belousov has clearly emerged as a new and important player within Putin’s elite.
Over two decades in government, he was seen as a technocrat trusted by Putin but unaffiliated with any elite group who deliberately kept a low political profile. Rather than building his own clan, he cultivated a system of like-minded allies, anchored in think tanks and expert institutions. His appointment to the ministry in 2024 was driven by the need to restore order to wartime finances amid surging spending and corruption under the previous minister.
In reality, Belousov was always an ambitious figure with a strategic, project-oriented mindset. Even before entering public service, he differed from other experts in his willingness to implement ideas rather than simply articulate them. His ideal has always been the “developmental state”: subordinating the interests of both business and society to the supreme interests of the state.
Unlike most senior Russian officials, he has never abandoned that vision. A rare, extensive interview in June 2023 offers a clue into his thinking, revealing a clear-eyed understanding of the wide range of challenges facing Russia and his strategic vision of how to address these.
As minister, Belousov has demonstrated to Putin that he can deliver. He gained at least formal control over the army and the military-industrial complex — large, entrenched structures with their own interests. He appears to have navigated both successfully, creating the conditions for Russia’s grinding and bloody battlefield advances in 2024-2025.
The army’s supply of both weapons and personnel (through ongoing contract recruitment) was made more reliable. Under Belousov, drone production was radically expanded, with the creation of the Rubicon Center, which simultaneously addressed combat missions, conducted scientific and analytical research, and trained new drone operators.
This, in turn, strengthened his standing with Putin. Belousov delivered the kind of war picture Putin wanted: no dramatic breakthroughs, but relentless pressure and incremental territorial gains.
Belousov has also become a favorite of military correspondents, in stark contrast to the previous minister, Sergei Shoigu, and, more importantly, appears to have built ties with one of the FSB’s key divisions — military counterintelligence, traditionally seen as the most ideological and least corrupt of its agencies.
This coalition spanning the army, the military-industrial complex, and a key FSB service, all enjoying Putin’s trust, provides Belousov with strong political foundations. Among other things, it shows that the war is rearranging Russia’s political elites. As a result, an ideologically mindful and institutionally powerful contender has emerged in the competition for power. Should this coalition consolidate, Belousov might eventually become Putin’s pick for prime minister.
The main obstacle to this trajectory is the resistance of Putin’s inner circle clans, who have little appetite for the ascetic, mobilized economy Belousov envisions — and every interest in preserving the existing mafia-state model for themselves.
Andrei Yakovlev is a Visiting Research Fellow, SCRIPTS Cluster of Excellence, Freie Universität Berlin. He is an economist whose main research interests include state-business relations in Russia, political economy of development, industrial policy, public procurement, and incentives for bureaucracy (with comparative study of Russia and China).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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