Ukraine has claimed numerous shoot-downs of Russian aircraft in recent weeks. What do you think is happening?
While not all shoot-downs of Russian aircraft have been confirmed with visual evidence or Russian reporting (which can indirectly confirm details), Ukraine should be credited with high-level confidence to have shot down a second Russian A-50 Mainstay airborne early warning and control aircraft (of two claimed) on February 24. Additionally, on March 9, Ukrainian drones struck what is said to be an A-50 repair facility in Taganrog, Southern Russia. Ukrainian officials claimed two of the planes had been critically damaged, according to the Financial Times. The Ukrainians have also brought down fighter and attack aircraft (e.g., Su-25 and Su-35 fighters, Su-24 and Su-34 ground attack.) Ukrainians claimed as many as 13 Russian aircraft were shot down in February alone.
The best explanation for their success seems two-fold. First, Ukraine’s success coincides with an increase in Russian air support to sustained ground offensives begun in late January that have continued throughout February across Eastern Ukraine.
Thus, a greater number of Russian aircraft are launching bombs (general purpose “dumb” variety and guided glide bombs) and are potentially exposed to Ukrainian ground-based air defense. Following the second A-50 shoot-down on 23-24 February, these combat aircraft are launching their bombs closer to the line of contact without the benefit of advance warning from an orbiting A-50 of Ukrainian air defense threats.
Second, Ukrainian air defense forces have demonstrated significant abilities in both technical and tactical innovation. The former has been helped by Western support, especially US, and Ukrainian IT expertise in integrating various Western and Ukrainian air defense system components (i.e., launchers, radars, and command and control units) to allow for smaller capable configurations, a more comprehensive air threat picture, and targeting combinations across a network of sensors and effectors.
Intelligence gained from Russian aircraft downed over Ukrainian-held territory may also be exploited to enhance the effectiveness of Western air defense systems and missiles.
Ukrainian forces have likely been able to connect a variety of Western launchers with both Ukrainian radar and fire control units and pass targeting information across a network of Western and Ukrainian systems.
This technical innovation has likely spurred a tactical innovation whereby Ukrainians deploy additional radar and fire control units with single or small numbers of launchers to multiple locations, including some that are advanced enough to engage Russian fighter and ground attack aircraft providing support to ground forces. The network integration would also allow an active radar in one location to paint a Russian air threat and engage it from a different location and direction across the Ukrainian air defense network.
This tactic multiplies air defense coverage, increases air defense lethality, and can increase its survivability through dispersion (assuming frequent movement, good concealment, and radar emission discipline).
Are reported Russian losses serious, in terms of airframes and personnel?
The Russian losses of A-50 and their aircrews are serious because their bench is not deep.
Russian Aerospace Forces (aka VKS) may have as many as seven left, but that doesn’t mean all are operational and manned with trained crews. These airframes and crews are operational or theater-level assets that Russia will be keen to maintain in sufficient numbers in the event (arguably unlikely) of a peer high-intensity conflict.
The fact that Russian forces have not yet established another A-50 orbit in support of the ongoing offensives could support this premise. The VKS are likely working out how best to improve their A-50 self-protection measures before placing more of these high-demand/low-density airframes at risk.
Losses of fighter and ground attack aircraft and pilots are much less of a threat to overall Russian air capability due to their large number, over 650 total aircraft according to the IISS’s 2023 Military Balance.
Given the priority Russia attaches to achieving territorial gains during a relative lull in Western support (primarily due to drastically reduced US military assistance), Russia likely believes it can afford the rate of aircraft attrition it has recently suffered for some time.
This notwithstanding, the Russian VKS leadership (operational to tactical) is likely seeking tactical and technical solutions to reduce their vulnerability to Ukrainian air defense and increase their own effectiveness in destroying or suppressing Ukrainian air defense.
We’re hearing a lot about Russian glide bombs. What are they and why didn’t Russia use them from the outset?
(For those interested in technical and tactical detail I recommend Tom Cooper’s Sarcastosaurus as he has dedicated several blogs on this subject over the course of his coverage of the Russian war on Ukraine.)
Russian glide bombs as reported in the media most frequently refer to MPKs or UMPKs (Russian abbreviation for guided, unpowered gliding bombs.) These latter were reportedly first introduced in Ukraine in early 2023 due to the tactical advantage of being delivered by Russian ground attack aircraft (i.e., either Su-24s or Su-34s) as far as 60km (37 miles) from the line of contact, and thus outside the range of normal short- and medium-range air defense.
Prior to their introduction, Russian aircraft primarily used general-purpose bombs (e.g. FABs, KABs) that were imprecise and ineffective. Developing, testing, and fabricating the guidance system kits at scale for MPKs and UMPKs has taken time, likely much of 2023.
The guidance kits include stabilizing wings and navigation systems that have improved over iterations of testing and employment.
While MPKs/UMPKs are not as precise as Western precision-guided munitions (e.g., JDAMs), Russia can make a lot of them, converting their large stock of aerial bombs into more precise glide bombs.
Worryingly, the Ukrainians have just reported that Russian aircraft are employing an improved version of their guided glide bombs which allow for even greater standoff (i.e., 80-90km).
Will this year’s arrival of F-16s for the Ukrainian Air Force make a difference in the air war?
Although initial F-16s from the Netherlands and Denmark and the first group of trained Ukrainian pilots are expected to arrive shortly (perhaps this Spring), it will take some time (months) for them to reach their potential in supporting air and missile defense of key cities and infrastructure and supporting Ukrainian’s front-line defense.
F-16s will indeed have a significant impact in the air and the ground in Ukraine but don’t expect to see that until the second half of this year. The long pole in the tent will be having enough trained pilots, maintainers, and sustainers, along with defended bases and bunkers, debris-free runways, repair tools and parts, and, of course, a variety of advanced munitions.
Several allies are working to make this happen and F-16 capability is a focused effort of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.
Training is ongoing in the US and Romania and could begin in Denmark, France, and the UK soon. The first group of trained Ukrainian pilots and support personnel are expected as early as May.
That might be enough to have a two-flight mini squadron of eight F-16s operating in limited missions (air and missile defense and/or close air support) by early summer. Near the end of 2024 when more trained pilots and support personnel have completed training and more F-16s have been delivered, Ukraine may succeed in operating several squadrons (ranging from 18 to 24 aircraft each) and thus have a greater impact on the war.
Strategically, the ability of Ukraine to plan and prepare the way with allied support to establish operational and sustainable F-16 squadrons and an effective concept of employment (from air and missile defense to close air support and air interdiction beyond the line of contact) will determine how much the aircraft will contribute to Ukraine’s military objectives.
Tactically, several critical factors will determine the impact of Ukrainian F-16s on the battlefield.
These include:
- the ability of Ukraine to defend F-16 air bases from Russian air and missile attacks;
- the ability of the West to provide advanced long-range precision munitions (e.g., air-to-air, air-to-ground, anti-radiation — US support here will be key);
- the ability of pilots to deliver battlefield effects while avoiding Russian air defense or air attack (advanced targeting radar like the APG-83 would provide greater standoff); and
- the ability of Ukraine to maintain operational readiness and to house their F-16s for priority missions. On the first and last point, Ukrainian forces have done well to date with other low-density, high-value systems and munitions (e.g., HIMARS, Patriots, NASAMS, and long-range missiles – Storm Shadow/SCALP.)
Should other allies join the Netherlands and Denmark in contributing F-16s to Ukraine (e.g., Norway, Belgium) and the training pipeline of pilots and support personnel continue, as well as the flow of parts and advanced munitions, then even more squadrons may be fielded in 2025.
Indeed, given the large number of F-16s in the Transatlantic inventory, the aircraft could form an enduring component of the Ukrainian Air Force for the foreseeable future.
Thus, allies would do well to think long-term in their support of the Ukrainian F-16 program and ensure a steady flow of the most advanced munitions and installation of the best-targeting radar systems in those aircraft provided to Ukraine.
Maj Gen (Ret) Skip Davis is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment after retiring from the US Army after more than 37 years of service. Commissioned in the infantry he served the first half of his career in rapid deployment airborne and infantry units and spent over 20 years abroad including command in Iraq and Afghanistan, and multiple operations in Africa and the Balkans.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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