Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, fallout from its war has spread beyond Ukraine on multiple occasions, with attack drones and missiles crossing into NATO countries in nine confirmed incidents.
Drones or debris have crashed into Romanian territory and Russian ballistic missiles have violated Polish airspace. In response, Poland said it might shoot down Russian missiles over Ukraine if they were headed for its territory while Romania amended legislation to allow the destruction of aircraft violating its airspace.
In another incident, an Iranian-designed Shahed drone flew into Latvia and crashed in the Rēzekne municipality. Latvia does not border Ukraine, nor is it on a direct flight path to Ukraine from Russia; the unmanned aircraft had crossed the whole of Belarus.
Latvia has since enhanced air defenses along its eastern border and called on allies to take more action in defending NATO airspace. The area threatened by weapons intended for Ukraine is increasing, according to NATO Allied Air Command.
Despite the growth in the number of such incidents, they have all so far been attributed to malfunctions or accidents, and may not have been intentionally aimed at NATO members.
Even so, NATO’s eastern flank countries are taking the threat seriously and enhancing their defenses.
A unifying feature of the incidents so far has been the difficulty in identifying and tracking them before mobilizing air defenses to destroy drones or missiles crossing into NATO territory. There is poor detection of low- and slow-flying objects, a crucial capability needed to counter Shahed-type attack drones.
NATO must learn lessons from Ukraine’s use of a layered and multispectral network of sensors. All aspects of surveillance and response have to work together and in sequence to defend against such threats.
But often there are obstacles or shortcomings to the proper functioning of the alliance’s air defense networks. For example, the Baltic states do not possess medium-range air defense (MRAD) systems and aren’t expected to have them until 2026.
This purchase is part of the German-led Sky Shield initiative that started in 2022 and aims to substantially invest into this critical sector. It currently boasts 22 members from both EU and non-EU states, and all have committed to increase the production of domestic air defense systems. However, this initiative is in its early days and it will take some years for it to have a significant impact.
Other allies have bolstered their capabilities in the region, but not enough to fully protect NATO skies. In addition to fielding more air defense systems, the alliance needs to achieve greater integration and interoperability and incorporate lower-tier counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS.)
Additional air and missile defense capabilities, such as sensors for surveillance, detection, and tracking, must be coupled with integrated regional/theater-wide C2 and targeting networks.
Moscow will always deny responsibility for airspace violations, but allies add to the risk by allowing them to continue. Such violations test NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities and decision-making, and may encourage the Kremlin to believe it would meet little or no resistance if they continue.
The incursions also pose a real military threat if Russia uses them to locate the positions of NATO air defenses by deliberately programming “mistaken” flights into allied airspace.
Washington and its allies should assume these incidents are deliberate and represent a test of NATO IAMD, and seek to improve the alliance’s response. Moscow has always attempted to challenge and disrupt allied resolve with all the tools at its disposal, and this is likely no different.
US support for allies, by stationing more capabilities in the region and pushing NATO members to invest in cost-effective C-UAS and MRAD capabilities, would deter Russia from exploiting such incidents.
The alliance’s difficulties in mounting a timely response to incursions point to a shortfall in NATO’s ability to defend against a full-scale Russian air and missile attack, including surface, sea, and air-launched weapons, as seen repeatedly in Ukraine.
An attack could be much larger in scope and size than Iran’s against Israel and, if Russia were to execute a 360-degree air and missile attack against the alliance, allies would have great difficulty defending themselves without significant warning and preparation.
NATO has taken note of the need to reinforce IAMD capabilities, as seen in the 2024 Washington Summit’s commitments to enhance related production and create a rotational model for air and missile defense, but these plans have yet to be implemented.
To defend against a significant Russian attack, US and European capabilities and support should be prepositioned to protect NATO priorities. This would require a shift in focus from a mindset of response to one of prevention/deterrence, in line with NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept.
The US should apply lessons learned in defending Israel against Iranian air and missile attacks to a similar Russian threat against European allies.
For example, the US could offer to allocate its forward-deployed naval assets with air and missile defense capabilities to NATO IAMD (in addition to their NATO Ballistic Missile Defense mission.) Washington could also increase ground-based air and missile defense systems in the region through rotational deployments or pre-positioned stocks.
An increased permanent forward presence would offer the advantage of saving time, lives, and valuable resources if the situation were to deteriorate.
Integration of allied air and missile defense systems is equally crucial. NATO allies need the ability to share awareness, decide integrated responses across nations, and cross-cue or engage remotely by sharing target and guidance data.
This is an area where Washington can lead and improve NATO IAMD before crisis or conflict. In the medium-to-long term, the US would benefit from a permanent uplift in NATO IAMD capabilities, as it would further deter Russia, lowering the chances of escalation and potential conflict.
Arnis Cimermanis is a recipient of the Baltic American Freedom Foundation (BAFF) professional internship scholarship and is currently an intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr. is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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