War in the Middle East is lining Russia’s state coffers with an unexpected windfall of billions of dollars from higher oil prices. Less material, but arguably more significant politically, are the gains the Kremlin will anticipate from another looming crisis emanating from the war: that of global food prices.
The war is hitting fertilizer, and therefore food, markets. About half the world’s supplies of urea — the most common raw material for nitrogen-based fertilizer — are exported via the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the production of ammonia, essential for fertilizer, requires natural gas, which is why nitrogen fertilizers often come from gas-rich countries. The Gulf states account for about a third of global ammonia exports; Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt are the leading exporters. Overall, around a third of the global maritime fertilizer trade typically passes through the Strait of Hormuz.
Since February 28, when the US-Israeli war on Iran began, that route has been effectively closed. According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 105 commercial vessels transited the Strait between March 1-18, carrying 8.7 million deadweight tons. In the same period in 2025, there were 1,870 voyages carrying 167.9 million tons — a 94% drop.
Prices for urea are up almost 40% since the start of the war, from $484 to $670 a ton — the highest level since 2023, though still well short of the 2022 record when prices cleared $1,000.
Disruption to fertilizer supplies will not have an immediate impact on food markets. The time lag between reduced fertilizer supplies and higher food prices is not days, but months, owing to the length of the production chain. Farmers begin with a shortage of fertilizer, or face prices that make growing food unprofitable. They either reduce usage — hitting yields — or do not plant at all. In three to six months, this will show up in reduced harvests. Then, after another one to three months, it will start feeding through to supermarket prices. We are only at the beginning of this cycle.
During the previous food crisis in 2022 — triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the imposition of sanctions, and disruption to Black Sea grain shipments — the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) food price index soared to record levels. This time, Russia and Belarus could be part of the solution. Both are now viable suppliers, while the Gulf states, responsible for a significant share of fertilizer production and transit, are out of action.
There is also a fundamental difference from 2022. Back then, farmers’ losses on fertilizer were offset by a simultaneous surge in grain prices as the Black Sea blockade hit wheat and corn supplies. Now, grain prices are rising only moderately, since the Gulf region is not a major producer. Farmers, therefore, face higher input costs with little prospect of recouping them at harvest time. This is worse for the agricultural sector and means that market adjustments will be more profound.
A study by the World Food Programme found that 45 million people are on the brink of famine as a result of the US-Israeli war with Iran — 28 million in Africa, nine million in Asia, and five million in the Middle East. India, where local fertilizer manufacturers have already cut urea production owing to rising LNG prices, and Brazil, the world’s biggest fertilizer importer at 49 million tons in 2025, are also under threat. Brazil is critically dependent on Middle Eastern urea to grow soy and corn, and exports around 60% of the world’s soybeans.
The FAO has warned that if the conflict drags on for more than three months, the consequences will be far more serious, affecting the next planting season and carrying long-term repercussions. The organization forecasts that global fertilizer prices could remain 15%–20% above normal in the first half of this year.
It is more accurate to speak of three consecutive shocks than a single event. The first wave is the ongoing surge in fertilizer prices. The second, due in autumn, will be reduced harvests. The third, next year, will be food inflation across the Global South, with tens of millions threatened by starvation and the risk of food insecurity spilling over into political instability — as the Arab Spring demonstrated.
Buyers shut out of Middle Eastern fertilizers are seeking alternatives. Russia, richly endowed with natural gas, is the world’s second-largest fertilizer exporter. Combined with Belarus, it controls around 40% of global potash exports, 23% of ammonia, and 14–16% of urea. Neither its production nor its logistics are affected by events in the Gulf; exports flow via the Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific. Russia also benefits from low production costs thanks to its own gas supply, high capacity, subsidized infrastructure, and export financing.
That structural competitive advantage is long established. Russia’s importance to fertilizer markets — especially for poorer countries — is so great that its fertilizer and food exports are the only major commodities left untouched by sanctions. As the war in the Middle East intensifies, Russia’s role will only grow. Nigerian and Ghanaian importers are already placing orders for Russian fertilizer for the third quarter, in anticipation of a lasting crisis in the Gulf — a rational market response to the disappearance of alternative suppliers.
The financial benefit is straightforward. Russia can sell more fertilizer at higher prices for the foreseeable future, with no changes to its production chain and no threat of sanctions. Last year, Russia exported $11bn of fertilizer and maintained its position as Europe’s leading supplier. With prices up by a third, the regime stands to gain an extra $1bn a quarter. Higher grain costs could yield another $500m. This is nothing like the oil windfall heading Moscow’s way, but it is a steady stream of additional revenue, unaffected by the Strait of Hormuz closure.
The political gains are no less significant. Russia is once again becoming an indispensable supplier for countries in the so-called Global South — this time offering food security rather than oil. In 2022, the Kremlin already exploited this dynamic: the Black Sea grain deal became a bargaining chip in its diplomacy with Africa and the Middle East.
Now it has broader opportunities. Fertilizer exports attract fewer headlines than wheat and grain shipments, but matter more to agriculture overall. For Nigerian or Ethiopian importers who need urea to plant crops, events in Ukraine are not the primary concern.
Significant food inflation over the next two years is more or less a foregone conclusion. It is simply a question of scale and geography. For Western shoppers, it is an inconvenience. For farmers in the Sahel or Bangladesh, it is a catastrophe.
Russia finds itself — unexpectedly — in a position that serves its long-term interests: structurally indispensable in the global food chain, with modest financial benefits and substantial political gains. Expect the Kremlin to trumpet its self-declared generosity to the world’s poor — it is a low-cost, high-return opportunity.
Alexander Kolyandr is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), specializing in the Russian economy and politics. Previously, he was a journalist for the Wall Street Journal and a banker for Credit Suisse. He was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and lives in London.
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Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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