A vote to elect members of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in October saw Russia defeated by Bulgaria and Albania, dashing its hopes of regaining its seat 18 months after a suspension following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The failed attempt to return was part of a Kremlin effort to change the narrative around atrocities in the war and reassert its influence over the international community’s accountability mechanisms.
As a part of the Council, Russia and its allies would be able to shape the UN’s understanding of human rights, and those who violate them, blurring the distinction between democracies and rogue states. It would also provide a forum to rally the support of countries in the developing world under the guise of a campaign to stop the Council from being a “tool” for Western nations.
The Human Rights Council already has a troubled reputation in the West. There have been calls to defund it, as well as strong criticism of its members and leadership. The claim that the body was biased led to US withdrawal in 2018, and there’s a belief it is not a suitable tool to counter Russian influence or promote democracy.
The facts suggest otherwise. The coordinated campaign by non-democratic states to take over the UN’s top human rights body is precisely because they take it seriously. During the 2022 process to expel Russia, Moscow said countries who voted for expulsion would face consequences in their bilateral relations.
It has been reported that Vladimir Putin built a task force of 12 ministries and other government officials to work on the country’s submission to the HRC’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
It is not only that Russia cares, but it cares a lot. And so should the West.
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the HRC has acted to make the Kremlin accountable. In October 2022, it approved a Special Rapporteur on human rights in Russia and the first report was published earlier this year.
This noted a systematic crackdown against civil society and resulted in an extension of the rapporteur’s mandate. Additionally, the Council put other procedures in place that have strongly condemned Russia’s use of arbitrary detention as an attack on freedom of expression, such as in the Alexey Gorinov case.
The Council is also responsible for the creation of an International Commission of Inquiry into human rights abuses by Russia in Ukraine. The Council is one of the few remaining forums where states can demand Russian accountability, especially given that Russia has been removed from other venues, such as the Council of Europe.
While October’s vote has been interpreted as a victory for the international community, the tally shows the extent of Russian influence over human rights diplomacy. While 93 countries voted in the UN General Assembly in favor of suspension in 2022, 58 abstained and 24 opposed the move. By October 2023, Moscow was able to secure 83 votes in the 193-member body to regain its seat.
This is the moment to put Geneva back on the map, at the forefront of diplomatic action. The HRC can exert real pressure on the regime in Moscow, and help to undermine its influence.
Especially important are the narratives Putin has managed to promote in the developing world, which underplay atrocities. These will be harder to maintain if the Kremlin suffers repeated reputational blows at the UN. For that, coordinated support for the candidacies of like-minded states, and increased oversight in the Council, are vitally important.
Ukraine is not mentioned in the 24 pages of Russia’s submission to the Council. Whether Putin’s people will be allowed to shape the debate and distract focus from the horrors in Ukraine will be decided, at least in part, in Geneva.
Grigory Vaypan is a Russian human rights lawyer and scholar. He is a Senior Lawyer at Memorial and a Democracy Fellow at CEPA.
Camilo Torres Casanova is an Intern at CEPA’s Digital Innovation Initiative.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Ukraine 2036
How Today’s Investments Will Shape Tomorrow’s Security
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
