To begin with, Xi Jinping wasn’t keen on Russia. His priorities lay elsewhere.
Xi’s three priorities since coming to power have been to ensure that the color of the red flag doesn’t fade, that China catches up with the United States economically and militarily, and finally to bring about the so-called unification of the motherland (by which he means the reincorporation of Taiwan). This is what is known as his Chinese Dream.
In order to catch up with the US, Xi Jinping’s benchmark was never Russia or even Europe. Moreover, Xi has to be seen on the continuum with his predecessors, thinking that China can continue to hitch a free ride on the coattails of the US, especially in terms of technological development. (The Five Eyes group of intelligence partners calls this open theft of Western secrets “brazen”, with Australia saying last year that it was “the most sustained scaled and sophisticated theft of intellectual property and expertise in human history“).
To this end, he sent positive signals to the Obama administration through various channels in his first two-to-three years in office to “establish a new type of great power relationship” with Washington. President Obama was dismissive of this and only then did Xi’s attention turn to Putin. Russia, while technologically far inferior to the US, was always believed by Beijing to be a military powerhouse. Obtaining military technology and resources from there could also partly help Xi realize his Chinese Dream.
In the past 14 years, Xi and Putin have met more than 40 times. The two men clearly hit it off. They each call themselves “old friends” and wish each other happy birthday every year. Of course, Xi’s favorable opinion of Putin mirrors his great sympathy for the Communist Soviet Union. Although Putin is not a communist, Putin’s desire to build an (essentially colonialist) “Russian world” through wars of aggression is also understood by Xi as an effort to rescue the lost Soviet Union.
As for Putin’s admiration and need for China, it indicates his sense even before the war in Ukraine that Russia will be forced to turn eastward. The all-out war, in turn, greatly reinforced his search for an alternative to the West in China.
Whether or not Putin personally told Xi Jinping when he was in Beijing in February 2022 that he had decided to launch a war against Ukraine, Beijing also smelled the inevitability of war. Moreover, China seemed convinced that Russia would rapidly resolve the problem. Beijing even promised that “China-Russia cooperation has no upper limit,” which naturally encouraged Putin to attack his neighbor at full-scale.
China’s superstitious belief in Russia’s military competence was reflected in the behavior of the Chinese embassy in Ukraine at the outbreak of the war. It apparently assessed that the Russian army would take Kiev on the third day of the war, and instructed Chinese students studying in Ukraine to hang Chinese flags on their cars while in retreat from Ukraine, so that the occupying forces (i.e., the Russians) would instantly recognize them as being from a friendly country and give them safe passage.
Disconcerted by Russian military failure, China was surprised and, initially at least, uncharacteristically humble in its explanations. Thus, in April 2023, Fu Cong, China’s plenipotentiary to the European Union (EU), hastily denied the seriousness of the promise of “unlimited Russian-Chinese cooperation” in order to dispel the West’s fears of a Sino-Russian axis.
Unsure of Russian success, and presumably fearing the consequences of its defeat, Beijing decided to play the role of mediator and neutral. It even broke with its previous pro-Russian practice and sent a special correspondent to the Ukrainian front to report on the courage and determination of the Ukrainian resistance to the invading forces. All of which, apparently, made Putin very upset.
According to reports in major Western media, Putin was allegedly in possession of some evidence that the freshly appointed Chinese foreign minister was “secretly communicating with the United States” and sent this information to Xi Jinping through his own channels. Xi then jailed Qin Gang, and Putin’s tip-off greatly strengthened Xi’s trust in his old Russian friend.
While the details of these reports remain unverified, Beijing’s decision to loyally side with Putin has been on prominent display ever since. All matters related to the war in Ukraine have been coordinated with Moscow. The principle is clear: not to harm Russia’s interests.
In order to build a joint new world order challenging Western preeminence, Xi has been actively involved in the expansion of the BRICS organization, and in order to further coordinate with Putin militarily, he last year appointed Dong Jun, a Russian-speaker who trained at the Moscow military academy, to the post of defense minister. More importantly, Chinese intelligence organs aided the growing network of links between Russia’s military seeking war-related materials from Chinese companies. Not to mention other assistance for the Russian military, such as providing satellite information.
The Ukraine war has actually brought numerous benefits to China. Not only has China been able to buy Russian oil and gas at a significant discount, but the Russian market, which had not been open to China, is now fully open. And Russia happens to have offset Western sanctions in various areas, including finance, with China’s help and cooperation. The volume of trade in 2023 far exceeds the goals set by both sides — trade amounting to $240bn.
With the prolongation of the war, Russia’s demand for Chinese military products has increased rapidly. It is true that China remains vulnerable to any threat against its trade; as a result, Xi has pretended, at least on the surface, that he does not ship weapons to Russia. In addition, China and Russia agreed that they would never openly call themselves allies.
But it has also intensified its efforts to provide dual-use products as well as manufacturing equipment and chips essential to military industry. More notably, Russia, in a reversal of its previous wariness of Chinese development in the Far East, has allowed China to develop the Far East together with Russia since last year, while China has agreed to directly invest in key Russian industrial sectors, for a total of 79 major projects, with investments totaling more than $160bn. The major chunk of investments will be made this year.
Developing the Far East makes Russian military industry, given the introduction of Chinese technology and equipment, more capable of fighting a protracted war with.
Ukraine and even other so-called hostile countries. This is the very opposite of what some Western observers had believed.
Of course, it should be noted that the Sino-Russian axis has its own vulnerabilities and unpredictabilities.
First of all, neither side will help the other at the expense of its own core interests, and this is especially true of China. Take Putin’s long-dreamed of a 2,600 km (1,600-plus mile) Siberian Power 2 gas pipeline project, for example.
Russia desperately needs China to reach out and fully replace pre-war European purchases of natural gas. But Xi Jinping does not want to burdening China with overdependence on Russia and excessive spending on pipeline construction, especially when other suppliers are available, this author learned in private discussions.
Moreover, while Xi does not want to see Putin fall as a result of his defeat, he would not necessarily hold Putin’s hand if the West’s weaponry were to tip the balance in Ukraine’s favor.
For China, the key issue is not Vladimir Putin’s neck, it is the survival of communist party rule. That comes before everything else.
Dr. Junhua Zhang is Senior Associate at the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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