Tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia persist, and this despite the tacit rapprochement that materialized as a result of the meeting between the presidents of the two countries in October in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
During the talks, held on the margins of a CIS summit, Putin expressed regret that the Russian military shot down an Azeri civilian airliner in late 2024, killing 39 people. He blamed a combination of Ukrainian drone activity in Russian airspace and a malfunction in the air defense system. The Russian president pledged full cooperation with investigators and promised that the conduct of all officials involved would be scrutinized.
Relations had seemed to improve until late December, when the rhetoric took a radical turn for the worse. In a year-end press conference, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov revealed that Baku had been informed that Russia’s investigators had reportedly closed the criminal case.
When Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov suggested that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was expected at a forthcoming summit and that Putin was likely to meet him, Azeri media said their head of state would not attend.
Tensions intensified in early January when the Russian Investigative Committee’s findings surfaced in the media. The account of events appeared to absolve Russia’s military of any blame or involvement in the aircraft’s destruction, attributing the crash to poor weather and failed landing attempts in Grozny, and concluding that the aircraft ultimately struck the ground while approaching Aktau. The account omitted any mention of drone activity, air defense failures, missile detonations, or shrapnel damage — points that Putin had accepted and mentioned in Dushanbe.
Baku swiftly pointed out the contradictions and suggested that Moscow was seeking to escape legal responsibility. The National Forum of NGOs, meanwhile, addressed an open letter to Russia’s ambassador in Baku, calling the closure of the investigation unacceptable and difficult to comprehend. The Azerbaijani media portrayed Russia’s backpedaling as further proof of persisting tensions between Moscow and Baku.
Whatever the reasons for the last plunge in relations, the underlying cause is geopolitical. Russia wants primacy in the South Caucasus, while Azerbaijan, much like the rest of the region, resists it. A scheduled visit by US Vice President JD Vance to Azerbaijan and Armenia from February 9, which aims to promote Washington’s involvement in the region through the TRIPP project, is a direct challenge to Russia’s position.
It once again underlines Russia’s discomfort in former areas of strength, and underlines that Washington can act against the Kremlin’s sensitivities in what it likes to call its backyard. The war of choice in Ukraine has seen Kremlin allies in Syria and Venezuela tumble, and shown that in a more transactional world, it is not powerful enough to attain its geopolitical goals.
Turkey is also aiming at Russia’s position in the South Caucasus. Increasingly influential across the Middle East, Ankara has interests in many of the same areas. A Kremlin focused on Ukraine needs Turkey to move its lifeblood of sanctioned oil and gas, and for imports of key technology. That means it has to be mindful of what Turkey wants.
For Russia, the diminution of its influence over Azerbaijan is part of a bigger trend whereby the Western powers plus Turkey are limiting Moscow’s projection of power. Azerbaijan’s former rival, Armenia, is still bruised by the lack of Russian support during the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and has responded by looking for new arms suppliers and for a more diversified foreign policy. Russia’s relations with Georgia remain stalled, given the continuous occupation of some 20% of its territory.
Of course, Russia and Azerbaijan will remain pragmatic when it comes to commercial interests. Last year, trade between Azerbaijan and Russia reached a $5bn, a 2.5% rise compared to a year earlier. The two sides hope to reach $8bn in bilateral trade, a growth partly reliant on Russian trade with Iran. That would be helped by Eurasia-wide infrastructure projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor. Antagonizing each other would be costly. Russia can inflict tremendous economic pain on Azerbaijan, while the latter can limit Moscow’s ability to reach Iran. This means that the relationship will remain transactional in nature.
But the airliner disaster will continue to weigh heavily on Russia-Azerbaijan relations, although short of a major escalation, it should be manageable.
Some things are hard to forgive, particularly high-profile, mass casualty events like the downing of Flight 8243. Like Russia’s shooting down of Flight MH-17 over Ukraine in 2014, it was widely concluded that the Russian leadership prioritized the cover-up rather than the inquiry.
Symbolic apologies and verbal assurances, though diplomatically significant, cannot substitute for a meaningful shift in foreign policy. Unless Moscow reconciles its investigative findings with the commitments articulated at the political level, bilateral relations are likely to remain frosty at best.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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