Would NATO fight if Russia entered its territory? Yes, says CEPA Fellow Skip Davis, but it’s also the case that alliance readiness has been increased across the eastern flank in the last decade and now extends far beyond the ability to meet an armed attack.
Question: What would happen on the ground if Russian troops crossed into NATO territory? Would alliance commanders need to await permission to engage?
Davis: NATO forward land forces are multinational battle groups and brigades stationed on the eastern flank, mostly in countries bordering Russia. They have a lead nation, but they’re established in nine different countries along the east, from Finland all the way down to Romania, all the Baltics, Poland and Slovakia, Hungary. Under NATO doctrine, they have the right to respond in self-defense. They would not need permission to respond.
But that is the simplest response. We have to peel the onion a little bit because Russia would normally be expected to do some type of preparation.
The alliance has been improving the ability to see and identify what we call indicators and warnings that provide early signs of potential hostile intent. That is a daily task. NATO air policing units have already responded kinetically against drone incursions. And they are part of an active joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) network across the eastern flank to look at air forces, but also maritime or land forces.
Any type of aggression would be preceded by troop movements. They are going to conduct some type of movement or collection of forces like we saw starting in 2021 along the Ukrainian borders. That is why NATO reacted, and various nations démarched Russia to explain: “Hey, we’re seeing what you’re doing. And it doesn’t look like just intimidation. It looks like preparation for some type of offense.”
Apply that type of logic to the Baltics. Military preparations are constantly being observed across the border to understand Russian intent. So there’s all sorts of signaling, be it visual, radio traffic, etc. There would also be satellite imagery that is not intrusive. You can see well inside Russia where signatures would indicate preparations. That intent would be explained to the senior leadership; think of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the North Atlantic Council. NATO commands would enhance readiness on their own. Think of the alliance’s Allied Reaction Force (ARF), which replaced the NATO Reaction Force.
The SACEUR has political authority to deploy any element of the ARF, just as it did with the unit’s predecessor in February 2022. He could deploy elements or all of the ARF to a region or to a country that was under potential threat of aggression from Russia. He can do that without waiting for a council decision. That is significant, and that is new. That’s post-2022. In that regard, if they were there and were attacked, they could respond.
But deployment and employment are two different things. If NATO had not yet been attacked by Russia, employment in case of hostile action (with rules of engagement) would require a council decision. If NATO is attacked, once aggression occurs, a nation under attack can invoke Article 5. Other nations can decide to assist a nation invoking Article 5 without a council decision. This has happened many times in the past, for instance, in 2014, when the US sent air and land forces to the Baltics after aggression in Ukraine.
A country under attack would probably invoke Article 5, ask for assistance, and then immediately request either Article 4 consultations or ask for a collective NATO invocation of Article 5. A collective decision obviously has greater political impact. It demonstrates solidarity, and it allows NATO to employ the NATO command structure. Generally, for Article 5, which is the foundation of the Washington Treaty, that is not a discussion point. If it is a clear aggression, as in troops crossing the border or significant strikes into allied territory that are easily attributed, that is it.
Cruise or ballistic missiles, massive numbers of drones — those are fairly easily attributed, and they are getting more easily identifiable and attributable because of the increases in air surveillance and border security all across the eastern flank. It’s unlikely an aggression would not be clear or would be unattributable or deniable. There would be plenty of evidence to demonstrate the veracity of a nation saying “I have been attacked.”
It is going to be more effective than it would have been, for instance, in 2021 before Ukraine. There is lots of investment, lots of things being developed: fences in Finland, but also the deterrence initiative on the eastern flank, connecting sensors and border security with military forces and response, both NATO and national, are all part of a strengthened deterrence and defense. It is not complete yet. It is not the Maginot Line. It never will be. But hopefully it will be more effective. It’s also important to note that SACEUR has the delegated authority to activate the NATO defense plans, or at least those parts relating to increased readiness and force deployments. That gets people moving towards the fight very, very quickly and is being exercised on a regular basis by the Allied Reaction Force and regionally as well.
Question: What are the chances that NATO freezes when it comes to the moment of decision?
Davis: I think the risk is low. A bigger concern would be the lack of a coherent, timely, collective military response. That is most people’s greatest concern.
But I guess we need to realize a couple of things. A NATO collective response is best; it’s much more significant than individual allies coming to aid and assist an individual nation. In the case of the nations with forward land forces in countries like the Baltic states and Poland, you have got troops from Canada, Germany, the UK, France, the Baltic nations already, Sweden, Finland, US, and Poland. We have many allies with forward land forces in place. They are the ones most likely to reinforce their elements, and that is why even if there is not a quick NATO decision, things are going to be turning very, very fast in those capitals with troops already committed.
They already have reinforcement plans. They could enact those plans without a collective decision within a couple of days. In effect, many countries would find themselves already committed. And that is the whole reason for the forces being stationed in forward positions and why they are now larger than ever. Those nations are going to protect their own soldiers on allied soil. So that is another reason to think that you’re going to eventually have a collective response because you’ve got big nations: the US, UK, Germany, and Canada, actually committed to the defense of the eastern flank.
I have heard some say that Russia could dispute the attribution of an attack. I can understand that in some of the hybrid warfare scenarios, for example, unmarked drones attack a German transport. But if you consider a German transport moving supplies to Ukraine, what other explanation is there? It’s likely not going to be China.
The bigger issue would be the extent of the allied response. There could be discussions about what to strike, and about containing escalation so that we do not get to a nuclear threshold. Whether to strike Russian forces inside Russia, and where? The first obvious elements to be attacked are those that are for fighting from Russian soil and attacking allied soil.
Frankly, those are easy rules of engagement. You are not just going to try to catch all the arrows; you are going to strike the archer. That is very well understood and accepted in NATO defense policy. But NATO restrains itself and might avoid attacking anything linked to nuclear capability, be that land, air, or maritime, including nuclear subs and the various strategic bombers that Russia would use for delivery of nuclear weapons. They are dual-capable. Ukraine has struck these aircraft and their bases when they were not loaded with nuclear weapons, so that has helped us to better understand Russian red lines.
The cold feet issue? I just have a tough time accepting the fact that a country worried about being attacked by Russia would not support the collective invocation of Article 5, even if they are not directly threatened. Part of that is because it’s in their interest to recognize when another ally is threatened, because it could be their turn someday.
And two, they are not required to send anything, except what they have agreed to in defense plans. And it is not all 31 coming to the aid of the one ally under threat that matters; some nations may not be engaged. But the total will be a significant number. Once you get the big nations going, then the other nations tend to come along. I think we have more to worry about in future interpretations of a far-right government: Think AFD in Germany, think Front National in France. Those are to be watched.
The other risk I would say is Russian miscalculation. And we do not think about that enough. Allies may want to make their response extremely robust, in terms of what they do to the Russian forces involved and threaten other forces elsewhere as a warning not to employ them. So Russians may think, “OK, NATO will hesitate”. And they may be wrong about that. That opens a possibility of horizontal escalation, meaning geographical space, or vertical escalation is possible. And that is where NATO would have to react very rapidly and robustly because they do not have the integrated inter-missile defense right now that Ukraine has. They are susceptible to missile and drone salvos.
It’s possible some allies could be intimidated and coerced, but I doubt that they would hamstring the response of SACEUR and the Joint Force commanders.
Question: Is an attack on the Baltic States likely? And is NATO sufficiently prepared?
Davis: The reinforcement of the eastern flank has been going on for some time now and is just getting better and better month by month. Many see the risk of a Russian limited attack, which was low, as growing and growing.
Why? Because they assume that Putin sees a window before that defense is solid. And this is where, to me, the risk remains fairly low, because if they have still got Ukraine going on, they would not be able to mount a limited land grab, especially now that we see the capability of the Ukrainian forces in using combined arms warfare and their autonomous systems to gain ground. If Russia takes its eye off the ball in Ukraine and attacks an allied nation, they’d struggle to retain ground.
Hybrid warfare is much more likely, although I am concerned about the vulnerability of our allies to air missile threats.
I’ve just been to Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. I was in Vilnius, and before that in both Warsaw and Rzeszóv, which is near the border and is a big, huge air and logistics hub for allied support to Ukraine, and then in Riga. And they all share the Danish assessment of an escalating Russian shadow war campaign and potential for Russian aggression. They take it very seriously. I did not go to Estonia, but I know they specifically have exercises to reinforce the east in case of a potential land grab.
Latvia’s and Lithuania’s ministries of defense and army, which we were talking to, take the threat very seriously and are planning their capabilities and their eastern flank early warning, obstacles, reinforcement, defense plans, all in lockstep with that idea. They are constantly watching and sharing intelligence on what they see. If there is a potential threat, they’d see it.
Maj Gen (Ret) Skip Davis is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment after retiring from the US Army after more than 37 years of service. Commissioned in the infantry he served the first half of his career in rapid deployment airborne and infantry units and spent over 20 years abroad including command in Iraq and Afghanistan, and multiple operations in Africa and the Balkans.
Ester Ljunggren is CEPA Editorial Intern and a final-year undergraduate student at Gustavus Adolphus College, where she studies political science, economics, and Russian. Originally from Sweden, her research interests include European and Eurasian affairs, political economy, and authoritarianism and democratic resilience in the post-Soviet region.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
