Construction of a permanent Russian naval base in Ochamchire, in the illegally occupied statelet of Abkhazia, is underway just over 18 miles (30km) from a planned Chinese-operated deep-sea port in Anaklia.
That shouldn’t cause a problem, should it? After all, the two countries have a so-called no-limits partnership, and China is fueling Russia’s military machine.
However, the proximity of the two projects and the differing ambitions they represent demonstrate the complexities of the relationship. This, after all, is what Russia likes to call the near abroad, where it has traditionally been jealous of supposed rights around its borders. Russia may rely on China’s economic support, but it is wary of Beijing’s growing influence.
Building the naval base represents an attempt to reassert Russian strategic influence in the Black Sea region, a theater of heightened importance due to the Russia-Ukraine war. While the port may not be ideally located for direct military engagement (it’s in the far east of the sea), it offers Russia a strategic logistical hub, potentially aiding supply lines. It is also further from the ports of Sevastopol and Novorossiysk, which have both been subject to Ukrainian attack and are regarded as vulnerable.
The Ochamchire base also signals Moscow's intent to address Beijing’s expanding presence in the South Caucasus, particularly near Anaklia, a key hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. A Georgian report stated that every project worth more than $100m since 2021 was funded with Chinese money. So, while Russia cannot hope to match Chinese wealth, the proximity of the bases certainly underlines the Kremlin’s desire to maintain influence. There is a clear tension between the narrative of “unlimited partnership” and the reality.
China’s 49% ownership of the Anaklia facility reflects a broader strategy of acquiring global port assets to enhance its trade dominance. Part of the Middle Corridor project, it is vital for connecting Asia to Europe via the Black Sea. For the Kremlin, China's growing influence in the Caucasus risks diminishing its own control over regional trade.
Russia is nonetheless continuing to extend its military cooperation with China, as seen in its participation in Exercise Maritime Cooperation 2024 in the Far East. This drill reflects their shared strategic interests, particularly in counterbalancing Western influence, but it also underlines another less-discussed point. The Kremlin’s decision to attack Ukraine has left it short of friends. Without China, it cuts a lonely figure on the international stage.
The result? It must accept whatever Xi Jinping offers, and its fears about Beijing’s growing influence are necessarily muted.
At the same time, the proximity of the Russian base to China’s economic investment poses a significant risk for Beijing. As Ukraine continues to take the war to wherever Russia establishes military assets, any Russian build-up increases the likelihood that Kyiv might target the area. A multi-million dollar port (past estimates have suggested the project could cost $2.5bn) close to the scene of military action might become an expensive farce.
Both sides will remember the fundamentals of their relationship. Beijing remains Russia’s largest buyer of cheap oil, and trade has ballooned, with Chinese imports soaring. Russia struggles to source the quantity and quality of dual-use goods from elsewhere despite its extensive sanctions-evasion network.
But it cannot allow China to expand without challenge. It is not just extending its naval infrastructure in the Black Sea but also seeking to reassert its influence across the region through infrastructure developments and diplomatic and economic initiatives. A central element is the reconstruction of the Abkhaz railway system, which enhances Moscow’s connections to Iran and the Persian Gulf, thus bolstering trade routes that bypass Western-controlled corridors.
It is also deepening its ties with both Azerbaijan and Iran; the latter has become a key ally and supplier of military hardware, including ballistic missiles and drones for the war against Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has made high-profile visits to Tehran and Baku to underline the importance of the relationships.
China, like most nations, does not recognize the breakaway, Russian-occupied republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in part to avoid undermining its position on Taiwan. This makes Russia’s military buildup in Abkhazia doubly tricky for Beijing.
For the West, the tensions between Russia and China in the Black Sea present both challenges and opportunities.
The base in Ochamchire complicates NATO’s ability to project power in the region, but it also offers an opening to engage with Georgia and other Black Sea states. Anaklia could finally give Georgia a deep-sea port and so become a key trading hub between Europe and Asia. This might accelerate Georgia’s economic development and strengthen ties with the West. Much will depend on Georgia’s critical October election, which is lining up to be a referendum on the country’s strategic outlook.
NATO and the European Union must be ready to act quickly to counter authoritarian influence. But it also needs willing partners, and right now, those are in short supply.
Nino Lezhava is a research analyst based in Georgia, specializing in Euro-Atlantic relations, geopolitical competition, the Black Sea, and South Caucasus.
Dr. Leon Hartwell is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CEPA and a Senior Associate at LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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