Russia’s step forward comes in Armenia, where recent developments will have put a smile on the faces of Kremlin officials.
The country had been slipping away since Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine three years ago. Armenia had diversified its foreign policy. Relations with the European Union (EU) advanced to the point of the Armenian government openly stating its desire to achieve eventual membership. Similarly, the country sought greater engagement with the United States up to the point of signing a strategic partnership agreement in early 2025, just before the departure of the Biden administration.
Even in the security realm, Armenia has made tremendous changes. Just a few days ago, it signed an agreement on military cooperation for 2025-2026 with the UK. Armenia has also signed a deal to import $2bn of Indian arms and to buy French weaponry, including 155mm self-propelled artillery and air defense systems, so minimizing dependence on Russia’s arms market.
But the geopolitical weather has changed and Armenia is being forced to pursue a different track.
Firstly, there is a painful realization that the country’s accession to the EU is an unrealistic prospect, especially against the backdrop of dire relations between neighboring Georgia and the EU.
Secondly, the ruling party, Civil Contract, recently lost a local election in the city of Gyumri (the second largest in Armenia). The opposition managed to form a coalition, and the openly pro-Russian Vardan Ghukasyan became mayor. This result clearly showed the Armenian government that there is a good chance that it could be defeated in the scheduled 2026 parliamentary elections.
That has made the government more open to resetting relations with Russia out of both pragmatic calculation — to reduce pressure on the government within the country, where many are dissatisfied with the current poor relationship with Russia — and also as a geopolitical necessity because of EU and US disengagement.
On a more practical level, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the Victory parade in Moscow in May. And in another sign of the deepening rapprochement, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Yerevan on May 20. This had been preceded by signals indicating the Armenian authorities have softened their position and become less critical of Moscow.
Another reason, albeit indirect, is that Armenia sees tensions in relations between Moscow and its old enemy in Azerbaijan as an opportunity to win back the Kremlin’s favor.
And this represents the step backwards for Putin’s regime. Azerbaijan and the Kremlin have been engaged in an uncomfortable often acrimonious exchanges since December’s shooting down of an Azerbaijani jet by Russian air defenses; 38 people were killed. Baku demanded an outright apology, without result. All of which has caused indignation in Azerbaijan and prompted the country’s president, Ilham Aliyev, to stay away from the May 9 victory Parade in Moscow.
Russian cyberattacks on the country’s media platforms have added to the cooling of relations. Azerbaijan responded by banning one of the Russian ultranationalist TV channels — Tsargrad — from broadcasting on its territory. Moreover, in April and May, Azerbaijan also held meetings with Ukrainian officials, which is quite notable given Baku’s previously careful approach to the war. The signal to Russia was clear.
Yet, there’s more to it than this. Azerbaijan has simply become more confident in its foreign policy following its conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 and the ensuing withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces. The country is now being courted by an ever-greater number of important players, in part because of its significant gas reserves – production has expanded more than sixfold since 2022.
There are now hints of greater engagement between the US and Azerbaijan. Recently, the special envoy of the US president for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, stated that Azerbaijan (which has warm relations with Israel) is among the countries that may join the Abraham Accords in the near future. He mentioned other countries too, including Armenia, Syria, and Lebanon, but it is Azerbaijan which stands out due to its geographic position just to the north of Iran.
Iran is also courting Azerbaijan, as underlined by the April visit from Iran’s president. The Iranian authorities emphasized the point on May 21 by executing a man who attacked the Azerbaijani embassy in early 2023.
Others in the queue include China, Israel, Turkey, Central Asian states, and the Gulf states. While relative independence in foreign affairs may come at the cost of tension with Russia, it’s a price the Baku regime seems happy to pay.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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