Vice President JD Vance used a speech at the Munich Security Conference on Valentine’s Day to attack “totalitarianism” in Europe. He spoke on the day of love, but there was no affection at all for Romania’s liberal democratic parties.
Vance singled out Romania’s cancelled presidential election as he accused Ukraine’s allies in the European Union (EU) of being the “enemy within” and afraid of their own people. The vice president said the invalidation of the election was an undemocratic attempt to deny voters their choice. It is hard to think of such language being aimed at Romania by the US at any time since the 1989 revolution.
Bucharest annulled November’s presidential election, in which the far-right, pro-Russian outsider Calin Georgescu came first, after the Constitutional Court ruled there had been significant interference from Russia to illegally boost his chances.
Four days before Vance’s comments, continuing political instability saw outgoing President Klaus Iohannis forced to resign, the first Romanian head of state to ever do so, leaving the nation more divided than ever and mainstream parties in turmoil.
Iohannis’ departure opens the way for a NATO-skeptic far-right candidate, possibly Georgescu if he is allowed to stand again, in a rerun of the presidential elections. Such a victory would weaken Romania’s commitment to NATO and the EU, and cause problems for the Western alliance in the strategic Black Sea region and on Europe’s eastern flank.
All of which would be good news for Russia, which seeks to rollback NATO’s eastward expansion (Romania joined the alliance in 2004) and to agree a direct deal with the US over Ukraine, largely bypassing Kyiv and Brussels, as a chance to weaken Western allies in the region.
And it is Romania’s right-wing nationalists who stand to benefit most from the new Washington-Moscow entente cordiale.
So how did Romania go from the most reliable Western ally in the region to a country beset by political instability? It began when outsider Georgescu unexpectedly — and improbably — won the first round of last year’s presidential election. Citing intelligence showing foreign meddling in Georgescu’s campaign, the Constitutional Court cancelled the runoff, with the government scheduling a rerun for May 4.
The ruling has proved divisive, raising tensions, and has served to boost the profile of Georgescu, who is now the frontrunner. The episode prompted Vance to take aim at the court, accusing it of relying on “flimsy evidence” to suppress ultra-conservative parties. “If your democracy can be destroyed with a few hundred thousand dollars of digital advertising from a foreign country, then it wasn’t very strong to begin with?” he said.
Romania’s nationalists, who are anti-Ukrainian but not overtly pro-Russian, hold about a third of seats in Parliament following the December 1 elections. They are expected to tap into the unexpected boost from Washington and portray Georgescu, or another far-right candidate, as the “American” choice, which would resonate with some voters.
This has been further reinforced by a report in the Financial Times that the White House has stepped in to plead for greater freedom for Andrew Tate and his brother Tristan, a pair of misogynist pro-Trump social media influencers who are being investigated in Romania for people trafficking, sexual offences, money laundering and engagement in organized crime.
Nationalists, who had already gained momentum in the months following the election invalidation, forced Iohannis’ hand by tabling an impeachment motion which analysts said he could have lost with defections from mainstream parties. If that had happened, there would have been a referendum, spelling even more disruption and turmoil at a precarious moment.
A nationalist win in the presidential election, and a subsequent move away from the West, would represent a sharp turn in direction for Romania from the 30-year pro-Atlantic course it formally committed to in the 1995 Snagov Declaration. That was signed by the leaders of all major political parties at the time.
But over the tears, Romanian democracy has been weakened by disillusion with a ruling elite that has been corrupt and sometimes self-serving. The hard-right has exploited this by focusing on themes of national sovereignty, anti-elitism, and Christian revival, which was amplified by trusted Orthodox clergy. Even as Romania’s economy overtook its neighbors, there were significant disparities in the distribution of wealth. Large urban centers thrived on Romania’s integration into the EU while rural areas and small towns felt left behind.
Georgescu, a former agriculture ministry official who has parroted the Kremlin line that Ukraine is an “invented state,” has harnessed an angry anti-establishment mood which is challenging the traditional pro-European parties.
However, it is not certain that Georgescu or any other nationalist candidate will secure an easy victory, even with Russian and American help. Iohannis’ exit may clear the path for a fresher, pro-Western face to make the case for Romania as a reliable member of the EU and NATO, both of which remain popular in the country. Romania is currently constructing the alliance’s biggest airbase on the continent at a cost of $2.7bn.
Those fighting to keep Romania inside the Western camp include Crin Antonescu, a former Liberal Party leader and candidate for the “Romania, Onwards” government coalition, who says he wants to “save Romania from a catastrophe.”
“We can’t turn back; there’s no time to lose,” he said. “I’m the only one who can get the plane back on track and re-establish its Western trajectory.”
Bucharest mayor Nicusor Dan, an independent, is also in with a chance with his low-key approach focusing on efficiency and distancing himself from mainstream political parties.
Even the many detractors of the former president acknowledge that his decade in office kept Romania, which shares the EU’s longest border with Ukraine, as a stable pro-Western state on NATO’s eastern flank. Disappointment with Iohannis was based on his hands-off leadership style and failure to meet people’s expectations for reform of the political establishment.
Non-nationalist politicians face the difficult task of showing they’ve heard the public’s grievances, while at the same time promoting a pro-European line.
Alison Mutler is a British journalist who has been working in Romania for almost 35 years. She was the Associated Press bureau chief for 25 years and was part of a team that covered the Romanian revolution for the British TV channel ITN. For the past five years, she has worked for the Romanian-English website Universul.net and has been its director for three years.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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