Once Chechnya’s blood-soaked leader is gone, a significant change will take place in the political landscape of Chechen society: a dialogue will commence between different factions that could ultimately lead to their cooperation against the Kremlin.
The issue has been discussed, albeit sotto voce, since alarmist reports about the 47-year-old’s health circulated in September. Some suggested he was gravely ill or even dead. As with repeated reports about Vladimir Putin’s health, these are unreliable indicators of the truth.
Nonetheless, the question of what comes afterward is worth asking. The region’s current governance is organized in such a way that crucial political decisions are orchestrated by Putin’s regime. The actions of nearly every prominent Chechen politician or official can be seen as a consequence of power dynamics in Russia’s administration, ministries, and special services.
There is a singular political apparatus built around Kadyrov and driven by violence and corruption, and there is a reluctance among those involved to dismantle it. Information leaking from the “inner circle” about the choice of a successor suggests that Moscow and Grozny are thinking about the issue and are keen to ensure that any succession plan ensures financial flows are preserved when change comes.
The names of Magomed Daudov, Adam Delimkhanov, and Abuzayd Vismuradov are mentioned as potential successors. Surprisingly, Muslim Khuchiev, the Chechen prime minister who always acts as head of the republic when Kadyrov goes on vacation, is not among the candidates, at least according to leaked information.
Kadyrov has never been a competent manager or a military professional. Political matters that traditionally fell under the purview of the KRA community (several dozen of Kadyrov’s inner circle whose car license plates contain the three letters K-R-A) have been resolved by Daudov, the Speaker of Parliament, who is often referred to as “Lord.”
He was a frontman in the conflict over land with the Ingush in 2018-2019, for example, and engaged in negotiations with his Dagestani counterparts.
Adam Delimkhanov has long held responsibility for matters related to the military and security issues. A deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation notorious for threatening to “rip the heads off” opponents, he allegedly wields considerable influence over a substantial portion of the criminal sphere, including Chechen and Caucasian organized crime domestically and internationally.
Much has been written about Delimkhanov’s office in the President Hotel in Moscow. And Pavel Krotov, whose role in the wholesale appropriation of properties, including in Ukraine, was described in a “Project” investigation, who works for Delimkhanov rather than Kadyrov. It’s an irony that Delimkhanov’s exit from the game would almost certainly have greater consequences for Grozny and other Russian regions than the loss of Kadyrov.
The extreme brutality attributed to Kadyrov, along with a series of forced public apologies by his critics and a video depicting a savage assault on a Quran burner in a pre-trial detention facility, reportedly by Kadyrov’s son, can be seen as an effort to compensate for the deficiency of his institutional authority. Fear is the only means of maintaining control over his surroundings and the republic.
In Kadyrov’s circles, both in his ancestral village of Centoroy and beyond, there are a significant number of individuals who committed crimes against their own people for whom bloodshed is not only permitted but expected.
Kadyrov’s eventual departure will offer the possibility of a reconciliation with those who fought for the republic’s independence. This would open an opportunity for the unification of Chechens.
Firstly, with Kadyrov out of the picture, his personal and absolute dependence on Moscow and Putin would end.
Any new leader would surely consider the prospects, including a near-certain entry into the world’s top 10 most-wanted war criminals (since running Chechnya for Putin is invariably a bloody business.)
Secondly, Kadyrov’s departure from the scene might well open a Pandora’s box of retribution for the suffering, torture, and abductions of relatives that his loyalists have inflicted on the population over nearly two decades.
Many individuals who have acquired positions and wealth from Grozny and the Kremlin will attempt to blame-shift their responsibility onto Kadyrov and his family. They will seek dialogue with the victims’ relatives and be prepared to go to great lengths to evade retribution.
Thirdly, it is difficult to believe that armed representatives from the diaspora, most of whom instill fear in their relatives at home due to their religious fundamentalism, could fight their way to political power after returning to the republic. They, too, will have to seek compromises to facilitate their return.
This necessary compromise, crucial for Chechen society to avert a civil war, is more likely to push Chechens towards a joint national liberation project. For some, it will be the sole path back to their homeland, for others it will signify forgiveness.
Zarina Sautieva is an in-residence fellow with the Democracy Fellowship program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She is a human rights defender and researcher from Ingushetia, Russia. She has a master’s degree in International Protection of Human Rights and worked at the human rights organization Stichting Justice Initiative. She was also a Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution and a Public Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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