The possible withdrawal of the United States forces from the European continent and the prospect that the Trump administration may not just be indifferent to its security but outright hostile have fundamentally reshaped the strategic environment.
Not only has an immediate and existential threat emerged to the east, but the alliance system with the US — for nearly eight decades a core pillar of European security — appears to be in disarray. There is now a real possibility that European states may have to confront Russia on the battlefield without American support.
As a result, deterrence has reemerged as a key necessity rather than the abstract concept it became after the Cold War. Decision-makers in European capitals must carefully assess how to deter a revisionist Russia that may soon be rewarded for its imperial ambitions in Ukraine. The next step, and one that Putin endorsed in 2021, is to effectively dismantle NATO and the idea of collective defense in Europe altogether.
Yet, across the continent, it remains unclear whether leaders fully grasp what deterrence requires.
Broadly speaking, it is a function of capability and resolve.
First, to deter Russia, European states need the military capabilities to deny a Russian attack or impose unacceptable costs in response.
Europe’s military buildup has been progressing, though far too slowly given the scale of the security challenge (a March 4 European Commission proposal for as much as $850bn in additional defense spending may mark a step change, if fully implemented).
Defense manufacturing capacity remains insufficient, weakening both Ukraine and Europe’s ability to rearm. Nevertheless, military preparedness has improved, and most European states now largely recognize that defense investments are not optional, though significant disparities remain. Unsurprisingly, geographic proximity to Russia remains a key determinant of defense spending.
Second, deterrence requires visible demonstrations of resolve. Capability is meaningless if the adversary doubts our willingness to use it — and this is where Europe’s primary weakness lies.
While the balance of power between European NATO states and Russia has shifted in NATO’s favor, thanks to increased European defense spending since 2022, extreme Russian losses in manpower and equipment, and Russia’s deteriorating economy, there is now a dangerous asymmetry in perceived balance of resolve.
Russia has consistently demonstrated its willingness to take extreme risks to achieve military and political objectives, absorbing immense societal suffering in pursuit of victory.
In contrast, European leaders, particularly those located in the western parts of the continent, have wavered at key moments, signaling severe risk aversion and pain intolerance. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Berlin, where Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his government repeatedly signaled to Moscow that minimizing direct risks to Germany was their top priority, even as the catastrophic consequences of a Ukrainian defeat became increasingly apparent.
In this situation, to what extent can the Kremlin believe that European resolve would hold firm in a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO? While an attack on a NATO member would undoubtedly present a different scenario — one in which European resolve might naturally be stronger — the direct risks would also be far greater, with nuclear escalation an immediate possibility rather than a distant concern.
Would Russia be certain that Western European states like Germany would respond with full force rather than once again prioritizing risk minimization, this time at the potential expense of their Central and East European allies? The issue is not whether European NATO allies would necessarily take this approach, but whether Putin and his inner circle believed they might, and thus miscalculate. Even if European resolve proves much stronger than Russia expects, a large-scale war could still result from such a misjudgment.
To prevent this, European leaders must make a concerted effort to demonstrate resolve. Wanting to avoid risks for one’s own societies is not inherently wrong, but leaders must be more aware of how their rhetoric — even when intended for domestic audiences — affects the credibility of their deterrence abroad. Fear is natural and entirely human. But projecting it outward risks inviting aggression, especially as the perceived balance of resolve moves further in favor of Russia.
Without a doubt, some European states face a steeper uphill battle than others. In particular, the likely next German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, will need to repair the damage caused by the previous government to Germany and Europe’s deterrence while balancing coalition politics, reassuring allies, and demonstrating resolve toward Moscow.
If Merz must err one way or the other, he should choose resolve (and the early signs here are positive — following the February 23 election, he said it was his “absolute priority . . . to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible.”)
This does not mean he or other European leaders should take unnecessary risks, but they must recognize that the message they send to the Kremlin is at least as crucial to deterrence as the defensive capabilities they now plan to build.
Fabian Hoffmann is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project (ONP). His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and defense policy. His PhD project focuses on the implications of conventional long-range strike weapons on nuclear strategy. His research has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, European Security, War on the Rocks, The Washington Post, and elsewhere.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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