Moldovan voters will be asked on October 20 to endorse a parliamentary vote to press ahead with EU integration in the teeth of Russian opposition. President Maia Sandu is backing a Yes vote on the same day that her own future will be decided in the presidential election.
If the vote succeeds, and the turnout is at least 33% of registered voters, it would establish EU integration as a strategic goal of the Republic of Moldova by enshrining the decision in its constitution.
The Kremlin’s allies in Chişinău have indicated their displeasure, with pro-Russian opposition parties walking out of the parliamentary vote.
Russia has the motive and means to disrupt the referendum. It has devoted extensive resources, including covert activities, to undermining Moldova’s pro-Western parties and bringing the country “back” into its Eurasian sphere of influence.
Transnistria, the Russian-backed breakaway region on the border with Ukraine, is Moscow’s dagger at Chisinau’s neck and includes a small Russian-officered military force. Moldova’s pro-Russian opposition has meanwhile announced the formation of a unified voting bloc in Moscow. It is fair to say, given its past behavior, that the Kremlin will be heavily engaged to defeat the referendum and unseat Sandu.
This is not as easy as it once was. Despite the force in Transnistria, the area is sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine and has no sea access. So while the Kremlin can bang the table, its options for direct, physical intervention are limited. There are limits too for the pro-Russian opposition leader, the Russia-based Ilan Șor, who is unable to campaign in the country because he faces 15 years in prison for his part in a $1bn bank fraud.
True, its supporters inside Moldova can be disruptive. The Russian-born Vadim Krasnoselsky, head of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), rages against the government, while Russia fuels disinformation campaigns, for example using AI to suggest Sandu had banned the drinking of rosehip tea, a national favorite. There is also a wide spectrum of cyberattacks.
NATO and the EU know all this, and their response should be spring-loaded. An alliance operation should be readied to handle the range of possible outcomes, in response to Chişinău’s possible pleas for help.
Romania is in Russia’s sights due to its geographic and historical closeness to Moldova (most Moldovans speak Romanian.) A NATO mission should be readied to prepare for the coming Russian campaign, giving a solid indication that the West is not going to budge on its backing for Sandu and her government.
The risks are easy to identify. Moldova’s economic digitization is leagues ahead of the technical and legal infrastructure needed to protect it, so cybersecurity operations will be hugely important.
The omnipresent insider threat is dramatically worsened by Russia’s occupation and influence operations, and cybersecurity lapses will open two major threats: general disruption and political disinformation.
Cyberattacks against banks, energy supply, and other businesses can stir up economic uncertainty, while wider social disorder can be sparked by attacking hospitals and other public utilities. In the lead-up to a referendum called by a pro-EU incumbent, financial panic and disarray can be played up and used to affect the outcome.
The London-based think-tank RUSI has identified “hack and leak” operations in Moldova as a serious propaganda risk. A 2022 leak of electronic communications between cabinet members kicked up controversy due to both the content and the suggestion it was from an insider.
A NATO cyber-support mission could provide consultation, technical expertise, and counter-information. Some cyber operations are best fought by common sense practices and knowledge of risks, not technical details, and the alliance can offer that in spades.
Alliance advisors would be able to ensure adherence to cybersecurity best practices, such as adopting “zero trust” models. Integration would take time and should thus begin immediately, while active cyber defense operators offer support to Moldova’s undermanned Cyber Emergency Response Team.
Cyber forensic operators would be able to meet fire with fire by identifying Russian and pro-Russian intelligence and military cyber actors. They should be targeted in “name and shame” campaigns to show the Moldovan population the cause of their heartburn.
At the same time as offering concrete cyber support, Brussels would do well to turn threat intelligence into diplomatic overtures. Where possible, Russian and Transnistrian plots uncovered by Western intelligence agencies should be unveiled and publicized.
If NATO’s cybersecurity and intelligence leaders are well-prepared for the operation, it would do more than protect Moldova. It would reinforce the alliance’s current footing, much as the declassification of intelligence about Russia’s invasion plans for Ukraine underlined the alliance’s resolve in February 2022.
The West has already suffered a serious setback in Georgia, where a Russia-friendly government is scheming to shift the country back into the Kremlin orbit despite huge popular opposition. It needs to get back ahead of the curve in Moldova and throttle this latest, transparent Russian plot.
Michael C. DiCianna is a research assistant with the Yorktown Institute. He has worked as a consultant in the US intelligence community for several years, focusing on military affairs in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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