Russian President Putin told a meeting of the Security Council on September 25 that there would be changes to the country’s nuclear doctrine. In fact, what he announced confirmed existing military practices rather than a new approach.
The evening meeting was a very obviously crafted attempt to draw the attention of the United States, where the business day had just begun. The US is considered in Russia to be the main instigator of Western military aid to Ukraine, the main conductor of NATO’s military policy, and Russia’s main geopolitical opponent.
It was stated during the meeting that the change in the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (nuclear doctrine) was the result of a change in the military-political situation. That is, the war in Ukraine is not going the way the Kremlin would like. In an effort to alter the terms of debate, the nuclear doctrine has been employed to address a tactical political problem, rather than as a document defining Russian strategy.
Russia finds itself in a bind. Dissatisfied and angered by the growing sophistication of the weaponry sent to Ukraine and discussions of its wider use inside Russia, it has sought to deter by drawing a series of so-called red lines. One after the other, these have been crossed as circumstances changed.
Yet the possibility of nuclear weapons use has to be taken seriously and (as the US has admitted) focuses discussion in Washington. In an effort to exert pressure, but not strengthen the real nuclear deterrence policy, the Kremlin sees changing the nuclear doctrine as the most effective solution.
At the meeting, Putin immediately noted that the use of nuclear forces is an extreme measure to protect the country’s sovereignty. Dmitry Peskov, the president’s press secretary, later noted that the proposed changes do not yet affect the global situation, since everyone already knows about Russia’s nuclear potential. Changes in the doctrine expanded the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons but remained as uncertain as before. That is, it aims to increase the fear of escalation without detailing the circumstances under which Russia would use nuclear weapons. In effect, this determination continues to rest with one man.
Thus the nuclear doctrine is not a mechanism triggered by certain events, where a red button lights up and a nuclear missile launches in response. The use of nuclear weapons is always a response to a set of variables, in a given situation, time, and types of threat. It is always a decision based on the forecast of the development of military threats. This is not only a military response, but also a political one. That is, further measures to expand or clarify the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the doctrine are not unconditional.
Putin said that in the updated version of the doctrine, aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear state, may be considered a joint attack on the Russian Federation.
In other words, Putin almost repeats the Budapest Memorandum signed by Russia in 1994. There, in agreement with the United States and Great Britain, it was declared in relation to Ukraine that nuclear weapons would not be used against a non-nuclear member of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), except in cases of an attack by such a state, together, or in alliance with a nuclear state. That is, Russia seems to be hinting legally at the possibility of carrying out a nuclear strike on Ukraine, but in fact no one even before the change in doctrine thought that Russia was incapable of this.
The Kremlin talks about the “participation” and “support” of a nuclear state that would make such an attack a joint endeavor. This is deliberately vague. What is meant by participation and support? That’s deliberate. The intention is to create uncertainty in the mind of the West when aiding Ukraine so that it must consider its actions against the possibility of a nuclear response from Moscow.
A “joint attack” is also a hint that Russia may use nuclear weapons against this allied nuclear state. The West, among which there are three nuclear-armed powers, is already helping Ukraine, and Russian officials already define this assistance as participation in the conflict.
The new doctrine expands the list of methods that may trigger a nuclear response. This was previously limited to ballistic missile attacks, but now includes any aircraft or missile, from drones to strategic bombers.
However, the Kremlin is talking only about a massive launch and not about single or group flights or launches. In fact, such a massive attack could be a reason for a nuclear response and, within the framework of the old doctrine, as threatening the existence of Russia or an attack on objects that interfere with the response of nuclear forces.
It should be noted that Ukraine is already attacking Russia using drone swarms — as with what Russia termed the “huge” September 18 attack on the Toropets ammunition depot and another on September 21 using 100 drones.
In the previous doctrine, the nuclear umbrella extended to Belarus only in case of an attack against it by ballistic missiles or any weapons of mass destruction, but now nuclear protection has become complete in case of aggression using conventional weapons. But once again, this merely confirms the Military Doctrine of the Union State of 2021, where the parties consider any violent action directed against one of the participants as an encroachment on the Union State that will lead to retaliatory measures using all forces and means, that is, nuclear weapons.
Tactical nuclear weapons have been actively used in joint exercises since the 1990s, and with their deployment in Belarus, they were finally confirmed as a means of nuclear deterrence of aggression against Belarus.
Thus the changes in the nuclear doctrine actually confirm principles already established in Russian military practice. The participation of nuclear states in aggression against non-nuclear states carries the danger of escalation into a global conflict.
Russia’s statements do clarify some areas, but the fundamental conditions for the use of its nuclear weapons remain unchanged — a nuclear response will follow events that threaten the very existence of the state (meaning the existence of the current regime) and the threat of nuclear weapons use is the foundation of its power.
Maxim Starchak is an independent expert on Russian nuclear policy, defense, and the nuclear industry. Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy of the Queen’s University in Canada and a Russia Correspondent for Defense News.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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