Days before Russia and its ally Belarus began military exercises to practice an attack on NATO’s eastern flank, the Kremlin probed alliance air defenses in Poland. The unprecedented seven-hour long incursion seemed designed to test military readiness and responses, and also to evaluate the broader political response.
One unanticipated reaction was Poland’s decision to close its eastern border with Belarus, whose skies were used by the 19 or more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on September 9-10.
This was a decision with serious consequences. It closed down rail traffic and thereby shut off a route that accounts for 90% of European Union (EU) railroad trade with China. The route carries an estimated $30bn of good annually.
At no point did Poland suggest that its decision was an act of hybrid warfare, that is a hostile act toward a foreign state short of outright war. Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński cited security concerns raised by the Russian-Belarus Zapad-2025 exercise, which is an openly unfriendly biennial military drill designed to rattle Poland and the Baltic states.
But when the exercise ended on September 16, the border closure did not. As of September 23 it remained in force.
It’s interesting to examine the words of Poland’s Foreign Ministry and its hawkish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. After a September 15 meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who had demanded a change in Polish policy, the Foreign Ministry said: “It was made very clear during the talks that in this situation, the logic of trade, which is also beneficial for us, is being replaced by the logic of security. And that was expressed very clearly by Minister Sikorski.”
China may have concluded that it’s being sent a message. It may even recognize a policy that comes masked with official denials, since that it how it has repeatedly behaved in Ukraine.
The country is a key ally — even the “decisive enabler” — for the Kremlin’s campaign to erase Ukrainian statehood, supplying large amounts of goods while funding the war through energy purchases. The contribution of its industries to Russian drone production, for example, is assessed as extremely important.
So it is conceivable that Poland has looked at China’s role in the mayhem on its eastern border and concluded that it carries a large weight of responsibility.
The block on trade will undoubtedly hit the Polish economy, and the government is already talking about compensation for firms that were affected.
Whilst this is not the first time that there have been tensions on the border, the complete suspension of goods has deeply complicated economic activity for China.
The railroad trade through the two countries is significant: whilst it may be under 4% of China’s trade to the European continent, it is significant and growing, not least because rail is three times faster than shipping (15 days compared to 45). The high volume of Chinese goods through the route is reflective of its key role in global trade: exports are a range of products, from frozen foods and fish through to high-value electronic devices. Whilst much of the trade will be unperishable, any delay to the food products will result in items being lost.
Should the route remain closed, it is reflective of a significant sunk cost for China, which heavily invested in Minsk’s transport facilities. Chinese investment, part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to create a new Silk Road, has had a transformative effect on Belarusian rail: high-speed rail capacity increased, routes were electrified, and a significant number of jobs were created.
With trade at a halt, China will see little return, and this forces adaptation: whether by sea or through the Baltic, new routes will need to be created. But even through the Baltics, an easy route, is not without political challenges for China. Lithuania has had several disputes with the superpower, including a trade dispute emerging from the recognition of Taiwan. Estonia and Latvia, whilst not as difficult, still perceive themselves as strongly within Western security frameworks, making negotiations challenging. China’s primary economic tool internationally is now being exposed to local geopolitical pressures, and any adaptation will be costly.
With the Chinese economy now suffering collateral damage from Russian and Belarusian aggression in Central and Eastern Europe, China finds itself in a bind.
It has already committed a great deal of political and economic investment into its “no limits” partnership with Russia and its Belarusian dependency. Its only real option is to press Warsaw and the EU, which has said it is closely following events.
It appears that the era when China could maintain its friendships with Europe’s authoritarian states while exploiting free trade with the EU, while refusing to open its own markets, is coming to an end. The EU is deeply unhappy about a trade relationship it terms “critically unbalanced” and characterized by “systemic distortions” resulting in an enormous €600bn annual trade deficit.
Poland has acted alone in this case. But other European states will be watching with huge interest. A few policymakers may even allow themselves a smile as they see Europe dishing out the same medicine that it has been force-fed for many years.
Jack Daniel Dean is a Ph.D. candidate at University College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies, where he researches Central and Eastern Europe. He primarily works on Romanian politics, but his research interests address the history and politics of the region more broadly.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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