1. A Domestic Policy Document Without an Institutional Anchor
The National Security Strategy (NSS), published in December, is above all a conversation between the Trump White House and parts of its own camp. It serves as political self-assurance, not strategic commitment. Trump wants to be free to make decisions and deals; he does not want to be bound by a framework of grand strategies. There is no coordinated line among American institutions, and rapid implementation is not to be expected.
2. A Worldview Without Order and a Strategic Contradiction
The NSS sees international politics primarily as a series of bilateral deals. Rules, institutions, and multilateral structures hardly play a role. At the same time, Washington claims global leadership without wanting to pursue global governance, an approach that will be hard to sustain.
3. Conspicuous Omissions: Russia and China
China is only mentioned in passing, and Russia is almost exclusively from a European perspective. At the same time, it remains unclear whether the US will take a confrontational stance or whether it will primarily seek deals with China and Russia at the expense of others. Nonetheless, the threat posed by the developing Chinese-Russian axis is unquestionable and makes the case for transatlantic cooperation in the most vivid way.
4. Ukraine: Pressure on Kyiv, not Moscow
The current demand for a quick ceasefire ignores the fact that Russia is blocking it. Implicitly, the pressure on a victim of Russian aggression indicates that the US would be willing to accept that Ukraine and nearby parts of Europe could become a Russian zone of influence. That has grim implications for NATO’s new allies, whose membership the Kremlin sees as part of the “root causes” of its war.
5. Rejection of NATO Expansion – More Rhetorical Candy than Strategy
The blanket rejection of further NATO expansion appears not to be a strategic statement, but rather a tactical signal to Moscow in the context of current talks. Putting it in writing in this official document is a gift to Russia without anything in return.
6. Criticism of the EU: A Problematic Alliance and a Counterproductive Tone
The NSS seeks proximity to a right-wing populist international whose influence on European politics is growing, but problematic for a majority of the continent’s governments and electorates. The derogatory tone towards the EU is counterproductive. At the same time, the diagnosis of economic stagnation, technological backwardness, and problems with integration is partly correct. Europe must take its own weaknesses seriously, without allowing outside powers to determine its future path.
7. Digital Influence and European Sovereignty
The Trump government sees EU regulation of American technology companies as an attack. At the same time, digital platforms are being used to polarize debates and influence political sentiment. Of course, European regulation is an expression of its own sovereignty, but given the US position, smart regulation makes more sense than confrontation. In the meantime, Europe needs to catch up technologically and remain competitive.
8. Perception in the US: An Impression of Partisanship, and an Element of Retaliation
The Trump administration believes (not altogether without reason) that European governments and media have always supported his opponents during his election campaigns. This impression shapes the tone. In parts of the camp, there is open talk of political “payback”. Europe must be aware of this perception without allowing itself to be intimidated.
9. The ‘Trump-Corollary’ of the Monroe Doctrine: Hemispheric Thinking as an Official Principle
The NSS defines Latin America as an exclusive zone of US influence. By definition, this does not seek the consent of affected countries and runs counter to European approaches, which do not accept zones of influence as a matter of principle. It is equally the case that by defining its hemisphere as the priority, Europe is demoted to a lesser position. That in itself should focus European minds.
10. Cooperation Remains a European Interest, but Our Continent Must Become Stronger
Despite harsh formulations and the hostile tone, close cooperation with the US remains in Europe’s interest. To put it plainly, there are things the US can do that Europe cannot (think space and intelligence capabilities, and strategic air lift and military mass). But the future US-European relationship will only prosper if Europe acts from a position of strength. For Europe, this means a much-improved political, economic, technological, and security policy, together with an ability to make decisions at speed. A stronger Europe is a prerequisite for a resilient transatlantic partnership. That will make it a more attractive ally, and will counter Chinese-Russian attempts to remake the continent for their own ends. In this much more challenging world, respect has to be earned.
Nico Lange is a Senior Fellow at CEPA. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Munich Security Conference and teaches at the Chair of Military History at the University of Potsdam, and at the Hertie School of Governance. He served as Chief of Staff at the German Ministry of Defense from 2019-2022.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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