When Donald Trump takes power in January, he will confront an international arena, particularly in Ukraine and Syria, that, while chaotic and challenging, are surprisingly conducive to his chances for realizing his agenda. But for that to happen, the new administration needs to rethink its rhetoric and clarify its thinking.
As with the first Trump presidency, it is not always obvious what its statements mean in policy terms. The President-elect has said, for example, that he is “vehemently opposed” to providing Ukraine with missiles to strike targets inside Russia because that means escalating the war. (It’s notable that his aides are far less categoric.)
These may be simple misunderstandings. For example, the current cycle of action-reaction began with Putin’s invitation of North Korean troops to fight Ukraine and the use of his own technology, particularly the use of the Oreshnik (Hazelnut) multiple-warhead, hypersonic missile. Both represented an escalation of the war. Approval for the use of UK-French Storm Shadows and US ATACM ballistic missiles was directly linked to these Russian decisions.
Indeed, the Oreshnik is itself either a missile created in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Missile Treaty or a descendant of the Rubezh missile that was a violation of that treaty.
This underscores the fact that no treaty or accord with Putin on Ukraine will be worth the paper it is written on unless Kyiv gets credible security guarantees. Indeed, by this author’s count, Russia has violated at least eight solemn treaties with Ukraine by invading it.
Therefore, as many have argued, a peace treaty or agreement leaving Putin in possession of areas occupied by his troops will not be an accord but rather a surrender that opens the way to years more war — which is precisely what happened after supposed ceasefires following Russia’s original 2014 invasion.
Instead, and perhaps ironically, the only way Trump can realize his agenda and score a success for his administration is to upgrade the Biden administration policy of supporting Ukraine but doing this on a more constant and regular basis.
Following this policy would keep the pressure on Putin, and if the US simultaneously tightens sanctions, it would deprive Russia of energy revenues and markets. Trump will then have opened the way for the US to enter those markets and keep energy prices down.
This makes a reality of Trump’s “drill baby drill” energy policy, which cannot succeed absent new markets for US energy. Moreover, the defense effort needed to support Ukraine will be a spur to the reconstruction of sorely needed improvements to the defense-industrial sector that has been advocated by three bipartisan commissions.
Increased defense spending, combined with White House pressure, can galvanize NATO allies into taking the lead in reforming their own severely underdeveloped defense industrial sector so that the alliance can then meet the challenges, including supplying Ukraine, for which it is admittedly not ready at present.
European diplomats told the Financial Times they see some encouraging signs that Trump’s team understands the risks and rewards in Ukraine and with Russia more broadly. Let’s hope this augurs well for 2025.
Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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