While the economic value of Italian aid packages since Russia’s full-scale invasion remains unknown, the materiel provided to the Ukrainians, including SAMP/T air defense systems, cruise missiles, and wheeled and self-propelled howitzers, has been essential to Kyiv’s fight against the invaders.
Ukraine and Italy signed a Bilateral Security Agreement in February which also includes broader defense cooperation, not unlike those Kyiv has with other NATO states. It stipulates a joint commitment to “fully restore Ukrainian territorial integrity,” by maintaining its “qualitative defense and military edge,” through “joint projects and programs.”
Building on this agreement at the NATO Summit in Washington, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni affirmed her country’s commitment to increasing military support to Kyiv in 2025 and supplying $1.8bn worth of weapons.
Italy’s direct military support to Ukraine is likely somewhere between $1bn–$2bn to date, far behind other European countries (France has sent $2.7bn and received criticism for doing too little). So far, it has also been slower than French and German companies, which for example have negotiated to establish units of Thales and Rheinmetall in Ukraine to produce and maintain equipment while training Ukrainian personnel.
Kyiv has established frameworks to attract investment and facilitate innovation, particularly related to multi-purpose drones and robotic systems, electronic warfare, and other urgent needs. The combination of a favorable fiscal regime for defense production, high demand, a skilled workforce, and the short loop between development, testing, and production has made Ukraine attractive to defense companies.
The UNITED24 fundraising platform, in tandem with BRAVE1, which coordinates Ukrainian defense technology, has successfully promoted both domestic and international participation by providing access and information to manufacturers, alongside organizational and financial support.
Such initiatives have streamlined the process of launching a defense product, cutting the wait time from years to a few months for arms companies, which are then able to test their innovations in a real combat environment and save months and millions in traditional testing activities. This offers access to a treasure trove of invaluable battlefield data and, through the rapid feedback of frontline intelligence, to preserve the West’s technological edge over Russia and other competitors.
Not only is it cheaper to produce weaponry in Ukraine than in the West, but the country also has enormous spare capacity, estimating that it has $6bn in defense-related orders but could accommodate another $14bn. The private sector is driving research, development, and technological innovation. Drone technology is a case in point, with private companies making up nine out of 10 manufacturers of long-range devices.
While external financial support remains critical to maintaining round-the-clock production, countries supporting Ukraine should consider more structured and mutually beneficial military assistance strategies besides direct funding. For example, given Ukraine’s local breadth of knowledge and experience, joint ventures can make significant improvements to products already in use or in the development phase, while providing investment returns through increased visibility and demand.
Similarly, Ukraine should devise a coherent long-term strategy for its defense industry which factors in the role of international partners. This would require the establishment of a deconfliction system to safeguard intellectual property rights, preserve competitive access to local resources and expertise, overcome logistical and bureaucratic hurdles, and protect the assets of foreign defense companies.
Setting up joint ventures and co-production is not without risks, both financial and physical, though there are ways to mitigate them. Concentrating production in Ukraine’s west, where war-related incidents have been rare, reduces the threat from Russian attacks, while ad-hoc international insurance schemes could be modeled on recently developed programs for the healthcare and agriculture sectors.
Italy is home to an advanced defense industry that includes Leonardo, the biggest defense company in the European Union, and an array of specialized producers of niche high-tech components and products. This offers Rome plenty of opportunities to support Ukraine’s inviolable right to self-defense and develop mutually beneficial defense cooperation.
The first possible avenue is through the bilateral security agreement, which expands on previous accords under which five Italian companies joined the Alliance of Defense Industries. It envisages Italian funds and scientific institutions contributing to military innovations in Ukraine.
The agreement also paves the way for greater Italian involvement through the Ukrainian Defense Industry Compact, including technology transfer, partnerships, joint ventures, and investment.
Second, industry-led business-to-business deals, while ultimately dependent on institutional approval in line with current Italian laws, can help bypass traditional bureaucracy, secure better and longer-term political commitments, and win public support through their economic spillover.
In addition, expanded training support and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s capability coalitions can also provide clear guidance on those requirements needing to be prioritized and allow direct military cooperation and exchange. The Italian military too can access the lessons emerging from the Ukrainian battlefield.
Italian defense companies and government agencies should follow in the footsteps of French and German competitors by investing in Ukraine. This would align with Rome’s foreign and security policy while giving Italian defense companies access to defense innovation, demand, a skilled workforce, and valuable battlefield data, all the while helping Ukraine to win.
Federico Borsari is the Leonardo Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at CEPA, where he also leads the Defense Technology Initiative. His work covers transatlantic defense and security issues, with a focus on defense technology and its impact on warfare. Bursary is also part of the NATO 2030 Global Fellow cohort of young professionals. Previously, he held positions at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) in Milan, and the Middle East Research Institute (MERI) in Erbil.
Oleksandr Seredyuk is a former Intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at CEPA. He holds an M.A. in Comparative International Relations from Ca’Foscari University of Venice, Italy.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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