Norwegian officials like to highlight predictability as the hallmark of their approach to security. Given the northern neighborhood, it is easy to see why. Russia’s next-door Kola peninsula is the Kremlin’s nuclear bastion, a vital part of its increasingly dilapidated strategic deterrent. Even uber-hawks on Russia like me agree that it is worth maintaining “strategic stability” – the notion that neither superpower can win a nuclear war. Everyone is safer as a result. 

So Norway has long trod lightly in its northern realm. It keeps its military presence there low and conducts exercises well away from the border. Norway is also nervous about allies barging around in this sensitive region. They come in and heighten tensions, and then sail away leaving us to cope with the aftermath, officials grumble. That is beginning to change, as Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre told last week’s Oslo Security Conference (disclosure: I chaired a panel there). 

Yet cautious changes are not enough. While the Norwegians soberly play the diplomatic equivalent of Hnefatafl (a Viking version of chess), Russia is engaged in a geopolitical version of buza, a performative mix of folk dance and martial arts: wide-ranging, disruptive, and unpredictable. 

A particular target is the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, where Russia enjoys some economic rights under an international treaty signed in 1920. Recently a Russian politician, Sergei Mironov, suggested renaming Svalbard as the “Pomor Islands”, after an ethnic minority in Russia’s far north. (That the Russian authorities actually persecute Pomors is an inconvenient detail). More seriously, Andrei Gurylev, a member of the defence committee of Russia’s sham parliament, the Duma, appeared to suggest that Russia should establish military bases there. 

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Predictability is not the answer here. Russia has already shown its willingness to break rules on Svalbard, and to act menacingly. (Norwegian officials have kept quiet about some instances of bad behaviour). The real aim of these stunts is to create a “new normal” in which Russia’s rule-breaking just becomes part of life. This is not just an irritant. It corrodes public confidence and the credibility of NATO’s deterrence. The price for this is paid not only in rich, well-armed Norway, but elsewhere, by weaker and more beleaguered countries.

At a time when transatlantic unity is under strain, and doom-mongering about European security abounds, it is particularly important for the stronger countries in the alliance to show not just resolve, but initiative. Instead of our decision-makers opening their inboxes each morning dreading to see what mischief Russia has got up to, they should turn the tables, cooking up our own ideas that stoke orders for headache pills in the Kremlin. “How do we explain this one to the boss?”, the creeps and cronies will ask themselves nervously as they try to digest our latest moves.

So here’s an idea. Norway is part of the 10-country Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a rapid-reaction military framework that includes the five Nordic countries, the three Baltic states, and the Netherlands, along with the largely notional leader, Britain. The agile, informal JEF bridges the gap between NATO’s lumbering decision-making and individual national defense efforts.

Norway is hosting a JEF ministerial meeting in the coming weeks. It should hold this on Svalbard. Not only that, it should encourage all the countries invited to turn up with their top military officials in uniform, and arriving on military aircraft rather than civilian flights. If you argue—as Norwegian officials do—that Svalbard is just another bit of Norwegian territory, then it is no more provocative than inviting foreign dignitaries to any other far-flung location. Time for the world to get used to crazy-spontaneous Norwegians.

Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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