Thanks to Ukraine’s aerial offensive or logistical lockdown of Russia, Western observers have belatedly grasped that Ukraine both has cards to play and may also be turning the tide. All too predictably, this realization, especially in Europe, has fostered the idea that we have to talk to Putin.
Presumably Ukraine’s offensive, by precluding a Russian victory, facilitates or will make it possible to arrange a ceasefire. Likewise, these still undefined talks will also involve not just Russia and Ukraine but also Europe in equally undefined roles.
Sadly, the prevalence of such chatter (supported in recent months by the leaders of France, Italy and Finland) reveals that too many have not learned enough from Russia’s aggression. The belief that Putin will recognize his losses, cash in his chips, and seriously negotiate with either Europe, the US, or Ukraine rather than keep spinning the wheel betrays just how shallow is the understanding of Putin and Russia among Western elites.
First, calls by Russians for the West to accept Moscow’s sovereignty, undoubtedly issued with the Kremlin’s assent, underscore the abiding strength of Moscow’s great power obsession (Derzhavnost’ in Russian).
Second, and more importantly, there is no sign that Putin is inclined to negotiate with anyone, beyond occasional discussions with the US administration in the frustrated hope that he will be handed victory on a plate (Secretary of State Marco Rubio has made clear that this will not happen). Instead, he is still gambling on victory, and given his worldview, ideology, and the political system he has built, this should not be a surprise. For example, at the time of publication, Ukraine says Putin plans to mobilize another 500,000 men by the fall. Moreover, he is claiming even more territory while the General Staff consistently provides mendacious reports about the progress of Russian forces.
Beyond these facts, the calls for talks with Putin emanating from Europe have neither articulated who will speak to him on behalf of whom nor is there any coherent agenda for these discussions. Since inadequate preparation foredooms any negotiations, speaking to Putin on this basis is a non-starter if not a recipe for disaster. Such calls for talks reflect just how ill-prepared Western leaders are for such discussions.
Furthermore, the idea that Putin will accept a ceasefire as the result of such negotiations is also not founded on a realistic appreciation of the man or his policies. Four years of war have led to the virtually total militarization of the Russian state and economy, along with the intensification of repression to levels that recall late Stalinism.
Moreover, like a Shakespearean villain, he has gone too far into war to return empty-handed. Since war has become the alpha and omega of Russian policy, Putin cannot suddenly announce or even negotiate a cease-fire without having to account for the estimated 1.8 million Russians killed, wounded, and missing in action, and his overall policies.
As Nina Khrushcheva has written: “Putin launched his war in Ukraine to project strength. Ending it under pressure would mean doing so from a position of weakness. For a leader whose authority rests on force and fear, such an outcome would pose an existential threat.” Neither is Putin alone the problem. Rather, the problem is the Russia he has created over the last generation. As a recent European study observed, a ceasefire, even under Putin, will probably not end Russian revisionism but merely shift it “into a different register.”
However, this should not be a counsel of despair. Instead of running after Putin in the misplaced belief that he can be brought to negotiations, we should deploy resources to bring about the only outcome that can ensure peace, namely Ukraine’s victory. Victory’s conditions are well known; they comprise the withdrawal of Russian forces, the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including Crimea, as well as (ideally) reparations, and war crimes trials.
Furthermore, as this war shows, Ukraine cannot be left in an undefined status as a neutral state. Putin’s Russia and its military, driven as they are by dreams of imperial revanche and an institutionalized paranoid threat assessment, cannot be trusted to resist the temptation to subvert or re-invade Ukraine.
Consequently, the country must not only continue its progress to EU membership under Brussels’ stewardship, but it must also become a NATO member as soon as possible, despite Russian threats. Given Russian policy, this conclusion would hold true even if Ukraine had not become the finest and most innovative military in Europe.
Taking Ukraine into NATO would also restore Western escalation control, negate Russian nuclear threats, and revitalize the alliance. Most of all, NATO membership creates the basis for Ukraine’s full integration with the alliance’s own defense efforts and provides a tested mechanism for transferring to it the capabilities it most urgently needs to win, e.g., Patriot anti-air missiles.
Membership also accelerates Europe’s own defense regeneration. The illusion that we can find a way for Putin’s Russia to rejoin Europe dies hard. But if Europe and ideally the US are to reunite to enhance their mutual security, assisting Ukraine’s course to victory and full integration into Europe is the only way forward.
Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. www.fpri.org
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
