Conflict is being shaped less by the performance of advanced systems than by the ability to produce, sustain, and regenerate them at scale. Mass is the new buzzword, along with non-admiring references to “exquisite” high-end systems
There is now a realization of a growing gap between how the West has designed its forces and the conditions under which they will actually have to fight.
This is no small thing. It reflects military forces designed for early advantage but increasingly vulnerable under real combat conditions.
Across Ukraine and the transatlantic security environment, as in the current conflict in Iran, conflict is being shaped less by the performance of advanced weapon systems than by the ability to produce, sustain, and regenerate equipment at scale.
In the Middle East, weeks of sustained strikes have degraded Iranian capabilities but failed to eliminate them, underscoring how systems tied to scalable production — particularly drones and missiles — are difficult to suppress entirely. Ukraine illustrates this shift even more starkly: it is on track to produce roughly 7 million drones this year, up from 4 million last year and 2.2 million in 2024. No NATO ally can match that output.
Modern US and allied warfare has been defined by the pursuit of precision — long-range fires, advanced interceptors, exquisite sensors, and highly capable platforms. These systems are extraordinarily effective. They are also extraordinarily expensive, complex, and difficult to produce at scale.
This creates a strategic paradox that modern force design has yet to resolve.
The more effective and desirable a weapon system becomes, the faster these qualities act as a constraint on its use. High-end capabilities are consumed quickly, replaced slowly, and rely on supply chains designed for efficiency rather than endurance. What appears as a technological advantage at the tactical level becomes, at scale, a structural vulnerability when production and replenishment cannot keep pace with consumption.
In Ukraine, this is visible daily: precision systems are decisive but scarce, shaping not only how forces fight, but when and whether they can fight at all. At the same time, lower-cost systems — particularly drones — are redefining the battlefield through scale and adaptability.
Countries are approaching these battlefield challenges in a variety of ways. But despite their differences, they all point to the same uncomfortable conclusion. Western strategy is still anchored in assumptions that do not hold under conditions of prolonged conflict.
Russia has oriented its war effort around endurance by building a sustained military-industrial mass over time. Ukraine has emphasized adaptation, leveraging rapid innovation and battlefield feedback loops. Europe has increased spending but still struggles to convert political intent into industrial output at speed (see the disastrous saga of the Franco-German Future Combat Air System, or FCAS).
For NATO, these shifts carry profound implications.
Deterrence has traditionally been measured in terms of forward presence, readiness, and technological dominance. These remain essential. But they are no longer sufficient.
A credible deterrent must now demonstrate that it can withstand equipment depletion, replace losses, and sustain operations under prolonged stress. In practical terms, this creates a force that may be formidable in the opening phase of conflict but increasingly constrained within 30 to 60 days as stocks of key munitions, interceptors, and high-end systems are depleted. Without that capacity, deterrence risks becoming time-limited — credible at the outset, but increasingly uncertain as conflict endures.
This requires resilient industrial systems — production lines that can rapidly raise output, supply chains that can absorb disruption, and energy and logistics networks that can sustain production.
Capability must also be redefined: systems have to be scalable, repairable, and producible at volume.
This is not a call to abandon high-end capabilities. It is a recognition that superiority without sustainability is brittle. A force that cannot replenish its most effective systems is not superior — it simply enjoys a temporary advantage. The difference is not semantic; it is strategic. One can be sustained. The other cannot.
The insight is straightforward, but the implications are not.
Industrial capacity is becoming a primary determinant of strategic outcomes.
This requires a fundamental shift in mindset and a recognition that current force design and acquisition systems are misaligned with the demands of sustained conflict. The current model prioritizes performance at the point of contact rather than persistence over time — an imbalance that adversaries are increasingly positioned to exploit.
Efficiency will have to give way, at least in part, to resilience; optimization must be balanced with redundancy; and speed of production must be valued alongside the sophistication of design.
The central lesson of Ukraine, and of the broader security environment now taking shape, is not that technology no longer matters. It is that technology alone is not decisive. Unless corrected, this will shape not only how wars are fought, but also on whose terms they are ultimately decided.
In the end, wars are contests of endurance. And in modern conflict, endurance is not abstract — it is measured in production lines, supply chains, and the capacity to regenerate.
Those who grasp this will define not only the course of conflict, but also its outcome.
David M. Cattler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a senior transatlantic security leader with more than 35 years of experience across the US government, NATO, and the Intelligence Community. Most recently, he served as Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), and was previously NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, the alliance’s senior intelligence official. Cattler is a graduate of the US Naval Academy and Georgetown University and was an MIT Seminar XXI Fellow.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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