What does the Jensen Huang Megaspeed scandal mean for Europe? At first glance, not much: Europeans will keep buying Nvidia chips. But a closer look shows that the ripple effects will have consequences for transatlantic relations and for Europe’s increasingly tense relationship with Beijing. The Netherlands and its star chip machine manufacturer, ASML, look particularly vulnerable.
Huang was perhaps Washington’s most influential China dove. He almost single-handedly persuaded President Donald Trump and his cabinet to take a lax approach to enforcing Biden-era export controls on Nvidia chips, to the fury of hawks on both sides of the aisle. His diminished influence, coupled with fresh revelations around the extent of illegal chip smuggling to China via Singapore, means that the hawks once again have the wind in their sails.
The Department of Commerce has already moved to block Chinese AI companies from using overseas data centers. Three bills look set to be rolled into the National Defense Authorization Act that would further crack down on China’s use of US chips.
One of them — the MATCH Act — takes aim at China’s supply of chipmaking tools. Dutch company ASML is the major global manufacturer of these tools. It would be forced to comply with the same restrictions currently faced by its US competitors, under threat of US sanctions.
European and Dutch diplomats, including the Dutch Royal Family, have already lobbied against the MATCH Act, which looked unlikely to pass into law — until the Megaspeed scandal broke. In effect, the Act would ban ASML from selling new chipmaking machines to China, which accounts for around a fifth of the company’s annual revenue, and from fulfilling its contractual obligations to service existing machines already in the country.
Even if the MATCH Act passes, the White House will have discretion over how aggressively the legislation is applied. President Trump has tried to shield Nvidia and maintain good relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping. That gives Washington leeway to decline to enforce its toughest provisions — but still leaves ASML vulnerable to shifting political priorities or a future, more hawkish administration.
If the US ultimately forces ASML to cut off servicing to Chinese companies, the Netherlands — and Europe — could find themselves exposed to Chinese retaliation. When Beijing imposed export controls on rare earths in 2025 in response to US trade actions, it ensured European companies were also caught in the crossfire. Beijing would likely not hesitate to make an example out of the Netherlands in order to discourage other countries from allying too closely with Washington.
The MATCH Act is being discussed just as Europe itself is in the middle of executing a major hawkish turn on China, driven by the latter’s industrial overcapacities and supply chain dominance. Whereas the EU was unwilling to take a strong stance on China during Trump’s first term — when administration officials pressed European countries to remove Huawei telecoms equipment — and under former President Joseph Biden, the bloc is now developing powerful new trade instruments directed against Beijing.
Despite this shift, Europe’s China policy remains fundamentally defensive. European capitals do not share Washington’s interest in undermining China’s AI sector. In fact, the EU benefits from Chinese competition to closed-source US frontier labs. Europe’s telecoms incumbents are resisting ripping out Huawei from their networks, arguing that the exclusion of Chinese suppliers would be costly and leave them dependent on expensive local vendors.
US China hawks should think twice before trying to strong-arm Europe into mirroring US China policy. Such a move would likely backfire by galvanizing anti-US and pro-China figures in Europe.
There is a deal to be done. For their part, EU countries need to follow through on the tough talk and deliver on China de-risking, with concrete measures such as improving coordination and closing gaps in EU and national licensing of chipmaking components. If Washington sees Europe acting of its own accord, it can formally take the threat of sanctions off the table. In the end, controls that allies adopt through their own volition are likely to prove more durable than those imposed on them by ultimatum.
Nick Reiners is a senior analyst in the Geo-technology practice at Eurasia Group, the global political risk advisory firm. He was previously a British civil servant and diplomat in London and Brussels, where he served as attaché for digital and intellectual property.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Steel and Silicon: Allied Innovation for the Next Century
2026 CEPA Tech & Security Conference