While Russia’s strategic positioning in the Baltic Sea poses significant challenges to NATO, the alliance is increasingly well-prepared to fight and win a war in the region.
The heavily militarized exclave of Kaliningrad hosts a formidable array of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including coastal defense systems as well as air force squadrons capable of decimating NATO maritime assets. Additionally, Russia’s Baltic Fleet has seen a modernization effort, with new fast attack and minesweeping/laying vessels that enhance its offensive capabilities.
These developments, coupled with increased hybrid activities — ranging from GPS jamming to attempts at redrawing maritime boundaries and suspected sabotage— underscore Russia’s intent to destabilize the region and challenge NATO’s operational freedom. Now that the alliance has expanded to include Sweden and Finland, Russia has escalated its hybrid tactics, testing its resolve and readiness.
NATO’s response to the Russian threat in the Baltic Sea is multifaceted, encompassing naval modernization, enhanced special operations interoperability, and increased surveillance and countering of Russian malign activities. Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine has only accelerated these efforts to secure what some optimistically call “NATO’s Lake.”
That will need extra military spending, lots of it. NATO countries around the Baltic have significantly upgraded naval capabilities in response to Russia's assertiveness: Denmark and Germany have invested in advanced frigates and submarines capable of countering the missile threats posed by Russian A2/AD systems. Denmark's Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates and Germany's new batch of Braunschweig-class corvettes are particularly notable for their robust anti-missile defenses (one of these Danish frigates shot down four Houthi drones in the Red Sea in April, although her commander later said some systems failed during the encounter — a reminder that the Danish pledge to raise defense spending by 50% is very necessary.)
Poland, another key NATO member, has pursued the acquisition of new multirole frigates and submarines under its modernization programs as part of an enormous rise in spending that will soon see the country devoting 4.7% of GDP to defense. Meanwhile, the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — have focused on mine warfare, both to block potential Russian naval breakouts into the North Sea and to keep vital maritime routes open for NATO reinforcements to respond to any land invasion. The recent addition of Sweden and Finland’s highly-capable air forces and access to their airfields has dramatically increased NATO’s capacity and capabilities with which to mount aerial responses to Russian aggression.
Special operations forces (SOF) play a critical role in NATO's defense strategy for the Baltic region. Exercises like Flaming Sword 24, held in Lithuania earlier this year, are designed to enhance interoperability among NATO's SOF units. This exercise brought together special operators from six NATO nations, including the United States, Germany, Denmark, and Lithuania, to conduct joint maritime and land operations. Such exercises are crucial for deterring the Kremlin while developing the rapid deployment capabilities needed to respond to Russian aggression in the Arctic High North and Baltic regions.
The emphasis on special operations highlights NATO's strategy of utilizing smaller, highly trained units to disrupt Russian operations and defend critical infrastructure, particularly in the face of hybrid threats. These forces are also vital for ensuring NATO can quickly reinforce its eastern members and maintain a credible deterrent against Russian moves in the region.
In response to Russia's hybrid activities, NATO has ramped up its surveillance and intelligence-gathering efforts in the Baltic Sea. This includes monitoring Russian naval movements, as well as the more insidious threats posed by cyber-attacks and sabotage. The recent uptick in GPS jamming and the damage to the Baltic connector pipeline between Finland and Estonia illustrate the diverse and complex nature of the threats, particularly as Russia expands its fleet of vessels capable of sabotaging seabed infrastructure.
The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a NATO-aligned confederation of 10 member states, has formed a high-readiness response force specifically to deter and defeat Russian aggression in the Baltic and High North. In this year’s “Freezing Winds” exercise, the JEF performed drills designed to prevent the sort of sabotage of seabed infrastructure which it already suspects Russia and China of conducting.
Finland and Sweden now significantly enhance alliance surveillance and countermeasure capabilities, given these nations' expertise in operating in the challenging Baltic environment. Sweden, for instance, brings a wealth of experience in submarine operations in the Baltic's shallow and brackish waters, further strengthening NATO's ability to monitor and counter Russian submarine activities.
Sweden's strategic thinking has been revitalized as Stockholm awakens to the heightened Russian threat. While the large and strategically critical Baltic island of Gotland, home to 25,000 troops during the Cold War, has at least been remilitarized, there are barely 400 soldiers now present. Gotland’s loss would be a disaster for Sweden and the alliance since it not only dominates the Baltic skies but also provides a key reinforcement route to the Baltic states.
Sweden’s defense chief says Putin has “both eyes” on the island and the prime minister has said its defense will be discussed with NATO partners.
There is still much work to do.
Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves as Chair of the Advisory Committee for No One Left Behind.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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