Reaching NATO’s 3.5% of GDP target for core defense spending for debt-ridden and politically fractured countries like Italy will be a challenge.
Even with financial support from the European Union’s ReArm Europe Plan and SAFE program, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni’s coalition needs to navigate major obstacles to achieve the commitments.
To reach 3.5% by 2035, Italy must spend at least an additional €165bn ($194bn). This is politically and fiscally very difficult, given Italy’s high public debt (135% of GDP), low GDP growth (0.7%), and the diverse composition of Meloni’s coalition (which includes a Kremlin-friendly party) and defense-averse voters.
Italy’s armed forces certainly need the money. One central element of any new plan should be to bolster military recruitment and critical infrastructure. By investing in the country and its youth, Meloni will strike patriotic tones admired by the center-right, so gaining traction with traditional holdouts.
The Italian armed forces have been declining following the Reorganization of the Military Instrument Law of 2012, which reduced total military personnel from 190,000 to 150,000 over a decade, restructured the defense budget, and closed costly installations.
Following the all-out invasion of Ukraine, the law was changed to cap the reduction at 160,000, but both the Chief of Staff, Admiral Cavo Dragone, and Defense Minister, Guido Crosetto, say the military should expand by at least 10,000, although they also argue as many as 40,000 more personnel may be needed. That broadly fits with decisions further north, where Germany is seeking another 60,000 men and women, while Poland wants another 300,000 regulars and reservists.
The Italian military’s quest for more troops is linked to Crosetto’s goal of lowering the average age in the military. As the armed forces grow, they will also require more equipment, some of it based on Italian research from the country’s strong defense-industrial base, and improved facilities — investments that would be difficult to oppose politically, particularly when framed as support for Italian talent that might otherwise seek jobs abroad.
Even with consistent polling data in support of Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, Italians would not look favorably on cuts to healthcare, pensions, or further European debt to fund defense spending. Reducing entitlement spending in favor of increased defense spending would only serve to grow public dissent, as around 39% of Italians express negative views toward European rearmament. Additionally, a governing coalition that has promised fiscal responsibility cannot risk raising debt levels — the salience of fiscal responsibility would be a confidence blow to Meloni’s coalition and give credence to the opposition.
Meloni’s center-right coalition also has problems from within. Some ministers are an obstacle to rearmament. Matteo Salvini, deputy premier and leader of La Lega, is a defender of Putin’s regime, and often calls for a reduction in lethal aid for Ukraine and peace on Russian terms.
In 2017, Putin’s political party signed a cooperation agreement with Lega, and Salvini even legitimized the rigged 2024 Russian elections by stating, “When the people vote, they are always right.”
More recently, Salvini has denounced a European army, Italian troops in Ukraine, and taking EU loans to fund defense spending. On the other hand, Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of Forza Italia, Antonio Tajani, states that “our goal is a European army,” while Meloni opposes a European army, but argues European rearmament is a step in the right direction. As defense spending becomes a growing international topic, these domestic disputes might risk the stability of Meloni’s coalition.
The solution? Italy is likely to deploy accountants to the frontline of its efforts. The country finally reached the far lower 2% spending target by adding military pensions and the coastguard to its figures. Likewise, it’s suggested the government plans to classify at least some of the planned €360bn-plus spending on roads and railways as security-related.
But there is a real need for infrastructure improvements, and it can be framed politically as an effort to renew the country rather than prepare for war. Meloni, therefore, has a good opportunity to control the narrative while balancing domestic and international priorities. At some point, however, she or her successor will still have to find the cash to provide Italy with the tools of hard power.
Niccolò Comini is a recent graduate of Kenyon College. He writes about Italian politics and foreign policy.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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