This is an edited version of the spoken testimony that CEPA’s President and CEO, Dr. Alina Polyakova, gave on June 18, 2025. The full hearing and Dr. Polyakova’s written testimony are available here.
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, Distinguished Members of the Committee:
It is an honor to address you today on a critical matter of US national security — the 2025 NATO Summit. I should note that the views expressed in this testimony do not reflect those of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), of which I am president and CEO, or its staff and fellows.
The NATO Summit in The Hague next week [June 24-25] convenes at a pivotal moment, as the transatlantic community confronts an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape marked by Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the growing cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, who collectively aim to undermine the US and our allies.
Therefore, this Summit represents a powerful opportunity for the United States to engage with allies as they commit to massive new defense spending levels. Because, as was true at NATO’s founding and is still the case today, the alliance remains central to the vital US national security interest of defending the US homeland.
NATO’s European allies are poised to commit to 5% of GDP to defense spending, which is a significant and appropriate level given the growing Russian threat to NATO and the broader geopolitical environment.
This new commitment signifies a profound transformation, positioning Europe as an example for other partners — a point made by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in his remarks to Indo-Pacific allies in Singapore last month. Indeed, the Trump administration deserves a great deal of credit for pushing European allies to step up in such a significant way on defense.
US leadership, both from the Executive Branch and from Members of Congress, will be instrumental in ensuring that financial commitments translate into concrete defense capabilities that will ultimately benefit global US national security interests and send a strong message to adversaries.
Showing allied unity at the summit will serve as an important deterrent.
In my written testimony, I provide specific examples on three key points:
1. Europe is stepping up, but US leadership and commitment — in principle, people, and resources — remain critical for NATO’s continued success as the strongest military alliance in history.
European allies are taking the right steps by setting ambitious spending targets to rebalance the burden-sharing relationship. As NATO Secretary General Rutte recently said, it is in all our interests to have a NATO that is stronger, fairer, and more lethal.
But while Europe is taking up the challenge, there is no magic wand that would allow European allies to produce a highly competent force that can deploy rapidly across the continent. That requires years of planning, as our military commanders would confirm.
Indeed, Europe would be a sitting duck for Putin without a US presence and capabilities, and the political leadership of NATO.
The US remains NATO’s indispensable nation. It is the key enabler for European capabilities and gives political leadership at a time when the alliance is confronting Putin’s growing appetite to use military force in Europe.
Indeed, it is US political leadership of NATO, which includes a US-appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), that is at the core of NATO’s ability to deter and defend.
2. Russia is now the threat to NATO that we feared it was at the start of the full-scale invasion.
As General Cavoli, NATO’s SACEUR, recently testified, Russia’s military has shown a remarkable ability to adapt and reconstitute.
Thanks to support from Iran, North Korea, and China, Russia’s war economy is mobilizing for long-term societal militarization.
In the meantime, Russia is also carrying out an increasingly aggressive shadow war against NATO in Europe, the kind we did not see even during the Cold War. And NATO is not yet configured to respond to and deter these tactics.
Russia’s actions signal that it is actively preparing for a direct confrontation with NATO, and not in the long term, but potentially in the next five years, so we need a common and comprehensive strategy to respond to this threat in the conventional and nonconventional domains.
3. NATO’s open-door policy is an asset to the alliance and the US
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has doubled in size, from 16 to 32 members. The integration of the former Soviet bloc states in 1999 and 2004 has ensured not only stability in Europe but also that these countries would be the strongest pro-US allies. That is still the case today.
Take the recent inclusion of Finland and Sweden, which has added significantly to NATO’s capabilities, force posture, and strategic depth.
And of course, Ukraine will also be a significant security asset to NATO, bringing the largest, battle-tested army to Europe, and the most cutting-edge capabilities.
With that, I thank you for your time and look forward to your questions.
Dr. Alina Polyakova is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as the Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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