A dedicated multinational NATO squadron of armed jet trainers could shoot down Russian drone incursions without burning through frontline fighters and scarce air-to-air missiles.
The need for something new is beyond debate. There has been a steady increase in incursions by Russian (and sometimes by Ukrainian) drones into NATO member states’ airspace over the past 18 months. That is now accelerating. Romania alone says 23 Russian drones entered its territory from January to mid-August, more than in the previous four years combined. The Baltic states have also registered a significant uptick.
NATO has responded. Aircraft from across the alliance — including the Netherlands, Spain, Poland, Romania, Italy, and France — have engaged unmanned intruders. But the weapon of choice has been advanced and expensive air-to-air missiles.
The problem is clear: regular one-way attack (OWA) drone interception patrols and scrambles are not a sustainable use of expensive frontline fast jet capacity, flying hours and limited stocks of high-end air-to-air missiles. Fast jet squadrons and associated missile stocks are already heavily tasked across Europe and are arguably the most critical capability set for deterring direct Russian aggression in the coming years. Alternative means are urgently required.
A multinational squadron dedicated to drone-interception duties under a NATO banner offers an obvious solution that could be rapidly created and deployed if prioritised by senior military and political leaders. Much of the staff work required to enable this already exists through the alliance’s airborne early warning aircraft that have been operating for 46 years.
To be worth the political and financial capital required, such a unit would need to be capable of intercepting the increasingly common jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 OWA drone models at night, in marginal weather conditions and in GPS-degraded or denied environments. The Ukrainian Intelligence Services estimate Russian production of jet-powered OWA drones at around 3,000 per month, so harassment will remain affordable at scale.
Geran series drones are frequently equipped with approach-warning sensors designed to detect spotlight illumination and laser designators. These can trigger pre-programmed evasive manoeuvres. The drones are painted matt black, and often fly in large groups, with some fitted with first-person view cameras and even MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems) missiles that can be used via relay link to try and shoot down defenders.
The best solution, given expense and efficiency considerations, would be a relatively simple jet aircraft with a crew of at least two. A twin cockpit allows a specialist sensor operator to scan the sky for the small thermal contrast signature of a drone using a well-stabilised sensor ball or targeting pod, while the pilot uses night-vision goggles (NVGs) to keep a careful lookout, aim weapons and navigate.
This would need specialists. Drone interception requires regular, realistic practice for aircrew and command and control structures alike. It is not something that flying instructors at a training wing or reservist multirole pilots could simply maintain proficiency in as a part-time secondary duty. And the best aircraft? Perhaps the most compelling, available option is the Czech Aero L-39NG. This aircraft is significantly cheaper to operate than other advanced jet trainers, with comparable operating costs to turboprop trainers like the PC-9. It is smaller, lighter, and less powerful than the M-346 and FA-50, but it can still easily reach 300 kts at medium altitude in level flight with external stores.
The author had no difficulty intercepting multiple simulated Geran-4 class targets flying at up to 270 kts at medium altitude and 220 kts at low altitude during an evaluation sortie in August. The L-39NG also has docile low-speed handling characteristics down to below 100 kts, so it could intercept slow-flying Geran-2 and Gerbera drones.
Perhaps most importantly, the Aero production line for the L-39NG has a smaller order backlog and more spare capacity than other advanced fast jet trainer lines, so a NATO squadron could be equipped far more quickly with this type.
Radar? The L-39NG does not have a radar, so like turboprop options, it would need to be vectored onto incoming threats by either ground-based fighter controllers, an AWACS, or more capable fighters such as the F-35.
Armament? Air-to-air missiles are too scarce, expensive, and necessary for other tasks. Machine guns and/or rapid-firing aircraft cannons are cheap but are hard to use effectively, while drone warheads of up to 90 kg (200 lbs) frequently explode when hit and can easily damage or destroy intercepting aircraft.
Air-to-air rockets are a far better option, with either laser- or infrared guidance. They provide a means to shoot down drones faster, more easily, and from a safer range. Laser-guided rockets require the drone to be tracked and illuminated with a laser designator within a targeting pod or sensor ball. IR-guided rockets simply need to lock onto the drone prior to launch. The aircraft can then break away after launch to start engaging other drones in a wave.
These rockets have some limitations in bad weather, do not work well through clouds, and laser-guided rockets are less reliable against very low-flying targets. Nevertheless, laser- and IR-guided rockets are still the best option available. There are two currently available options, which include the BAE Systems AGR-20 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System Mk. II (APKWS II) and Thales LGR275 Laser Guided Rocket. Both cost far less per shot than traditional air-to-air missiles – around $25,000–$50,000 per shot. The Thales option is likely to be more compelling due to a better proximity fuse and the fact that getting US Foreign Military Sales shipments of the AGR-20 is currently very difficult due to heavy American use of the rockets against Iranian OWA drones in the Middle East.
A single multinational NATO squadron of, perhaps, 16–24 aircraft with aircrew that train and deploy exclusively as counter-OWA drone interception specialists could bring major advantages to the alliance for a far smaller cost than a traditional fighter squadron.
First, it could provide a dedicated NATO capability to sustainably counter one of Russia’s primary means of probing and undermining its borders. Such a squadron could be formed and equipped in only a few years, if seriously prioritised.
Second, financial and personnel contributions to such a multinational NATO squadron would offer a way to play a critical role in the day-to-day frontline defence of NATO for smaller Eastern and Central European air forces that currently struggle to equip and train high-end fast jet squadrons. Detachments could be deployed to sit alert in countries like Romania, Poland and the Baltic states where Russian drone incursions are increasingly common.
Third, such a force would reduce the attractiveness for the Kremlin of using airspace violations by OWA drones as a tool to probe and undermine NATO red lines and air defence capacity.
As a purely defensive tool, a multinational NATO squadron might also be less likely to raise opposition from certain alliance member states than other options to bolster deterrence against Russian probing.
This is an edited version of a longer article published on the RUSI website.
Justin Bronk is a Senior Research Fellow, Airpower & Technology, at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology. He holds a private pilot licence and has 40 hours of backseat experience in military fast jets.
All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the Center for European Policy Analysis. Nor do they represent the views of RUSI .
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
