On the sidelines of this summer’s NATO Summit in Ankara, 12 allies, led by the UK, commited $50bn to developing deep strike precision capabilities. Then, in August, the new British Prime Minister Andy Burnham announced Ukraine would be given blueprints for long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles.
These steps were welcome, but without further action they will not fill the long-range fire gap with Russia. Many of the new capabilities planned by the European group will not be available until the next decade.
European NATO not only lacks the integrated air and missile defense equipment to counter Russia’s long-range capabilities, but don’t have enough equally powerful missiles to deter the Kremlin.
Allied states and Ukraine need to come together to develop a strategy to remove the disparity in long-range weapons, especially as the alliance confronts production and cost issues around air defense systems and shortfalls in missile deliveries.
The Kremlin has invested heavily in an array of long-range weapons systems since 2018, including the Avangard, the Iksander, and the still experimental Burevestnik, giving it a dynamic range of capabilities, some of which are hypersonic.
Long-range weapons have heavier payloads, but carry a higher price tag and have so far rarely been used. The Oreshnik, the Kremlin’s much vaunted hypersonic missile, has only been fired three times.
Short- and medium-range missiles have been more widely deployed, with a horrific impact on Ukrainian civilians and devastating damage to vital infrastructure, but long-range capabilities pose a threat far beyond Ukraine if Russia decides to expand its war on Europe.
The Kremlin’s use and development of these weapons has evolved alongside low-cost, mass-produced uncrewed systems. It has also become more common for Russia to deploy a tactic also used by its allies in Tehran and fire missiles simply to force Kyiv into expending precious defensive munitions, making it more vulnerable to long-range attack.
Though steps are being taken to close the gap, including bolstering the production of deep strike capabilities in Europe, NATO’s European member states are ill-prepared to defend themselves, one of the roles the US has traditionally filled in the alliance’s military structure.
While Europe works to build credible deterrence, NATO allies should look to the following path:
First, support Kyiv’s efforts to limit Moscow’s ability to produce missiles. They could, for example, provide Ukraine with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) needed to strike deeper into Russia.
Ukraine has already demonstrated its ability to target production facilities and missile components, and has successfully struck hundreds of miles across the border, so any additional assistance with targeting would be used effectively.
Washington has provided smaller ISR platforms to Ukrainian forces already through security assistance and “lend-lease” style mechanisms established since 2014, and particularly after the full-scale invasion. While the provision of larger platforms is harder due to fears of sensitive technology falling into Russian hands, the US should build on the momentum of recent intelligence-sharing wins and Ukrainian long-range strikes into Russian territory.
Help with hitting Russian production would not only improve Ukraine’s position in the war, but would whittle down the Kremlin’s options for directly increasing tensions with NATO.
Some might argue such support would be escalatory, but its aim would be to deter and limit the escalatory behavior of the Kremlin. Putin’s threats against NATO members have been plentiful since the full-scale invasion, and particularly since the addition of Finland and Sweden to the alliance.
Second, it is more necessary than ever for Europe to increase the scale of domestic missile production and procurement. Even if the US maintains its presence on the continent, a stronger European pillar in the alliance will give more options to NATO’s military planners.
Deterrence comes from having dominant, or at least comparable, capabilities.
Should the US continue scaling back its military presence in Europe, it will need to do so with respect to NATO’s regional defense plans. There is a real risk of capability gaps becoming gaps in operations and deterrence, which the Kremlin is eager to exploit.
Moscow’s positioning should also serve as an impetus for continued investment and rethinking of integrated air and missile defense systems.
Missiles and drones are used for a wide variety of missions and often in tandem with one another. NATO’s answer, beyond procuring new air defenses, necessitates offensive operational concepts, plans, and capabilities that can do the same.
Ukrainian systems can absolutely fill this niche, and European allies should welcome recent discussions with Kyiv over arms exports.
Europe and the US are desperately lagging in long-range deterrence capabilities. While moves toward investment are welcome, being able to produce at the speed of need and at economical cost is vital.
Peter Victor Roberto is a Program Officer with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). His research interests include Ukraine’s security, defense industry, EU defense policy, and conventional military posture. He received a B.A. in Criminology, Law, and Society from George Mason University and an M.A. in Diplomacy and International Relations from Seton Hall University.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
