The West is ceding ground to the Kremlin in the battle for influence, even in countries such as Georgia and Moldova, which had appeared well on the way to European integration.
The crisis in relations between Tbilisi’s ruling Georgian Dream party and the European Union began in 2023 — a year after the full-scale invasion — when it made its first attempt to adopt a Russian-style bill on so-called foreign agents. The law was ultimately passed this year in an atmosphere of violent clashes between demonstrators and police.
After the return of party founder Bidzina Ivanishvili to Georgian politics at the beginning of 2024, still more repressive bills were approved. These included the Kremlin oriented family values law, intended to infringe on the rights of the LGBT+ community. As a result, in October, the European Parliament called on the European Commission to freeze all financing for Georgia.
“Georgian Dream” has repeatedly hinted it might strike a deal with Russia to return Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia, a populist offer that displaced talk of European integration in the run-up to the October 26 elections, even though polls showed an overwhelming majority of Georgians support membership of the EU and NATO.
In Moldova, where the pro-European incumbent President Maia Sandu faces a run-off vote on November 3, the level of popular support for entering the EU, which was nearly 70% in 2007, was barely enough to scrape through the October referendum to enshrine a path to membership in the constitution.
Many experts pointed to the influence of Kremlin propaganda on the results, along with the bribery of voters with Russian money, though fading support for Brussels has deeper roots in disappointment with reforms, particularly over corruption, and a loss of faith in government as a result of political scandals. Poverty is on the rise.
Much of Moscow’s growing influence elsewhere has been the result either of tactical miscalculations by the West or the weakness of individual Western states. For example, Europe’s political and economic circumstances mean it will continue to buy Russian gas, even after its declared goal of cutting off all shipments by 2027. This has had a profound effect on Putin’s ability to finance the war — the state is rolling in money and able to offer recruits as much as $31,000 in sign-up bonuses, a life-changing sum.
Again, Moscow advances where the West is forced to retreat for its own internal reasons.
And yet, even against this backdrop, the Kremlin has struggled to press an alternative political agenda or economic model on other countries, failing to take advantage of a propitious moment and convert its influence into economic gain.
One reason is that the primary effort of all Russian state institutions, be they international analytics, security, or even focused on the fight against terrorism, are directed at supporting propaganda myths to the detriment of their main functions. The same thing now appears to be happening in foreign policy, where the creation of an “image” that fits official ideology is more important than a practical result.
A good illustration is the Kremlin narrative around BRICS, which held a summit in Russia in October.
Timofey Bordachev, program director of the Putin-backed Valdai Discussion Club, wrote a fiery article describing BRICS as “a symbol of the revision of the international order” and “an instrument for the civilized restructuring of the entire system of global regulation in politics and economics.” He insisted that Western criteria for assessing effectiveness are not applicable to the association.
The significance of BRICS for Russia lies more as a symbol of “opposing the West” and less as an organization with any expectation of real effectiveness, he argued.
This does not mean BRICS members are incapable of setting and implementing practical tasks, and its networks have achieved some goals, just not with Moscow as the beneficiary.
Russian analysts noted, for example, that in 2023 direct foreign investment in Ethiopia by China made up 39.1% of its total foreign direct investment, and 311 Chinese projects have been operating in the country since 2000. India is meanwhile Ethiopia’s second-largest trading partner and foreign investor.
In contrast, Moscow’s focus on Ethiopia’s accession to BRICS has nothing to do with markets and investment, but is based on the fact that the country’s leadership “is one of the most Russia-friendly in Africa.”
Kremlin analysts, sensing this contradiction in foreign policy, try to explain it by saying Putin voluntarily “renounced pro-active policies in most areas” so Russia could restore stability and alleviate the aggressive attacks of the West.
The only market in which Russian experts cite a growth of mutual trade is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), made up of the post-Soviet states. However, even pro-Kremlin analysts admit the main growth in turnover since 2022 is due to imports from Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which are being used to evade Western sanctions.
Kseniya Kirillova is an analyst focused on Russian society, mentality, propaganda, and foreign policy. The author of numerous articles for CEPA and the Jamestown Foundation, she has also written for the Atlantic Council, Stratfor, and others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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