In the maelstrom of events in early 2026, one has been missed. Moldova’s President Maia Sandu said on January 12 that if her mostly Romanian-speaking country were asked to vote on union with Romania, she would be in favor.
The theme is familiar to Moldovans and Romanians, but maybe less so to outsiders. It’s not every day a head of state suggests her country should be folded into another, but there is a long history here, and good reasons why the issue is coming up now.
Sandu, like many Moldovans, holds dual citizenship of Moldova and Romania. In a country of 2.4 million, there are as many as 1 million who have acquired or are applying for Romanian nationality. Moldova’s official language is Romanian, and the two countries have a long-shared history.
Supporters of unification — the unionists — saluted the move; the Moldovenists, who back the preservation of Moldovan statehood, angrily reacted against it.
So why did she raise the issue? Sandu suggested it was an alternative to address the region’s security uncertainties and Moldova’s limited ability for self-protection.
Some opposition forces viewed this statement as a declaration of intent that contradicts the president’s constitutional obligation, as guarantor of Moldova’s sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integration, as prescribed by Article 77. Others saw it as evidence of the government’s economic and reform failures, including the inability to open European Union (EU) accession negotiations because it has been involuntarily bundled with Ukraine, and that issue is subject to a Hungarian veto.
It’s not the first time Sandu has raised the question, but her previous interventions in 2016 and 2018 were made when she was the opposition leader. Almost eight years later, after being re-elected in November 2024 in the teeth of Russian opposition, Sandu has again positioned herself as a believer in the idea of unification.
This timing is not accidental. It is very likely that Chișinău is signaling to Bucharest and Brussels that all options are on the table. While juggling the idea of a unification referendum, Sandu also advocated for EU accession as an independent state, which she notably described as the more realistic path.
Sandu’s comments were not met with much enthusiasm in Romania, where President Nicușor Dan suggested that the two Romanian-speaking states should adopt reunion through Moldova’s EU accession. No reaction has followed yet from Brussels, which may have been caught by surprise. Over the past four years, the EU has provided financial and political support to the Moldovan government, including a €1.9bn ($2.2bn) growth plan that also aims to strengthen security and defense capabilities.
Sandu’s simultaneous pursuit of EU membership while supporting a unification referendum (as allowed by the constitution’s Article 142) raises two key questions.
Firstly, the remarks on unification were not the result of external pressure. The comment came during an interview with British journalists and was intended for the international audience, particularly in Europe. Otherwise, Sandu could have opted to place this issue on the public agenda through local or Romanian channels.
The timing coincided with US-Russia coordination on peace talks in Ukraine and the growing interest among various EU leaders in resuming dialogue with Russia to balance US pressure. These developments leave the Moldovan government, including Sandu, without a discourse that can attract attention.
Any rapprochement between the EU and Russia could undermine Chișinău’s foreign policy, which was almost entirely based on invoking the (very real) Russian threat. Pundits in both Romania and Moldova claim that Sandu’s statement about a unification referendum is preparation for future political competition for the position of the future president of Romania in a reunified country.
Secondly, even if the idea of unification is gaining broader political support in Moldova, realizing it would require a bill passed by a majority in parliament. The ruling Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), aligned with Sandu, could use its 55 votes in the 101-seat parliament to submit such an initiative, gaining an additional six votes from the pro-unification opposition party called Democracy at Home.
Nevertheless, the latest surveys show that only about 29% of the public supports terminating Moldovan statehood in favor of joining Romania. This percentage has remained stable over a long period, despite the understanding that unification would entail immediate EU and NATO membership. The political risks of a referendum are underlined by the 2024 vote on adding EU accession to the constitution, which squeaked through with 49.65% of Moldovans voting against. Such results are far from guaranteed.
Whether the unification debate in Moldova becomes state policy depends on whether a broad majority of Moldovans coalesces.
An even greater possible barrier is the Gagauzian minority. Forged by a very likely pro-independence narrative from Russia (the Kremlin has been paying large sums of money to influence the region), the Gagauzian elites could trigger legal procedures to demand self-determination if Moldova ceases to exist. Unification would also impose costs and administrative pressure on the Romanian state, which is facing a severe budget crunch. Union may one day be possible, but it’s wise not to expect immediate progress.
Denis Cenusa is a Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and an associate expert at the Eastern Europe Studies Centre in Lithuania, and the Expert Group in Moldova. He holds a master’s degree in European Interdisciplinary Studies from the College of Europe (2013). An alumnus of the US Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program (2020), Cenusa completed a fellowship at the Eastern European Studies Center in Vilnius (2022).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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