Russia is not just stealing Ukrainian land and property, it is also stealing people. Its need is urgent. The hunt for able-bodied men and women is a central aim of the Kremlin’s colonial quest because it’s fighting and losing a demographic battle on the home front.
The 3 million or so Ukrainians living in the occupied lands are the target of sustained campaigns to make them “new Russians.” But a captive does not a Russian make. And worse, the Kremlin’s policies are only intensifying the population problem, something that the “new territories” cannot resolve.
The war unleashed by Putin in Ukraine is a battle not for territory but for people, according to the distinguished Bulgarian political scientist, Ivan Krastev. He argued in June that Putin had become obsessed with Russia’s demographic decline during the Covid lockdown. The Kremlin leader ruminated to an audience of children in 2021 that Russia’s population would now be 500 million were it not for the (manmade) catastrophes of the 20th century. (It is now below 150 million and heading south).
Sociologists note that following a more favorable period in the mid-2010’s, the Russian population is once again plunging. This was due to natural demographic trends characteristic of modern societies, as well as reasons specific to Russia. Covid killed at least 820,000 Russians, the worst record in Europe because of a poor health system and because so many refused vaccines; up to a million have chosen exile; and more than 600,000 have been killed and wounded in Ukraine.
Add to that a natural population decline during the period 2017-2024 of approximately 4.15 million. For a ruler focused on population decline, Putin has shown a funny way of addressing the problem.
On the other hand, by occupying Ukrainian territories, Russia initially “repatriated” about 6 million Ukrainian citizens. It is entirely possible that including these people as Russians was one of Putin’s incentives for aggression. While about half have left, many for Ukrainian government-controlled areas, the remainder live a life under constant Russian watch and Kremlin pressure.
Russia’s government is meanwhile treading the familiar path of legislation to produce more babies. This has generated a series of exotic bills designed to “improve the demographic situation.” For example, the Duma recently approved on first reading a bill which bans “childfree propaganda” for which the legislation proposes a fine of up to 5 million rubles ($52,000). In practice, there is no organized propaganda in Russia about refusing to have children, although such measures might affect ordinary people who publicly say that they are not ready to have children. At the same time, experts note that no such prohibition can significantly increase the birthrate.
The Russian Orthodox Church, which is very close to the Kremlin, has also been drumming up support. For example, in the Tversk region all pregnant women in the early stages will be given a letter from Metropolitan Ambrose to dissuade them from having abortions. Not far behind Ambrose are officials in the Voronezh region, who created the Telegram-bot “Za-rozhdeniye” (For birth) in which priests try to dissuade women from having abortions.
Sociologists point out that attempting to improve the demographic situation through war is simply irrational. The majority of the millions of “new Russians” acquired as a result of occupation are pensioners who cannot leave the territories devastated by the war. In the opinion of independent specialists, the net losses resulting from “militant Putinism” will cancel out the effect of the occupation in the next 10 years, at best.
To judge from surveys, Russian citizens today prefer to live one day at a time without making long-term plans. Nearly a third of the population makes plans only a month ahead, and another 29% do not plan for more than a year. The decision to have children requires more time and greater confidence in the future while the turbulent political situation does not at all contribute to the desire to raise a family.
Another way for the population to grow naturally is through migration, but Russia has launched a campaign against migrant workers in recent months. Five anti-immigrant bills were recently introduced in the Duma. According to the new package, a lack of paperwork will become an aggravating factor if migrants fall foul of the law, while the punishments for document forgery and for facilitating illegal migration will be toughened.
There already is a shortage of migrants, experts note. More than half the companies employing foreigners face a shortage, and the lack of workers in the housing and utilities sectors may reach 50%. Chain stores delivering food products encountered an “unprecedented shortage” of staff at the beginning of the year, especially harvesters and couriers. At the same time, Russians will not work in such conditions or for such low wages as migrants from Central Asia.
Meanwhile, men under 35 continue to be sent to the front. Most often, their motivation is not only money, but also a desire to achieve success and status in society — going to war is one of the few goals in life that can realistically be achieved.
Once in the army, they may die in combat, or from violence by fellow soldiers or simply commit other crimes that are increasingly common among the ranks. From January to June 2024 alone, Russian garrison courts sentenced nearly 3,000 servicemen to prison terms, three and a half times more than the first half of 2023.
Kseniya Kirillova is an analyst focused on Russian society, mentality, propaganda, and foreign policy. The author of numerous articles for CEPA and the Jamestown Foundation, she has also written for the Atlantic Council, Stratfor, and others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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