Since January, Ukraine has noticeably hardened its public tone toward Belarus. This toughened rhetoric culminated on June 19 in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s ultimatum to the Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka.
The Ukrainian president gave Minsk a week to deactivate Russian signal boosters on Belarusian territory used to control drones heading toward Ukraine. Zelenskyy added: “If he does not do it, we will.”
Although Lukashenka initially responded to Zelenskyy with his own military threats and personal insults, the Belarusian leader ultimately yielded to Kyiv’s demands. According to Ukrainian intelligence reports, Minsk deactivated the drone control systems on June 22.
On closer inspection, however, Lukashenka’s about-face had actually taken place a week before he gave in — and four days prior to Zelenskyy’s ultimatum. In an interview with the Saudi news outlet Al Arabiya on June 15, he offered a personal apology to Zelenskyy for his past insults and explained his change of heart as follows:
“Belarus — we understand this, which is why we do not want to go to war — is extremely vulnerable militarily if Ukraine attacks Belarus the same way it attacks Russia,” he said. “Because Belarus is in the palm of the Ukrainian military’s hand. We understand perfectly well that our key infrastructure — production and logistics — will be under attack.”
There are, therefore, grounds to assume that Kyiv’s ultimatum to Minsk was conveyed to Lukashenka by the Ukrainian side even before Zelenskyy publicly announced it.
International media and the Belarusian opposition-in-exile were quick to portray this as a defeat for Lukashenka. According to this narrative, much like a pre-fight stare-down in boxing, Lukashenka was the first to blink.
However, the truth is that the actual winner of the climbdown — other than Zelenskyy — was Lukashenka himself.
A central question in international literature on political signaling is how governments can demonstrate resolve during foreign policy crises without appearing to be bluffing, while also dealing with the potential reputational backlash in the domestic political arena should they back down.
Take the 2012 study by Matthew S. Levendusky and Michael C. Horowitz from the University of Pennsylvania, which found that backing away from past threats does not necessarily harm heads of state. On the contrary, it allows them to score points in the domestic arena and portray themselves as poised, prudent politicians choosing peace over war. Provided leaders base this change of course on new (intelligence) information and emphasize that the reversal serves the national interest, they need not fear domestic political repercussions.
Applying these insights to Lukashenka’s U-turn and the reasons he gave for his change of heart suggests the Belarusian dictator has followed this course.
Ukraine’s threat gave Lukashenka the opportunity to bolster his old, famous image among his supporters as the Bat‘ka, a mainly provincial term for father. Events allow the regime to argue that “Bat‘ka Lukashenka” has once again demonstrated his willingness to set aside his ego for the good and prosperity of his people. In doing so, Lukashenka can once again fulfill his obligations under the autocratic social contract — obligations based on the principle of domestic stability in exchange for the denial of political freedoms.
Second, Lukashenka can also position himself in contrast to Putin. Putin chooses war with Ukraine; Lukashenka chooses “peace” with Ukraine. This campaign of dissociation from his Russian counterpart aims to distance his public image from the Kremlin’s inhabitant in the eyes of Western nations, thereby improving relations between Minsk and the West.
Third, such a tactic can signal to the Kremlin that Lukashenka’s hands are tied when it comes to potential Russian demands for Belarusian boots on the ground in Ukraine.
That said, one aspect regarding future Belarus-Ukraine relations remains open to question: How often can this “game” be played out by Lukashenka (and Zelenskyy) without further exacerbating the security situation in Eastern Europe? Should Kyiv issue another ultimatum to Lukashenka in the near future, would the Belarusian autocrat once again play the role of the prudent statesman? There is reason to doubt this.
A repetition would see:
- Lukashenka’s tactic lose its domestic political effectiveness,
- Ukrainian efforts directed at Lukashenka could drive him into Moscow’s protective arms, and
- Might mean that Belarusian territory — situated near NATO’s military Achilles’ heel, the Suwałki Gap — could be used to directly menace NATO territory.
It is therefore in the interests of Ukraine’s Western allies to make it clear to Kyiv that, despite the domestic reputational gains for Zelenskyy, further public ultimatums of this kind directed at Minsk should be avoided.
Boris Ginzburg is completing his doctorate in political science at the Institute for East European Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin. His research focuses on authoritarian politics in the post-Soviet region, non-systemic opposition movements in Russia and Belarus, post-Soviet organized crime, and German and Israeli foreign policy.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
