Snap elections are often a sign of political upheaval – not so for Japan. When Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi dissolved parliament in January and set the stage for elections on February 8, it wasn’t, as in France, a sign of paralysis or weakness.
Rather, it’s a sign of political stability — Takaichi’s popularity is poised to give her center-right LDP party, which was on the verge of collapse before she took over, a landslide, and so continues her honeymoon with the electorate four months after taking office.
As many traditional US allies, most obviously in Europe, grapple with the rebalancing of the relationship with the US, Japan observes the drama with a clear-eyed pragmatism. During the latest tensions with Europe over US ambitions to take sovereignty over Greenland, I was in Tokyo. There I met many officials, experts, journalists, and industry representatives, all of them following unfolding events closely.
There is a collective understanding among Japanese foreign policy and national security thinkers that what happens in Europe, and especially with Russia’s war in Ukraine, will have profound and long-lasting implications for the Indo-Pacific.
Japan is a frontline state facing an increasingly dangerous security environment as it eyes an increasingly militarized China, with its growing willingness to use economic coercion. North Korea, another near-neighbor, behaves as a nuclear state and now acts as a Russian military subcontractor, sending soldiers to fight in Ukraine to satisfy the Kremlin’s needs. Meanwhile, increasingly aggressive moves from Russia and China have included joint military incursions into Japan’s air and maritime domain. Japan is transforming its once-pacifist strategic approach to defense and security in order to adapt and prepare for the future. Defense spending is rising fast from a low level.
Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan began rethinking its approach to security, self-defense, and rearmament by legalizing collective defense through a reinterpretation of its constitution. That strategic shift has carried through the administrations that followed, culminating in the former Prime Minister Kishida’s address to the US Congress in April 2024, where he linked the security environment of Europe to the Indo-Pacific: “Ukraine of today may be East Asia of tomorrow.”
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, a disciple of the assassinated Abe, has continued the former premier’s legacy of focusing on defense and security, with the country now set to meet its defense spending target of 2% by March, two years earlier than the original goal. A reenergized defense industry is also picking up the signals, looking at the success of South Korea’s defense exports and fast-increasing defense spending in Europe, while warily watching the rise of Beijing’s subsidized companies.
For anyone visiting this frontline Indo-Pacific state, it is apparent there is a cool clarity that national interest must be prioritized, as it manages a more unpredictable United States, and a Europe tempted to deepen engagement with an increasingly aggressive and ambitious China.
But how? The majority view, as described to me, is to prioritize the US relationship and maintain the status quo that has ensured Japan’s security since World War II. The US is critical and is Japan’s main treaty ally.
That was only underlined by the new US National Security Strategy (NSS), which states that the US will “harden and strengthen our military presence in the Western Pacific,” but also stresses that much more of the military burden must be shouldered by Japan.
As a non-nuclear state, Japan depends on the US to maintain strategic deterrence against China and a nuclear North Korea. Multiple administrations have focused on the US-Japan relationship. Abe recognized the importance of this relationship for Japan’s security and spent considerable time building a rapport with President Trump. Takaichi is following in her mentor’s footsteps by leveraging the shared bond with Abe to connect with Trump and maintain the US-Japan alliance.
The need to build a wider network of partners is recognized by the country’s strategic thinkers. Increasingly, Japan has been bolstering partnerships with countries like Australia, India, the Philippines, and ASEAN Nations to counter China’s growing military and economic influence. It is undertaking a multi-billion-dollar effort to build a sixth-generation combat aircraft with the UK and Italy.
As China is both Japan’s greatest security challenge and its largest trade partner, building deeper economic relationships with like-minded allies is essential. It cannot, of course, force countries in the region to choose a side, but instead, there is a pragmatic approach to seeking out mutually beneficial areas of cooperation.
Not everyone is convinced the status quo can be saved. While I was in Tokyo, an op-ed was making the rounds by Nikkei columnist Hiroyuki Akita (whom I also had the chance to meet) that imagined the world without the West. While still a minority view, as he told me, a debate is stirring on whether reliance on the US as the sole guarantor of Japan’s security is sustainable. One reason for the skepticism was the muted US public response to China’s retaliation against Japan following the new Prime Minister’s comments on Taiwan last year.
This is one lesson some are taking from the tensions in the US-Europe relationship — that traditional alliances may not be as stable as previously thought. NATO, after all, is the most deeply intertwined defense and security alliance in the world, but as one European colleague told me, “NATO is just a piece of paper” in many European minds now. While that may not be true — after all, the US is still the largest contributor to NATO and has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to Article 5 — perceptions often make reality. So if NATO can be questioned, the thinking goes, what does that mean for other alliances? Nothing seems sacred.
The answer is reminiscent of Europe’s path toward “strategic autonomy.” It would mean that Japan must become far more independent when it comes to defense capability and capacity, and potentially open the door to reconsidering its nuclear weapons-free policy. While this comparatively hawkish view is still far from being absorbed by decision-makers, the fact that it is being discussed and debated openly reflects a major shift in strategic thinking.
Japan struck me as a country that understands exactly where it sits in the world, politically and diplomatically. As the world’s fourth-largest economy, Japan is aware how its geopolitical standing is affected by struggles with long-term economic stagnation, an aging population, and a malaise amongst younger generations who have only experienced a country in stagnation.
But it is exactly this pragmatism and clarity about immediate and long-term threats that make it stand out, and ready to make the radical adjustments that may follow if the US backs away from its old role as the world’s dominant security power.
Dr. Alina Polyakova is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as the Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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