It’s very difficult to understand the progress of a military operation, even if you’re there. If you’re somewhere else, it’s even tougher, given that both sides highlight success and downplay failure. When, for example, was the outcome and significance of the Battle of the Bulge understood? It took a while.
So it’s early to declare Kursk a success or failure, or even a draw. Even so, there are signs emerging from reliable analytical sources that Ukraine’s operation is having at least some effect on its most important aim — to siphon Russian forces from Eastern Ukraine to Kursk and so weaken its successful offensive in Donbas.
Estimates suggest there is a substantial movement of forces into Kursk Oblast. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) cites Ukrainian estimates that troop numbers rose to around 40,000 from about 11,000 at the start of the incursion. The Ukrainians say another 20,000 are on the way.
ISW stated that Ukraine has “forced the Russian military command to redeploy elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.”
It’s unclear how many of those additional men would otherwise have been deployed near Russia’s target towns of Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and other settlements, but there is evidence that at least some have been diverted. Elements of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, for example, which has been fighting near Pokrovsk, have been identified in Kursk.
Russia has committed significant forces to retake towns seized by Ukraine in Kursk, including deploying naval infantry and elite airborne units. These efforts have faced stiff resistance from Ukraine’s highly mobile special operations forces, who have played a critical role in repelling Russian advances and launching counterattacks.
Reports indicate that Ukraine continues to occupy over 100 settlements and hold significant ground, while Russian forces have struggled to mount a coordinated response, slowed by the long distances involved and competing demands across the 600-mile front line in Ukraine. It has recaptured some ground, but not much.
Ukraine’s approach in Kursk has been characterized by ambushes, precision strikes, and small-unit tactics, leveraging their familiarity with asymmetric warfare. This style of warfare has allowed Ukraine to disrupt Russian supply routes, especially by targeting infrastructure such as bridges and roads in the Kursk region.
Ukrainian forces have also seized opportunities to weaken Russian defenses through drone strikes and long-range missile attacks. The destruction of several bridges over the Seym River has further complicated Russian efforts to organize a cohesive defense. Ukrainian special operators also destroyed one of Russia’s largest stockpiles of artillery and missiles in a cataclysmic explosion on September 17 estimated at upward of 1.8 kilotons — causing a blast wave felt nearly 200 miles away and registering around three on the Richter scale.
Despite some Russian territorial gains in Eastern Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk, its progress has slowed in recent days, and it would be extraordinary if it were otherwise.
While Russia now offers huge sign-up bonuses for recruits, it is struggling to maintain its forces at its current strength and faces a deeply embarrassing occupation of its territory by a neighbor. Putin may not want to fall into the Ukrainian trap, but he may have no choice. Even 60,000 troops probably won’t be enough to evict the Ukrainian army.
Ukrainian special operations forces are critical to the operation in Kursk. These elite units, trained in unconventional warfare, have excelled at quick strikes, gathering intelligence, and destabilizing Russian lines.
Their successes in ambushing Russian columns, destroying supply convoys, and obliterating munition and oil depots have contributed to Ukraine's ability to hold territory despite Russian attempts at recapturing key locations. In addition, Ukrainian intelligence has been vital in identifying high-value Russian targets, leading to precision strikes that further sap the morale of Russian troops
The operations serve a dual purpose: not only do they directly affect the battlefield by eroding Russian military strength, but they also act as psychological warfare. The knowledge that Russian forces are unable to secure their own territory has contributed to growing discontent. As many as 150,000 Russian civilians have fled the region, leaving behind a vacuum that Ukraine has started to fill by establishing administrative control over several towns. These actions signal Ukraine's intention to maintain a long-term presence in Kursk.
The Kremlin finds itself in a difficult position. State-controlled media has struggled to craft a cohesive narrative about the incursion, often downplaying the severity of the situation. However, the ongoing fighting — and Ukraine’s ability to hold ground — has damaged Putin’s image domestically. The symbolic and strategic importance of Kursk to Russia, given its proximity to Ukraine and its role as a logistical hub, adds to the pressure on Moscow to reverse Ukraine’s gains.
What might Ukraine do next? First, it could expand information operations by broadcasting more aggressively into Russian-controlled areas, highlighting Russian military failures and Ukraine’s humanitarian efforts in occupied regions. This could sow further discord among the Russian population, especially as economic hardships from the war increase.
Second, Ukraine could leverage its control over certain territories to facilitate defections from Russian forces. The surrender of hundreds of Russian troops indicates a level of disillusionment that Ukraine could exploit through promises of safety and humane treatment. Encouraging desertions and defections could accelerate the weakening of Russian military morale.
Finally, Ukraine’s ability to continue precision strikes deep within Russian territory while simultaneously defending the areas they have captured will be crucial.
Keeping the pressure on Russian supply lines, key military infrastructure, and command centers will stretch Russian forces even thinner, making it more difficult for the Kremlin to mount successful counteroffensives in the coming months. The longer Ukraine can hold Kursk, the greater the political and military risk for Moscow.
Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves as Chair of the Advisory Committee for No One Left Behind.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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