As an example of 21st century aero-design, the Su-57 may have won some hearts during its first public overseas appearance at Airshow 2024 in China. Aviation enthusiasts and military analysts got a rare up-close look at the fighter jet and its sleek lines. But the real audience for new military aircraft are its pilots, and those of the enemies who may confront it in combat, and they may have more mixed feelings. The aircraft faces significant questions about its effectiveness in modern air combat and Russia’s broader military priorities.
The SU-57 Felon is a product of Russia’s continued emphasis on hyper-maneuverability. This is rooted in a Cold War-era belief that close-range dogfighting capabilities are paramount. While agility remains a valuable asset for any air-to-air fighter, the modern battlefield has evolved significantly. Most air engagements now occur beyond visual range (BVR), where factors such as stealth, sensor range, and advanced missile capabilities are critical.
Stealth, in particular, is an area where the SU-57 seemingly falls short compared to its Western counterparts. Effective stealth design reduces an aircraft’s radar cross-section (RCS), allowing it to avoid detection and gain the upper hand in longer-range engagements. However, the Felon reportedly has a radar profile similar to that of fourth-generation non-stealth aircraft.
This undermines its ability to remain undetected in contested airspace, a key requirement for modern air dominance. In contrast, US fighters like the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II have been engineered with advanced stealth features that significantly reduce their radar profile, enhancing their survivability and effectiveness.
The SU-57 also lags on radar capability. Air superiority in modern conflicts depends heavily on the ability to detect, track, and engage adversaries at long distances. The radar systems on the SU-57, while advanced by Russian standards, are considered inferior to Western equivalents in both range and resolution. Moreover, the F-22 and F-35 are designed as part of a network linked to other systems beyond the airframe, allowing these aircraft to fight (and win) as part of a far more robust and capable team.
This technological gap stems from systemic issues within Russia’s defense sector, where innovation is often hampered by outdated infrastructure and limited access to cutting-edge research and development.
Moreover, effective beyond visual range combat relies not only on stealth and radar but also on advanced missile technology. Here, too, the SU-57 demonstrates significant limitations. Aside from the R37M Axehead, which is designed to target less-maneuverable bombers and cruise missiles, Russia has struggled to develop air-to-air missile systems that can match Western weapons in terms of agility, range, and reliability — many of the purportedly “advanced” systems for the Felon are still in development.
The pace and effectiveness of these efforts remain questionable. The Kremlin’s financial constraints and ongoing war in Ukraine have only exacerbated these issues, diverting resources away from critical, advanced defense projects.
The SU-57 project’s production figures also paint a bleak picture. Despite being in development for over a decade, Russia has only managed to produce a limited number of these aircraft, with estimates suggesting fewer than 20 have been completed.
This is starkly contrasted with the scores of F-35s that have been produced and deployed by multiple NATO countries, with the 1,000th airframe recently rolled off the assembly line. The SU-57 has also been marred by accidents and losses. Reports indicate that several have been lost due to technical failures and even Ukrainian strikes, a testament to both the aircraft’s airfield vulnerability and the shifting dynamics of the current conflict.
This limited production and subpar performance have led many experts to view the SU-57 as more of a propaganda tool than a genuine step forward in air combat capabilities. The aircraft serves as a showcase for Russia’s technological aspirations and as a means to promote foreign sales, rather than a reliable addition to its own air force. Once a partner in the Felon project, India withdrew from the effort in 2018 amid ballooning costs and shrinking capabilities.
The focus on flashy, hyper-maneuverable designs — without adequately addressing stealth, sensor integration, and missile technology — suggests that Russia’s military-industrial complex remains entrenched in outdated priorities.
Of course, the Russian air force remains a serious threat with hundreds of antiquated Soviet-era aircraft, requiring vigilance and continued defense development by the West.
The ultimate measure of any weapon system lies in its effectiveness in combat. As it stands, the SU-57’s deficiencies in stealth, sensor range, and missile capability — combined with its limited production and reliability issues — indicate that it is unlikely to fulfill its intended role as a game-changing fighter.
Instead, it may join the long list of Russian superoruzhie (super weapons) that fail to live up to their billing, serving primarily as a tool of propaganda rather than of practical warfare.
Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves as Chair of the Advocacy Committee for No One Left Behind.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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