“China is developing by leaps and bounds, at a fast pace, very confidently,” beamed Vladimir Putin at a March press conference. “I am sure that in the coming years, we will only strengthen and build up our relations and achieve common successes for the benefit of the Chinese and Russian people.”
Honeyed words were likewise used during the two leaders’ summit in Beijing on May 16. “‘I love you more‘, ‘No, I love you more‘,” as one publication mischievously explained the public relationship.
That same spirit suffused Russian reporting on Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Europe, which portrayed the Chinese Communist Party general secretary as a conquering hero. “The Chinese have subtly humiliated America,” boasted News-Front, a Donbas tabloid. “Xi Jinping humiliated Macron,” exclaimed state-run RT. “[T]he bright anti-American symbolism of Xi Jinping’s actions demonstrates the uncompromising approach of China to the current Democratic administration in Washington,” proclaimed Duma deputy Nikolai Valuev.
But as Russia has tripped over itself to laud China, within China the response has been closer to indifference. China is making it increasingly clear that Russia will be a junior partner in the relationship, and Russian officialdom seems grateful to have any partner at all.
According to data provided by Omelas, an AI and OSINT firm where the author is chief technology officer, the top story related to Russia in China over the past week concerned the birth of a tiger cub whose mother hailed from Siberia. Chinese sources published twice as many pieces on Serbia as on Russia.
Since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, he and Putin have formed a special bond. As of October 2023, Xi had held meetings with Putin 42 times, more than any other five heads of state combined. Shortly after Xi’s election, Putin announced a “Pivot to the East,” pursued far more aggressively after the West imposed sanctions for Russia’s previous invasion of Ukraine in 2014. That year, European banks issued loans to Russia worth twice as much as those from Chinese counterparts. Within four years, the ratio was reversed.
But the full-scale invasion, and the unprecedented sanctions implemented by the West in response, put the process into overdrive. China has proven an eager buyer of Russian raw materials, especially hydrocarbons, and an eager seller of manufactured goods essential to the Russian war effort. According to a Russian economics think tank, China’s share of Russia’s trade has increased from 15% to 35% in just the past three years.
This transition has seen China, and Xi in particular, assume the role of savior from “Western oppression” in the eyes of Russian officials who fawned over Xi’s European visit. Xi visited Belgrade on the 25th anniversary of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy, which Russians still hold as proof of the alliance’s lawlessness. He responded forcefully to President Macron’s charge that China was aiding Russia. He shared the stage with Viktor Orbán as the Hungarian premier announced his support for China’s 12-point peace plan. That plan, released over a year ago, would essentially codify a Ukrainian surrender — removing that country’s right to join NATO and leaving Russia in control of large areas of Ukraine.
The timing was auspicious, coinciding both with Putin’s inauguration and with Victory Day, both occasions for Putin to denounce Europe, including the historic claim that it was in fact Europe, rather than the Soviet Union, that allied with Hitler in the early years of World War II. Almost immediately after Putin’s inauguration, the Russian president announced his first foreign visit would be to China.
Russia’s ambitions are extensive. Mikhail Mishustin, in his first public remarks after being confirmed again as prime minister, called for a free trade zone with China. Meanwhile, Putin has promised to devote his current chairmanship of the BRICS grouping to develop a framework for AI opposed to the West, which, given the state of member countries’ technology, means one developed by and for China.
And yet even Putin must be aware that when dealing with China, whose national output is 10 times greater than Russia’s, the likelihood is that it will become not a partner but a vassal.
Ben Dubow is a Nonresident Fellow at CEPA and the founder of Omelas, a security firm that tracks authoritarian influence online.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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