When Russia growls, smaller countries quail. That, at least, is what the Kremlin expects. But when its deputy envoy to the United Nations, Dmitry Polansky, summoned the Czech permanent representative there to an emergency meeting of the Security Council to hear a complaint about Ukraine’s alleged use of Czech-made rocket launchers to strike the Russian city of Belgorod, the reaction from Prague was forthright.
“We refuse to be summoned anywhere by Russia. Czechia will not serve the lie-poisoned propaganda of the aggressor. When Russia wants to discuss the withdrawal of its occupying troops…, we will be happy to come,” tweeted Jan Lipavský, the Czech foreign minister. Polansky’s response was to accuse the Czechs of “cowardice and shortsightedness” for refusing to turn up. (This bizarre description of a brave decision makes me fear that Polansky’s dictionary may have gone missing: anyone who finds it should return it to 136 East 67 Street, New York, NY)
Lipavský’s colleague in Warsaw, Radosław Sikorski, now starting his second stint as Poland’s chief diplomat, lost no time in making Kyiv his first foreign trip last month. “The time of European empires is in the past,” he said there, calling Russia’s aggression against Ukraine “the last colonial war in Europe.” The bipartisan consensus in Poland about the outcome was that “Russia should lose, and Ukraine should win.”
Next door in Lithuania, Gabrielius Landsbergis was in a similar vein, lambasting the West for its habit of treating Russia as “tomorrow’s problem” rather than today’s. “For nearly 25 years, we have been kicking [the] can down the road, trying to contain Putin’s imperialism with dialogue and diplomacy while he continues to ignore borders and flatten cities,” the Lithuanian foreign minister lamented in a strongly worded social media post.
These three countries have first-hand experience of Kremlin imperialism: occupation, annexation, and partition. Yet they are not afraid to speak bluntly. Indeed, it is because of their history that they are so aware of the dangers ahead. If Ukraine is pulverized, the Kremlin’s appetite will not abate, it will increase. As Landsbergis puts it, failure to defeat Russia means we are choosing “to suffer unimaginable and unnecessary losses” later.
The fearless words of these “Three Musketeers” contrast sharply with the timidity and defeatism that has been seeping through some Western chancelleries in recent weeks. True, some other politicians say brave and sensible things. The New Year message from the outgoing Finnish president, Sauli Niinisto, deserves a mention here. Romania, once seen as flaky, is now one of the most reliable countries on the eastern flank. British politicians stick firmly to their country’s strong message. But it would be hard to imagine similarly musketeerish words coming from the White House, the office of German chancellor Olaf Scholz, or from Emmanuel Macron’s Élysée Palace.
This squishiness is infectious. The failure of most big Western allies to maintain firm rhetorical pressure on Russia encourages smaller ones to follow suit. In countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, foreign policy thinking is finely (perhaps too finely) tuned to Washington. Elsewhere in Europe, the Franco-German tempo sets the beat.
So far, this represents a wobble, not a change of course. But it is ominous, nonetheless. With a long slog looming on the Ukrainian battlefield in 2024, and at least the possibility of a calamitous upheaval in transatlantic security following the US presidential election, European countries should be more focused on the dangers they face, not less.
It may not bother them (though it should) that Ukrainians pay in blood, tears, and rubble for their dithering. But at least their own security should concentrate their minds. Where’s D’Artagnan?
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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