In recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s key strategic partners in Europe, serving as a showcase for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its broader geopolitical ambitions.
With more than $10bn worth of projects launched in just 15 years, the economic footprint of China in Serbia is undeniable. But with this influx of Chinese capital and infrastructure comes a more complicated reality — one in which economic growth, authoritarian entrenchment, and international diplomacy are deeply intertwined.
“There are undisputed benefits that can be seen in the hard infrastructural development,” says Stefan Vladisavljev, a program coordinator of the non-governmental organization Foundation Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, and an expert on Chinese presence in Central and Eastern Europe.
“There’s a vast network of projects developed in a very short space of time, and that would not have happened without China,” he says.
From highways and bridges to energy plants and railways, Chinese-financed construction projects have transformed Serbia’s physical landscape. For many Serbians, this tangible development has helped foster a favorable view of China.
“It has created a context in which China has become quite popular because they are being seen as an actor who is willing to facilitate the economic development of Serbia without asking for much in return,” Vladisavljev notes.
However, that “no-strings-attached” approach hides a more complex truth. While Beijing’s investments have fueled growth, they’ve also entrenched a system in which transparency and accountability are largely absent.
“We have no idea what the actual terms are within these agreements with the Chinese,” Vladisavljev warns. “It is very much a governmental process; it utilizes the institutes of the international agreements, making them pretty much immune to any due diligence.”
With a parliament that acts more as a rubber stamp than a check on executive power, contracts with China are often ratified without public debate or scrutiny. This lack of transparency — combined with China’s symbolic and material support — has allowed the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) to strengthen its grip on power.
“China has provided the politicians in power what they need to create a context where they hold undisputed power in Serbia,” Vladisavljev explains.
That support has proved valuable to a government increasingly accused of democratic backsliding, with ongoing protests in Belgrade underscoring just how autocratic the regime has become, despite winning the last election.
The protests began when the Chinese-financed Novi Sad railway station canopy collapsed in November, killing 16 people. Demonstrators have been angered by the long-standing belief that Serbian misgovernment is related to official corruption and media censorship.
Ultimately, the Chinese role in Serbia illustrates the delicate dance between economic development and democratic erosion. In his view, the problem isn’t just domestic; it’s compounded by the passivity of the international community.
“I’m not saying that China is making Serbia a more authoritarian country,” Vladisavljev explains. “You would not expect Russia or China to criticize Vučić for undermining democratic values, but you would expect it from Brussels or Washington. At the very least, they should call out the use of brute force against peaceful protesters.”
Still, Serbia’s aspirations to join the European Union may ultimately compel a shift.
“To join the EU, we need to align with norms, standards, rules, and regulations,” Vladisavljev explains. “That will probably reduce Chinese influence in some areas, but it doesn’t mean we’ll sever political ties with Beijing.”
Vladisavljev’s perspective is echoed by Douglas Brenton Anderson, Editor-in-Chief of European Guanxi — an EU-China-focused think tank. However, Brenton Anderson takes it a step further, arguing that Serbia will need to completely reverse its current policies toward Beijing in order to achieve EU accession.
On the frequently raised issue of debt-trap diplomacy, often cited within criticism of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Vladisavljev strikes a more measured tone.
“Debt trap, for me, shouldn’t be seen as one of the challenges. We owe the Chinese, the West, and the IMF,” he says. “The real concern is the lack of transparency—the fact that we don’t know the premises on which these deals are made. They’re treated as international agreements, immune from public scrutiny or proper due diligence.”
As Serbia balances its growing partnership with Beijing against its long-standing EU aspirations, one question looms large: at what cost does economic development come — and who ultimately pays the price?
Éanna Mackey is a reporter based in Ireland with a background in geopolitics and economics. He has worked as a freelancer on post-conflict stories in both Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he was an ICFJ Investigative Fellow in 2024.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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