“We must deliver a new era of European security,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said as she set out the bloc’s priorities for 2026, unaware that within weeks Washington would underline the seriousness of its intentions in its own backyard by seizing President Nicolas Maduro and restating its intent to take the Danish Arctic territory.
Von der Leyen’s declaration, on December 18, underlined the central challenge facing the continent at a time when execution matters more than intent, and delivery more than reassurance. Europe has been getting better at words and analysis, but often falls short on action.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Europe enters 2026 with unprecedented defense budget commitments from some of its capitals, an increasingly militarized Russia, and a transatlantic relationship that is increasingly unreliable.
Expectation and outright fear is rising among allies, adversaries, and European publics, testing the continent’s capacity to meet them. The question is no longer whether its governments understand the threats but whether they can translate intent into action at a pace the strategic environment demands.
Europe’s defense transformation is now constrained by a lack of coherence as well as a shortage of money.
The money really matters. And while some countries, most notably Germany, Poland and the Nordic-Baltic eight, are making very significant spending increases right now, some are moving at a leisurely speed more suited to the more peaceful years of the 2010s than the fluid and sometimes alarming 2020s. Britain and France, in particular, are making promises about a stabilization force for Ukraine that they will struggle to meet with their currently underfunded militaries. Both nations are heavily indebted, and both are stronger on defense rhetoric than on spending reality.
Europe now has two types of defense policy; while many European NATO allies have committed to historically high targets, reversing decades of underinvestment, others argue they can only meet the 5% alliance spending target by 2035.
There are other challenges too. Better funded forces will also need to fight together, move quickly, and sustain operations.
Multinational systems must function seamlessly across national and institutional boundaries, and interoperability will be a key criterion of success. It will require common technical standards, shared data architecture, and procurement discipline, without which Europe risks building parallel capabilities that look impressive on paper but fail under operational stress.
The continent’s capitals must also be able to share data in real time, move forces and supplies through resilient logistics networks, and execute decisions quickly across borders, even under cyber pressure and in contested environments. Deterrence will rest on whether Europe can operate as one single system.
Total defense, integrating military planning with civilian infrastructure, private-sector capacity, and societal resilience, should therefore be a strategic imperative. The private sector is indispensable, not only for defense production but for dual-use technologies, transport, energy, and communications.
As Europe accelerates military production, it must treat industrial facilities as a security priority. Expanded output creates new vulnerabilities, including the risk of sabotage (as with a 2024 German defense company fire attributed to Russia), cyber intrusion, and covert disruption — see the attack on Poland’s railways in November. European societies must also be confident that their governments can respond decisively to threats, and slow, ambiguous, or minimal reactions invite repetition.
Continuous Russian military incursions into NATO airspace, violations of Estonian territory, and credible reporting of contingency planning against Poland, for example, are not isolated incidents. Treating them as such creates strategic blind spots and leaves a vacuum for Moscow to exploit.
Public reassurance is a strategic necessity. Only if citizens believe Europe can and will defend its borders can an all-government and all-society approach take root. That means confronting understandable political hesitation about making the electorate nervous, but Russia’s growing shadow war campaign simply makes such considerations out of date.
The need for greater European strategic independence from the US is no longer theoretical as Washington’s defense posture increasingly treats Russia as a manageable regional problem rather than an existential threat. Moscow’s own rhetoric tells a different story, framing the war in Ukraine as a “fiery” civilizational struggle with the West.
A ceasefire or “peace deal” in Ukraine would not end the threat, as Russia’s economy has been reoriented toward war, with roughly 40% of resources devoted to the military. Its forces are learning, adapting, and mobilized for the long term; any pause in fighting would likely mark a period of instability ahead of further conflict.
This reality reinforces the importance of continued support for Kyiv, but Europe must reframe this assistance as pragmatic self-defense. Only if Russia is decisively weakened in Ukraine will it lack the capability and the will to threaten the rest of Europe. This means action is vital on frozen Russian sovereign assets, and arms production must outpace Russia’s to sustain Ukrainian forces and secure Europe’s own readiness. The €90bn ($105bn) European Union (EU) loan to Ukraine is a decent start, but merely defers hard decisions to 2028.
Military preparedness alone will not suffice. Europe faces intensified hybrid pressure aimed at eroding political cohesion through disinformation, cyber operations, and the financing of populist movements to undermine democratic resilience.
It needs hybrid deterrence, with clear thresholds, credible response options, and the political will to use them. Ambiguity will invite escalation as surely as weakness.
The most significant test for the EU is the quality and durability of its proposed security guarantees for Ukraine. Von der Leyen said the EU has “pretty precise plans” for the possible military deployments to Ukraine as part of post-conflict security guarantees, but while talks on the UK-French led force have moved forward, there is not yet much detail on how it will operate and what its rules of engagement may be.
The European Commission will also pay to train Ukrainian soldiers and encourage member states to use the €150bn loans-for-arms fund for joint production agreements with Ukrainian defense companies.
Peace is not on the horizon, and the sooner this reality is accepted by policymakers and the public, the stronger Europe’s deterrence posture will be. 2026 will be decisive because it will reveal whether Europe can sustain strategic seriousness over time.
Supporting Ukraine remains the central test, militarily, financially, and diplomatically. Europe must resist pressures for a premature settlement on unfavorable terms that would weaken both Kyiv and European security. At the same time, it must prove that its ambitious defense plans can move from paper to practice.
Europe has the resources, the industrial base, and the technological expertise to secure itself. What it lacks is consistent confidence and the political discipline to act on the reality that its security ultimately depends on its own choices.
Margaryta Khvostova is a PhD Candidate in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Surrey, and a PhD Fellow at the Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE).
Professor Amelia Hadfield is Head of the Department of Politics, Founding Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE), and Associate Vice President of External Engagement at the University of Surrey.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End
Russia’s Shadow Warfare
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
